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3Executive Summary
This report documents the results of the Department of
Energy, Office of Basic Energy Sciences (BES) Workshop
on Basic Research Needs to Counter Terrorism.  This two-
day Workshop, held in Gaithersburg, MD, on February 28
and March 1, 2002, brought together BES research partic-
ipants and experts familiar with counter-terrorism tech-
nologies, strategies, and policies.  The purpose of the
workshop was to: (1) identify direct connections between
technology needs for countering terrorism and the critical,
underlying science issues that will impact our ability to
address those needs and (2) recommend investment strate-
gies that will increase the impact of basic research on our
nation’s efforts to counter terrorism.
The workshop focused on science and technology chal-
lenges associated with our nation’s need to detect, pre-
vent, protect against, and respond to terrorist attacks
involving Radiological and Nuclear, Chemical, and
Biological threats.  While the organizers and participants
of this workshop recognize that the threat of terrorism is
extremely broad, including food and water safety as well
as protection of our public infrastructure, we necessarily
limited the scope of our discussions to the principal
weapons of mass destruction. 
In order to set the stage for the discussions of critical sci-
ence and technology challenges, the workshop began with
keynote and plenary lectures that provided a realistic con-
text for understanding the broad challenges of countering
terrorism.  The plenary speakers emphasized the socio-
political complexity of terrorism problems, reinforced the
need for basic research in addressing these problems, and
provided critical advice on how basic research can best
contribute to our nation’s needs.  Their advice highlighted
the need to:
▲ Invest Strategically – Focus on Cross-Cutting
Research that has the potential to have an impact on
a broad set of technology needs, thereby providing
the greatest return on the research investment.
▲ Build Team Efforts – Countering terrorism will
require broad, collaborative teams.  The research
community should focus on:  (1) Research
Environments and Infrastructures that encourage
and enable cross-disciplinary science and technology
teams to explore and integrate new scientific discov-
eries and (2) Exploring Relationships with Other
Programs that will strengthen connections between
new scientific advances and those groups responsible
for technology development and implementation.
▲ Consider Dual Use – Identify areas of research that
present significant Dual-Use Opportunities for
application to countering terrorism and other 
complementary technology needs.
The during the workshop, participants identified several
critical technology needs and the underlying science chal-
lenges that, if met, can help to reduce the threat of terrorist
attacks in the United States.  Some of the key technology
needs and limitations that were identified include:
Detection –  Nonintrusive, stand-off, and imaging 
detection systems; sampling from complex backgrounds
and environments; inexpensive and field-deployable 
sensor systems; highly selective and ultra-sensitive detec-
tors; early warning triggers for continuous monitoring 
Prevention – Methods and materials to control, track, and
reduce the availability of hazardous materials; techniques
to rapidly characterize and attribute the source of terrorist
threats
Protection – Personal protective equipment; light-weight
barrier materials and fabrics; filtration systems; explosive
containment structures; methods to protect people, animals,
crops, and public spaces 
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Response –   Coupled models and measurements that can
predict fate and transport of toxic materials including pre-
event background data; pre-symptomatic and point of care
medical diagnostics; methods to immobilize and neutralize
hazardous materials including self-cleaning and self-
decontaminating surfaces
The workshop discussions of these technology needs and
the underlying science challenges are fully documented in
the major sections of this report.  The results of these dis-
cussions, combined with the broad perspective and advice
from our plenary speakers, were used to develop a set of
high-level workshop recommendations.  The following
recommendations are offered to help guide our nation’s
basic research investments in order to maximize our 
ability to reduce the threat of terrorism.
▲ We recommend continuing or increasing funding for
a selected set of research directions that are identi-
fied in the Workshop Summary and
Recommendations (Section 5) of this report.  These
areas of research underpin many of the technologies
that have high probability to impact our nation’s
ability to counter terrorism.
▲ New programs should be supported to stimulate the
formation of, and provide needed resources for,
cross-disciplinary and multi-institutional teams of sci-
entists and technologists that are needed to address
these critical problems.  An important component of
this strategy is investment in DOE national laborato-
ries and user facilities because they can provide an
ideal environment to carry out this highly collabora-
tive work.
▲ Governmental organizations and agencies should
explore their complementary goals and capabilities
and, where appropriate, work to develop agreements
that facilitate the formation of multi-organizational
teams and the sharing of research and technology
capabilities that will improve our nation’s ability to
counter the threat of terrorism.
▲ Increased emphasis should be placed on identifying
dual-use applications for key counter-terrorism tech-
nologies.  Efforts should be focused on building part-
nerships between government, university, and indus-
try to capitalize on these opportunities. 
In summary, this workshop made significant progress in
identifying the basic research needs and in outlining a
strategy to enhance the research community’s ability to
impact our nation’s counter-terrorism needs.  We wish to
acknowledge the enthusiasm and hard work of all the
workshop participants.  Their extraordinary contributions
were key to the success of this workshop, and their dedi-
cation to this endeavor provides strong evidence that the
basic research community is firmly committed to support-
ing our nation’s goal of reducing the threat of terrorism in
the United States.
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This report documents the presentations, discussions, and
recommendations from the Department of Energy / Office
of Basic Energy Sciences (BES) Workshop on Basic
Research Needs to Counter Terrorism.  The workshop,
which was held on February 28 and March 1, 2002, in
Gaithersburg, Maryland, identified the critical science
issues and opportunities in research areas supported by
BES that will be important to our nation's ability to
detect, prevent, protect against, and respond to terrorist
threats in the United States. 
While terrorism is not new to the international community,
events in recent years such as the 1993 bombing of the
World Trade Center and the attack on the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 have
shown that assets on United States soil have also become
targets for terrorist activities.  Most recently, the
September 11 suicide attacks resulted in the deaths of
more than 3,000 civilians.  These devastating events have
focused the attention of the entire world and caused the
United States to launch a War on Terrorism.  A major
response to these terrorist events has been the formation
of the Office of Homeland Security to develop, coordi-
nate, and implement a comprehensive national strategy to
detect, prevent, protect against, and respond to terrorist
attacks within the United States.
This nation’s strengths in basic science research are
expected to play an important role in the initiative to
counter the threat of terrorism.  In his speech before the
American Association for the Advancement of Science in
December 2001, Dr. John H. Marburger III, Director of
the White House Office of Science and Technology
Policy, stated, “Science and engineering have critical roles
to play in the war on terrorism.”  He went on to indicate,
“We need improved tools with which to prevent, detect,
protect, and treat victims of chemical biological, radiolog-
ical, nuclear, and conventional terrorist attacks.
Additionally, we will need new and improved tools to
recover facilities from those same types of attacks, should
they ever occur.”
As a leading supporter of basic science research, the
Office of Basic Energy Sciences convened a workshop to
understand better how fields of research that it supports
can meet our nation’s needs to counter terrorism.  This
workshop involved participants from the BES research
community (including scientists from national laboratories
and universities), experts in the technologies, strategies,
and policies used to counter terrorism, and representatives
from several other governmental agencies and organiza-
tions.  Appendix I gives a list of participants in the inten-
sive two-day workshop.
There are many examples where basic science research
and resulting technology can impact the ability to detect,
prevent, protect against, and respond to terrorism.  For
example, sensors, detectors, chem lab on a chip, and
atomic and molecular spectroscopy could all be important
to the Detection of terrorism.  Prevention of terrorist acts
could be enhanced through improved methods for con-
trolling and tracking radiological materials and the devel-
opment of new manufacturing methods that minimize the
creation of hazardous industrial chemicals.  Likewise,
Protection against terrorism could be increased through
improved filters and membranes and the development of
new protective fabrics, while improvements in our ability
to Respond to a terrorist event could be made by develop-
ing methods to immobilize and neutralize hazardous
materials.  
The goal of this workshop was to identify direct con-
nections between technology needs for countering terror-
ism and the critical, underlying science issues that will
impact our ability to address those needs. 
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To set the stage for the discussions of critical science and
technology challenges, the workshop began with keynote
and plenary lectures that provided a realistic context for
understanding the broad challenges of countering terrorism: 
▲ Dr. Jay Davis, National Security Fellow at the Center
for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory (LLNL), provided the keynote
lecture entitled “The Role of Science and
Technology in Countering Terrorism.”  Dr. Davis
spent three years prior to returning to LLNL as
founding director of the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency of the Department of Defense.  His presen-
tation stressed the overall socio-political complexity
of the terrorism problem.  
▲ Dr. Micheal R. Anastasio, Deputy Director for
Strategic Operations at LLNL, lectured on “Counter
Terrorism and Long-Range R&D Needs.”  Dr.
Anastasio serves on the National Academy of
Sciences Sub-Panel on Radiological and Nuclear
Threats and focused on the principal threats associated
with radiological and nuclear materials.  
▲ Professor Micheal J. Sailor from the University of
California at San Diego focused on “Basic Research
Needs to Counter Chemical Threats.”  Prof. Sailor
stressed the need for science and technology integra-
tion to allow new scientific breakthroughs to impact
the practical tasks of fighting terrorism.  
▲ The final plenary lecture addressed the biological
threat and was presented by Dr. David Franz
(Colonel, U.S. Army Retired), Vice President,
Chemical and Biological Defense Division of Southern
Research Institute.  Dr. Franz has served as both
Deputy Commander and then Commander of the
U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
Diseases (USARMID).  
This panel of experts shared some very important 
perspectives with the workshop participants concerning
the nature of terrorist threats, the complex processes
involved in countering these threats, and the important
role that basic science can play.  Although we could never
capture the full impact of these presentations in our 
written report, the following sections summarize some 
of the key points associated with basic science’s role in
countering of terrorism.
1.1 Context for Scientific and Technologica l
Applications for Countering Terrorism  
To enhance the nation’s ability to counter terrorism, one
must first recognize that terrorism is an extremely com-
plex socio-political problem and that there are simply no
“Silver Bullets” to easily solve the problem.
▲ Scientific breakthroughs or new technologies alone
will not end terrorism.  Any solution must be com-
patible with existing doctrine, operations, and train-
ing.  In other words, to be useful, science and tech-
nology must be considered as part of an overall sys-
tem, and the technological piece of that system must
be simple and easy to use.
▲ It is important to note that no one customer exists for
new science and technology applications for counter-
ing terrorism.  In fact, there are many customers,
none of which has sole responsibility for countering
terrorism in the U.S.
▲ Finally, the ultimate customers are not familiar with
science and technology and are unlikely to under-
stand or appreciate the needs or capabilities of the
basic research community, but that does not mean
that they will not ultimately benefit from research
efforts. 
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1.2 Opportunities for Basic Research
While the context for understanding terrorism is very
complex (and somewhat daunting), there are many impor-
tant contributions that science and technology can make:
▲ The strength of basic research is in new knowledge
and the associated cost effectiveness.  Terrorism 
presents tough problems, and new approaches can 
be extremely valuable.  
▲ Basic research can provide assistance across all cate-
gories of homeland security; however, the special
relationship between detection and response (foren-
sics and attribution) presents some of the more sig-
nificant opportunities.  Our nation’s terrorism policies
stress retribution and rapid identification of those
responsible. 
▲ The ability to couple physical measurements with
modeling tools is very important.  Too often, those
responding to terrorist acts either have measurements
but no models to help in understanding their signifi-
cance, or they have models with no actual data to
guide their application.  In addition, tools to help
interpret sparse data sets or to analyze large volumes
of data will also be extremely useful.
▲ Dual-use is an extremely important concept and can
contribute to the “critical mass” of interest needed to
support science and technology investments.  A good
example might be a scientific goal that contributes to
the development of a biohazard detector, but at the same
time, it has relevance to human health diagnostics.
1 .3 Chal lenges to the Basic Research Community
The challenges that our plenary speakers addressed were
not those associated with the science itself but with the
scientist’s and technologist’s interface with the overall
efforts to counter terrorism.
▲ Scientists and technologists must be honest and
straightforward about what is possible and what is
not.  Those responsible for countering terrorism are
looking for solutions, not hype.
▲ The basic research community must be prepared to
work with a team that they will probably not lead.
Scientists will set the scientific directions but not the
overall approach and strategy for countering terror-
ism.  Thus, scientists and technologists will need to
understand enough about the overall approaches to
countering terrorism that they can understand the
true value of their work to that broader integrated
effort.
▲ The focus on integration, both at a systems level and
at a technology level, must be constantly addressed. 
With this background and perspective in place, the work-
shop participants divided into smaller groups to discuss
specific technology needs and critical scientific issues.
The following sections summarize the workshop discus-
sions and address the Radiological and Nuclear, Chemical,
and Biological threat areas.  Each section separately
addresses (1) the technology needs posed by terrorist
threats in that area, (2) specific examples of how basic
research supported by the BES Materials and Chemical
1 These areas of research include Materials Synthesis and Processing, Biomolecular Materials and Interfaces, Physical & Chemical Properties of
Materials, Surfaces, Interfaces and Thin Films, Nanoscale Materials and Structures, Nano- and Micro-scale Diagnostics, Microfabrication, Atomic and
Molecular Spectroscopy, Catalysis and Chemical Transformations, Separations and Analysis, Radiation Effects, Heavy Element Chemistry, and
Biochemistry.
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Sciences programs already plays an important role in the
effort to counter terrorism,1 (3) the fundamental scientific
issues and challenges that promise to impact the ability to
counter terrorism, and (4) future research needs, including
new science thrusts as well as new facilities and infrastruc-
ture development.
The participants in this workshop fully recognize that the
threat of terrorism extends beyond the topics addressed in
this workshop.  Of particular interest to the Department
of Energy is the potential vulnerability of our nation’s crit-
ical infrastructure for energy, information, and transporta-
tion.  The Basic Energy Sciences Advisory Committee is
planning a separate comprehensive workshop structured
around energy reserves, production, and consumption
with break-out sessions for specific energy sources and
consumption sectors.
2.1 Terror ism Threats and Techno logy  Needs
The nuclear threats facing the U.S. are constantly evolv-
ing and have grown more complex since the end of the
Cold War.  However, the events of this past year have
proved the necessity to reevaluate these threats on a scale
never before considered.  
In the past, potential adversary states were easily identi-
fied, and nuclear weapons program development was
monitored through treaties, intelligence agencies, nuclear
reactor monitoring, and scientific advancements.  With
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the possibility of
diversion of complete weapon systems or nuclear material
to rogue nations and terrorist organizations has increased.
In addition, new nuclear powers (e.g., Pakistan and India)
have further complicated global proliferation issues.
While the operability of nuclear weapons has always been
important to national security, their role has been more as
a strategic deterrent rather than as an offensive/defensive
weapon.  In the current climate, complex and highly
organized domestic and state-sponsored foreign terrorist
units have multiple mechanisms at their disposal to engage
in nuclear threats.  In addition, the potential threat scenar-
ios have now been expanded to consider the use of all
radiological materials as potential “weapons,” introducing
the need to monitor, track, and respond to a greatly
broadened suite of materials.1
The most potentially catastrophic terrorist threat involv-
ing radioactive materials is the possibility of a self-sus-
tained fission chain reaction detonated in an urban area.
This scenario is credible and is taken very seriously by the
federal authorities.  Such an event could result in a signifi-
cant number of deaths and massive devastation.  The
resulting fallout, containing highly radioactive fission and
activation products, would contaminate many square
miles.  Such a device need only contain several kilograms
to a few tens of kilograms of a fissile isotope, could be
2   Radiological/Nuclear Threats
1 See for example J. Warrick, “Making of a ‘Dirty Bomb’,” Washington Post, March 18, 2002, page 1; J. Glanz, “Despite New Tools, Detecting
Nuclear Materials Is Doubtful,” New York Times, March 18, 2002, page 13.
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transported in a small truck, and would be difficult to
detect because of the relatively small amount of external
radiation that it would produce, especially if shielded,
before detonation.  
Prevention of such a devastating terrorist attack requires
that terrorists do not obtain the essential ingredient for
building an atomic bomb, namely, fissile actinide isotopes
such as U-235 or Pu-239.  If they have obtained such iso-
topes, the fissile material must be detected before intro-
duction into the U.S., or during transport and before
assembly into a functional device.  Other credible threat
scenarios include the use of radiological materials as
potential weapons.  A noninclusive list of potential threats
includes the use of so-called “alternate nuclear materials”
or the generation of “dirty” bombs, which use a combina-
tion of conventional explosives and nuclear material.
Radionuclide release may occur from the sabotage of
nuclear facilities or repositories, from raids/attacks on
nuclear materials in transport, or from hospitals where
radionuclides are used for diagnostics and therapy.
To realize how work supported by the Office of Basic
Energy Science can impact homeland defense and counter
terrorism, an understanding of the threats and the mecha-
nism of a nuclear-based terrorist attack is required.  The
threats discussed above have common features.  The three
basic objectives for a terrorist are to obtain radiological or
nuclear materials, to develop or utilize known technology
for “weaponization,” and to deploy the weapon/material in
a desirable area.  Within each of these objectives are
inherent weaknesses that a counter-terrorism effort can
exploit.  
2.1.1 Detection
The primary goal of any counter-terrorism effort is to pre-
vent an attack as early in the development stages as possi-
ble.  Many current approaches employed to prevent a
nuclear/radiological attack rely upon detection of materi-
als.  Access to nuclear or radiological materials as well as
weapon production capabilities and facilities has been
considered of primary importance.2
Many technologies have been proposed for monitoring
production, from radiation detection methods employed
in on-site inspection governed by treaties to stand-off
detection of chemical effluents resulting from the process-
ing of nuclear materials.3 Several factors complicate the
application of such methods, however.  First, the list of
fissionable isotopes that merit monitoring has been
expanded to include potential “alternate nuclear materials,”
including Np-237 and certain isotopes of Am.
Furthermore, the possible use of a “dirty” nuclear device,
or a combination of a conventional and a nuclear explo-
sive device, brings any radioactive material into the realm
of a potential threat. 
The need to detect both traditional and alternate nuclear
materials leads to many requirements that are not met by
current scientific technologies (e.g., simple, inexpensive,
3 “Technology R&D for Arms Control,” Arms Control and Nonproliferation Technologies, Office of Nonproliferation Research and Engineering,
National Nuclear Security Agency, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program, Spring 2001, http://www.llnl.gov/nai/communication.html.
2 “Proliferation Concerns: Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet
Union,” National Research Council (U.S.), Office of International Affairs, Washington, D.C., National Academy Press, 1997. 
10
Basic Research Needs for countering terrorism
low-level detection of nuclear material in the field, differ-
entiation of nuclear fuel versus weapon production, etc.).
Further, there is a growing need to develop a broader and
more thorough system to monitor transportation and com-
merce corridors for the transport of radiological materials.
Any systems employed must address the requirements of
rapid throughput, elemental/isotopic discrimination, and
low system cost.  Also, for the first responders to any ter-
rorist incident, there must be a reliable, cheap, “yes or no
answer” approach to the detection of nuclear material.
The nuclear emission (alpha, beta, gamma) of constituent
isotopes is one of the more sensitive clues for detection of
radioactive materials.  Active interrogation with neutron,
electron, proton, and gamma sources also can be used to
activate some elements that are then detected by the
nuclear emission of the activated isotope.  The develop-
ment of more compact, higher flux sources could enable
this technology to be more widely utilized.  The field of
nuclear detection has further growth potential with the
development of new sources and better (more sensitivity,
higher energy, greater spatial resolution, and room tem-
perature compatibility) nuclear detectors.  
Another technique widely used for isotope analysis is mass
spectrometry.  This technique, which depends on the
method used to ionize or vaporize the material, has
extremely high resolution and can determine isotope
ratios.  Mass spectrometry-based techniques can provide
sensitivities down to tens of atoms with nanometer spatial
resolution by combining the selectivity obtained via tun-
able laser excitation of one or more electronic transitions
with high-spatial-resolution sputtering techniques such as
ion bombardment.  Such information, along with the
identification of elements and molecular speciation in par-
ticulates down to the nanometer scale and below, should
be invaluable in tracing the origin of the material for
forensic purposes.  High sample throughput for identifica-
tion purposes can be achieved using high brightness x-ray
sources, such as third-generation synchrotrons, which
soon are expected to provide 50-nm spatial resolution for
x-ray techniques such as diffraction and absorption that,
respectively, identify physical structure and quantify the
presence of a wide range of elements and their local envi-
ronments.
Other methods of detection for radioactive materials
based on ionic and/or molecular recognition need to be
more fully developed.  Although nuclear methods indicate
that an element is present, they do not provide informa-
tion about its form or oxidation state.  Moreover, the sen-
sitivity of nuclear methods for long-lived radionuclides
might not be adequate for some applications.  
Alternative detection methods could be based on the visi-
ble fluorescence emitted under visible or ultra-violet exci-
tation (e.g., the UO22+ and the Cm3+ ion) or the infrared
fluorescence emitted by the neptunyl and plutonyl ions.
The design of specific ligands that undergo a spectral
change upon binding of particular actinide ions is another
promising avenue of exploration.  If color changes accom-
pany the binding, it is possible that specific colorimetric
reagents might be designed to indicate the presence of a
particular ion.  Advances in rapid element separation using
high-speed ion exchange or capillary electrophoresis
methods and new solid-state ultraviolet light sources may
serve as the basis for physically small, rapid, highly sensi-
tive instruments for quantifying a broad range of lan-
thanide and actinide elements in a few seconds in sample
solutions. 
2.1.2 Preparedness
Preparedness refers to the ability to respond to terrorist
threats and attacks within the U.S.  If an attack cannot be
prevented, efforts would turn to response: protection of
people and assets, emergency response, and event mitiga-
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tion/recovery.  Measures must be in place to rapidly iden-
tify the elements/isotopes of concern, to deal with imme-
diate concerns, and, ultimately, to remove these materials.
Dose exposure information must be rapidly collected and
evaluated, and the appropriate response initiated.  If
radioactive material is dispersed in reservoirs, it must be
identified, and emergency responders must be ready and
able to provide instructions.  Methods must be available
to deal with individuals contaminated with radioactive
material.  Promising new reagents are being studied for
the removal of actinides from humans, but much more
work is necessary before these reagents can be utilized.
Cleanup methods and materials must be available for the
removal of radionuclides from surfaces, soils, water, and
air.  Agents for removal of contaminants from soils and
surfaces as well as methods for the separation of radionu-
clides from air and water are necessary.  Available reagents
must be evaluated and new ones developed if necessary.
Modeling of the effects of radioactive contamination in
air, water, and soils must be performed, based on reliable
kinetic and thermodynamic data so that the consequences
of this type of disaster can be determined and its effects
mitigated.  Finally, the question of the storage and dispos-
al of the radioactive material under emergency conditions
needs to be addressed.  
Research related to the effect of ionizing radiation on
matrix materials may serve a dual purpose, identifying
both radiation damage and also shedding light on the util-
ity of radiation as a decontamination measure.
Radioactive sources or accelerators that produce ionizing
radiation are used to decontaminate biological or toxico-
logical agents from materials by decomposing such agents
into harmless products.  At the same time, the material
being cleansed may also be degraded.  Understanding the
fundamental processes that occur in both condensed and
aqueous phases and, most importantly, at interfaces fol-
lowing the passage of ionizing radiation is necessary.  In
the case of a nuclear incident, the chemical changes
induced by the radiation may result in unexpected prod-
ucts that make remediation difficult and dangerous.
Similarly, the effects of radiation on biological materials,
although an active area of investigation, need to be
explored at the molecular level.  Low-dose thresholds (or
low-dose linear responses) need to be explored at the sin-
gle molecule/single cell level.
It should be noted that as the sole agency in the federal
government with a spectrum of research activities involv-
ing nuclear and radiological materials, the Department of
Energy (DOE) bears a unique responsibility for providing
the underpinning science.  Preparedness includes, in the
context of the science base, maintenance of the infrastruc-
ture (laboratories, instrumentation, computers, etc.) and
expertise (technical personnel, databases, etc.) for devising
technical solutions to the problems that might be encoun-
tered with radiological/nuclear materials.  Owing to the
hazards in working with these materials, the aging infra-
structure at DOE’s national laboratories represents a par-
ticular problem for this area of research.  This, coupled
with the decline in university programs designed to train
actinide and radiochemists, is a particular challenge in
preparing to address threats associated with nuclear and
radiological materials.
2.1.3 Prevention
Another general category of threat reduction involves 
preventing acquisition or utilization of the materials.
Physical protection is the first line of defense.  Advanced
materials could aid in the containment of hazardous mate-
rials to prevent their dispersal upon insult (e.g., explosion
scenarios).  Physical protection of nuclear materials could
be augmented by the application of technology designed
to stabilize nuclear/radiological materials to prevent their
use or dispersal.  These could include implementing
advanced proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel cycles, devising
12
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more efficient/rapid methods for the recovery and stabiliza-
tion of existing radioactive sources, and identifying
improved material forms for the storage of nuclear materi-
als (this latter point is increasingly important as the U.S.
and Russia further reduce their active nuclear weapon
stockpiles).  A related technology need is identification of
possible unconventional methods of material processing to
better anticipate possible scenarios and monitoring methods.
Prevention of a nuclear incident also depends on the inter-
diction of the material or suspicious persons before entry
into the U.S.  This involves inspection and detection of
nuclear materials entering the country.  More sophisticated
detection, as discussed previously, is clearly pertinent.
Advances in detector materials would be particularly 
valuable in detecting the illicit transport of fissile or other
radioactive materials.  
2.1.4 Protection/Response and Recovery
If an attack cannot be prevented, efforts would turn to
protection of people and assets, emergency response, and
event mitigation/recovery.  Protection against such attacks
may well rely upon rapid identification of material disper-
sal pathways.  Strategies could be envisioned in which
critical facilities are equipped with response systems that
employ detection systems (with technology gaps similar
to those discussed above) to control building ventilation
systems, or where broad-area monitors are employed to
aid in formulating evacuation routes.  In some instances,
technology needs may include means of hardening infra-
structure to operate in harsh environments.  
Rapid identification of the nature of the weapon by emer-
gency responders would be of primary concern, since the
initial response would be significantly different, depend-
ing on whether a chemical, biological, or radiological/
nuclear weapon is used.  Careful post-attack analysis of
materials can also be invaluable to the identification of the
perpetrators.  Attribution and the fear of a devastating
response are also powerful deterrents to attack.  For a
nuclear attack, determining the specific radiological
agents present in the weapon, (e.g., long-lived isotopes,
such as U, Pu, etc., versus short-lived fission products,
such as Cs, Sr, etc.) will also dictate treatment.  Current
approaches for distinguishing these characteristics often
rely upon laboratory analysis, requiring sample collection
and transport.  Technology is needed to provide portable
equipment for economical chemical and radiochemical
analyses of radiological materials.  Finally, technology
needs exist in the design of appropriate mitigation/recov-
ery strategies, from prediction of migration of radiological
materials (identifying the scope of required treatment) to
devising new incident-specific solutions for broad area
decontamination.  Knowledge of the interaction of
nuclear materials with biological systems is also important
to develop enhanced remediation schemes and medical
therapies.
2.2 BES Research Accompl ishments and
Impl icat ions for  Counter  Te r ro r i sm
The DOE programs in radiological/nuclear chemistry 
had their genesis in the Atomic Energy Commission’s
chemistry research program that was built on the wartime
Manhattan Project.  That program was primarily directed
at the needs of the plutonium project, and investigated
chemical processes for separating uranium, plutonium, 
and fission products.  After the production facilities for
producing and processing plutonium were operational and
successful, longer range studies were undertaken, such as
the discovery of new transplutonium elements and chemi-
cal studies of their properties, the development of new
analytical methods, systematic spectroscopic studies of 
the actinide elements, and studies of radiation chemistry.
Current BES activities have evolved from this beginning.  
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Short descriptions of the relevant activities in the areas of
Heavy Element Chemistry, Separations and Analysis, and
Radiation Chemistry are given below, followed by an
abbreviated list of the research topics currently studied
within these activities.  Other BES activities that provide
support for some radiological/nuclear issues are men-
tioned.  A few of the notable accomplishments of the BES
activities are described.
2.2.1 Heavy Element Chemistry
The BES Heavy Element Chemistry activity is the sole
source of federal support in the U.S. for fundamental
research on the chemistry of the actinides and their fission
products, both of which are potential “signatures” of activ-
ities related to proliferation and nuclear or radiological
terrorism.  Relevant information developed under this
activity includes spectroscopic identification; better
understanding of the environmental chemistry (fate and
transport) of actinides and fission products; and enhanced
chemical characterization methods such as advanced x-ray
spectroscopies.  The supported research provides the basis
for innovative sampling and analysis technologies needed
Chemical Analysis of
Radionuclides
Structural and chemical speciation information
is needed to develop predictive models for the
fate and transport of radionuclides and to guide
the selection of cleanup technologies.  While
nuclear counting techniques can detect and
identify the isotopic make-up of radionuclides, they provide no chemical information. BES-supported fundamental
research has contributed to the development of methods to characterize the speciation of actinide contaminants
under a variety of conditions.1
Spectroscopic and x-ray absorption methods were used to identify the oxidation state and speciation of 
plutonium in wastes, structural debris, and soils at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS).
Identification of plutonium oxide in soils added to a growing body of evidence that colloid and particulate
transport is a dominant migration pathway for plutonium in soils at RFETS. These results guided the 
development of new models for protecting surface water quality.  As a result of this research, technologies 
are available to guide our response in radiological decontamination should it become necessary.
[Los Alamos National Laboratory]
1 S. D. Conradson, I. AlMahamid, D. L. Clark, N. J. Hess, E. A. Hudson, M. P. Neu, P. D. Palmer, W. H. Runde, C. D. Tait,  “Oxidation
State Determination of Plutonium Aquo Ions Using X-Ray Absorption Spectroscopy,” Polyhedron (1998) 17, 599-602.
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to improve the detection and tracking of special nuclear
materials; the timely detection of a clandestine national or
subnational nuclear weapons program or noncompliance
with international treaties and agreements; advanced field
and laboratory nuclear materials analysis methods; and
micro technologies for detection and analysis.
Actinide Chemistry topics include the following:
▲ Fundamental research into the chemistry of f-ele-
ments, including thermodynamic and kinetic meas-
urements, for improved chemical syntheses, charac-
terization, and separations.
▲ Fundamental research that advances the understand-
ing and utilization of photon, neutron, electron, and
magnetic interaction-based spectroscopies for chemical
studies on actinide and important fission product
species, and explores the electronic structure of the
5f elements.
▲ Fundamental research on the coordination chemistry,
reduction/oxidation state behavior, interfacial sci-
ence, and bonding of the actinides, to improve
understanding of their fate and transport, such as 
that mediated by sorption or partitioning at the 
mineral/water interface.
▲ Research on the chemistry of f-elements in gaseous
and solid states.  Chemistry of transuranium elements
on the microgram and larger scale. 
Chemical Recognition and
Extraction of Radionuclides 
Environmental cleanup of radionuclides,
whether because of legacy processing or in
response to a terrorist event, will require the
design of chemical “tweezers” that can pluck a
single ion out of a host of millions or even 
billions of competing ions.  Developing chemical-recognition principles is a critical first step in addressing this
challenge.  Solvent-extraction technology was recently selected at the Savannah River Site for cleanup of some
31 million gallons of highly radioactive salt waste.1 The selected technology met the difficult processing
requirements, including the ability to remove 99.9975% of the cesium from waste containing an average of
only 15 ppm of cesium.  The process employs the molecule shown above, known as BOBCalixC6, which had
its early roots in BES-supported fundamental research in the 1970s and included the contributions of Prof.
Donald Cram (University of California at Los Angles), who won a Nobel Prize in 1988 for his pioneering
work in the field.  
[Oak Ridge National Laboratory] 
1P. V. Bonnesen, L. H. Delmau, B. A. Moyer, R. A. Leonard, Solvent Extr. Ion Exch. 2000, 18, 1079-1108.
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▲ Computational modeling of the molecular structure,
bonding, and spectra of 5f element compounds.
▲ Development of soft and hard x-ray synchrotron
methods for element and species identification and
characterization of local and extended structure. 
2.2.2 Separations and Analysis 
The BES Separations and Analysis program supports
research on fundamental issues in chemical detection and
associated processes for chemical separations needed for
reliable detection.  Research on methods such as particle
mass spectrometry may lead to new means for identifying
elements, compounds, and particles relevant to the detec-
tion and attribution of clandestine nuclear explosions.
This research can lead to innovative sampling and analysis
technologies to improve the detection and tracking of
nuclear materials, advanced field and laboratory radiologi-
cal materials analysis methods, and micro technologies 
for detection and analysis.  Some of the relevant topics 
supported by the activity are listed below.
▲ Fundamental research on ionic liquids and supercritical
liquid systems used for the separation of radionuclides.
Actinide Sequestering Agents 
The syntheses and characterization of
actinide-specific ligands patterned after natural
iron-sequestering agents called siderophores
have received long-term support from BES.1
This work is based on the recognition of the
chemical similarities between Fe3+ and the
somewhat larger Pu4+ion.  Expanding the
coordination sphere of these synthetic ligands
and incorporation of the HOPO metal binding
group have resulted in a series of new ligands.  These new compounds have been evaluated for their efficacy in
removing actinides from mice (in studies supported by NIH).  (See Figure.)  Two of the newly synthesized
actinide-specific HOPO chelating agents have shown exceptional promise during the preliminary evaluation
of their efficacy for actinide decorporation (removal from the body) and toxicity in mice.  These compounds
decorporate injected or inhaled Pu and trivalent actinides much more effectively than DTPA (the approved
therapeutic drug) in all tests in mice and rats, and they have remarkable oral efficacy.2
Dose effectiveness of 3,4,3-LI(1,2-HOPO) injected intraperitoneal (IP) at one hour or 3,4,3-LI(1,2-Me-3,2-
HOPO) given orally at three minutes after an intravenous (IV) injection of 238Pu compared with CaNa3-
DTPA injected IP at one hour.  The figure shows that the HOPO ligands are much more effective than DTPA
for removing Pu.
1P. W. Durbin, B. Kullgren, J. Xu, and K. N. Raymond.  “Development of Decorporation Agents for the Actinides,”  Radiation Protection
Dosimetry (1998) 79, 433-443.
2P. W. Durbin, B. Kullgren, Jide Xu, and K. N. Raymond.  “Multidentate Hydroxypyridinonate Ligands for Pu(IV) Chelation in vivo:
Comparative Efficacy and Toxicity in Mice of Ligands Containing 1,2-HOPO or Me-3,2,-HOPO,”  Int. J. Radiat. Biol. (2000) 76, 113-117.
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▲ Fundamental research on ligand systems used for the
separation/concentration of radionuclides, a neces-
sary first step in the analysis of trace amounts of ele-
ments of interest.
▲ Fundamental research into atomic spectroscopy, with
application to multi-photon and other advanced laser
ionization techniques for ultra-sensitive elemental
analysis/detection.
▲ Research on the laser ablation of particulates and
solids for quantitative chemical and isotopic analysis.
(Laser-ablation analysis of particles on air filters is a
promising method for determining if clandestine
nuclear activities are under way.)
▲ Research on the size, shape, and chemical characteri-
zation (using laser spectroscopic and time-of-flight
mass spectrometry) of individual airborne particles.
▲ Research on single-molecule/particle detection,
micro- and nano-fluidic devices for chemical analysis
(lab-on-a-chip).  
▲ Fundamental research in the use of mass spectrome-
try for analysis.
2.2.3 Radiation Chemistry
BES is the sole supporter of radiation chemistry in condensed
systems (nonbiological) in the U.S.  It funds specialized
electron radiolysis facilities that serve the academic
Detecting Nuclear/
Radiological Contamination
of Water Supplies 
Research supported by BES has led to the
development of a series of novel extraction
chromatographic (EXC) resins that can selec-
tively remove one or more radionuclides from
aqueous solution.1 The resins combine a highly selective metal ion extractant in an inert polymeric support.
Sample solutions, adjusted to the proper acidity, are passed through a series of columns packed with the
appropriate resin for a particular radionuclide.  The selected ions are retained on the columns, while others
pass through (see Figure), and retained ions are washed from the columns for analysis.  Columns with different
extractants can be coupled so that multiple ions can be detected in a single sample.  
These resins can address widespread problems in radiochemical analysis and are well suited to either defining
the scope and isotopic signature of contamination resulting from an incident of nuclear/radiological terrorism. 
[Argonne National Laboratory]
1M. L. Dietz, E. P. Horwitz, R. Chiarizia, "Recent Advances in the Development of Extraction Chromatographic Materials for the
Isolation of Radionuclides from Biological and Environmental Samples," in Solvent Extraction for the 21st Century, Volume 1, M. Cox, M.
Hidalgo, and M. Valiente, Eds., Society of Chemical Industry: London, 2001, pp. 53-58.
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research community, industrial users, and other national
laboratories.  Radiation chemistry investigates the funda-
mental chemical effects produced by the absorption of
energy from ionizing radiation.  Although not specifically
aimed at solving problems in counter-terrorism, the funda-
mental knowledge developed by this activity underlies the
use of radiation sources for decontaminating materials
(e.g., mail) that harbor pathogenic organisms.  This same
knowledge is applicable to the use of radiation sources for
deactivating chemical toxins by means of irradiation.
Analysis in bones and teeth of free radicals generated by
radiation can reveal exposure to radiation and determine
the dose of exposure to irradiation.  In the event of nuclear
terrorism or a nuclear accident, radiation effects on con-
taminated materials and at contaminated sites must be taken
into account to undertake the proper mitigation measures.
Some of the relevant topics supported are listed below.
▲ Radiolytic and photolytic oxidation of multifunctional
compounds
▲ Radiation effects in homogeneous media and 
multiphase systems 
▲ Structure and chemical properties of radiation-
produced intermediates 
▲ Radiation-induced chemistry in supercritical fluids
and other solvents
▲ Radiation effects in solids
2.2.4 Experimental Condensed Matter Physics  
This activity supports generic research on semiconductors,
magnetic materials, and systems that provide a science
base for the development of advanced, highly sensitive
sensors and detectors, some of which may have applica-
tion for the remote detection of nuclear detonations.
2.2.5 Mechanical Behavior of Materials and
Radiation Effects  
This activity supports studies of the effects of irradiation
on the chemical and physical properties of materials,
including a number of ceramics that have been suggested
as potential immobilization “hosts” for surplus fissile 
materials in both the U.S. and Russia.
2.2.6 Synchrotron and Neutron User Facilities  
The synchrotron and neutron facilities provide a unique
set of analytical tools for characterization of materials at
the atomic and molecular level.  These tools determine
the atomic constituents of materials, the positions of the
atoms in materials, and the behavior of materials under
the influence of external perturbations such as radiation or
chemical attack.  Various experimental and theoretical
tools are available for the nondestructive detection and
identification of radiochemical species that might occur
after a terrorist event.
2.2.7 Geosciences
Geophysics research focuses on improving subsurface
imaging, which includes a large component involved with
understanding how seismic waves are generated and then
propagate through anisotropic, heterogeneous earth 
materials.  This work can improve capabilities to account
for the environment’s effects on seismic observables.  This
is important for the interpretation of both teleseismic and
near-field seismic data in terms of the source mechanics.
Indirectly, this work has an impact on the ability to use
regionally based seismic monitoring methods to detect
very low yield events that might arise from a clandestine
testing of nuclear devices.
Geochemistry research focuses on studies of the interac-
tion of minerals and mineral surfaces with water.  This
knowledge is relevant to the determination of the fate and
transport of radionuclides in the environment as well as
18
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Scientific Analysis Alleviates Public
Concern over the Three Mile Island
Reactor Vessel 
On March 30, 1979, two days after the accident in the Three
Mile Island Reactor, press reported the existence of a noncon-
densable bubble in the reactor vessel.  This bubble was said to consist mainly of hydrogen, and the danger of
explosion was reported to be imminent. BES scientists analyzed1 all possible sources of noncondensable gases
including radiolysis, and it was determined that a continuing growth of the bubble during several days after
the accident was not possible.  In addition, they were able to show that the bubble did not contain a com-
bustible mixture.  The tools and capabilities of basic research will also play an important role in guiding our
response and public education surrounding future possible acts of radiological/nuclear terrorism. 
1S. Gordon, K. H. Schmitt, and J. R. Honekamp, Radiat. Phys. Chem. 21, 247-258 (1983).
Forensic Analysis of Radiological
Materials
BES-funded research into the fundamental chemistry of mass spec-
trometry has helped lay the foundation for ultra-sensitive isotope
analysis techniques.  Investigations into ionization and gas phase
ion processes have led to the development of ultra-sensitive thermal
ionization mass spectrometry for isotope analysis and high-preci-
sion, high-accuracy secondary ionization mass spectrometry for the
analysis of isotope ratios in situ with high spatial resolution (see
photo).  Finally, improvements in chemical separation and analysis
of radionuclides (U, Pu) using electrochemically modulated separa-
tion combined with MS show potential for rapid screening of phys-
iological media, such as urine, with a minimum of sample preparation.
The isotopic data, as well as elemental proportions, could be used to detect nuclear activity and to fingerprint
the source of nuclear materials that may be part of a terrorism event.
[Oak Ridge National Laboratory]
Color-enhanced image of uraninite
showing variations across sample (at
red dots) in ages (millions of years)
determined by SIMS based on varia-
tions in U and Pb isotope variations.
Note 20-micrometer spatial resolution
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the long-term stability of nuclear wasteforms with respect
to aqueous corrosion/dissolution after they have been
emplaced in a geologic repository.  The Geosciences 
program also supports research in analytical methods 
that can be used for trace measurements of isotopes for
geological dating.  These same methods may be used 
for determining isotopic ratios in forensic analyses.
2.3 Scient i f ic  Issues and Research Opportun i t i es
Fundamental scientific challenges must be overcome to
achieve new and improved technologies that effectively
counter radiological and nuclear threats.  Here some of
the problems with current capabilities and techniques are
defined more precisely.  The underlying issues that must
be addressed to resolve homeland security deficiencies are
identified, and the opportunities for innovation in solving
these problems are cited.
2.3.1 Detection
Radiation measurements are hampered by the limitations
of available materials.  There are different problems with
the two main classes of materials.  
Scintillators
The first major class of radiation-detecting materials pro-
vides rather limited energy resolution such as scintillators
or ambient-temperature semiconductor gamma detectors,
such as cadmium zinc telluride (CdZnTe).  These materi-
als are likely to be most useful for a first responder, large-
area detector system, or ultraminature instrument applica-
tions.  A scintillator converts ionizing radiation or
absorbed neutrons into light that is then measured with 
a photosensor.  
Many types of scintillators are available.  Their principal
limitations are poor energy resolution and lower than
desired quantum efficiency.  This provides a significant
research opportunity because improved energy resolution
or better conversion of the energy carried by a high-ener-
gy photon or neutron into multiple lower energy scintilla-
tor photons offers the possibility of large gains in overall
detector efficiency.  Currently, CdZnTe is comparatively
expensive, and its cadmium content presents environmental
hazards upon disposal.  Lower cost synthesis of similar but
less hazardous materials is desired.  Development of large-
area, multiple-detector “blanket” systems for contact use in
rapid assessment of low-level surface contamination during
environmental cleanup following a radiological or nuclear
incident is a concept worth assessing if the cost of needed
sensors and signal electronics can be lowered sufficiently.
Semiconductor-Based Materials
The second class of materials used for radiation measure-
ment provides high energy resolution.  These are typically
semiconductor-based, such as lithium-drifted germanium
(Ge(Li)).  These detectors efficiently convert incident 
ionizing radiation into electron-hole pairs that are then
detected using conventional electronics.  
The principal limitations of these materials are their cost,
availability, and, in the case of Ge(Li) commonly used for
high-resolution gamma detection, the cryogenic tempera-
ture essential for optimum performance.  Large-volume
detectors of this class are quite expensive because of the
difficulty in synthesis and fabrication.  Development of
improved pixel-based detectors, better surface-passivation
Technology Need Present Problem
Rapid, reliable, simple, cheap
radiation detectors for first
responders.
Field deployable, moderate
to high resolution, radiation
measurement instrumentation.
Current detectors are 
expensive and moderately
complicated.
Current detectors are delicate
and require cryogenic 
temperatures to obtain 
energy-resolved spectra.
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techniques to increase the reliability of materials, and
lower cost synthesis methods present significant opportu-
nities for achieving cost-effective improvements in detec-
tion systems.  High-resolution gamma detectors that oper-
ate at temperatures significantly higher than 77 K are
desirable for field detection or portable instrument appli-
cations.  High-energy x-ray and gamma lenses offer a
means of significantly enhancing detection of radionu-
clides at a distance for a given detector volume and are
useful in imaging of radionuclide sources.  However, such
lenses are currently handcrafted and are expensive.  
Radionuclide sensing via active methods involves irradia-
tion of the suspect material with photons or subatomic
particles, such as neutrons, and assessing the response of
that material, such as absorption of an incident photon or
emission of neutrons because of induced nuclear fission, to
the irradiation field.  Some of these active interrogation
methods have the potential to detect the presence of
light-element–based high explosives as well as most
actinide elements.  However, absent improved detectors,
the intensity of irradiation field needed may damage or
destroy plants, animals, and materials.  In addition, some
suitable irradiation sources are not readily portable (e.g.,
proton accelerators).  Methods for low-cost fabrication of
high-power mm RF components would be enable creation
of portable (“table top”) accelerators.  Similarly, advances
in femtosecond laser technology would advance “table
top” electron accelerator technology.  Further develop-
ment of electrically powered, portable neutron generators
would advance detection of fissile materials in transit at
border checkpoints and transportation hubs. 
Remote laser sensing offers controlled illumination over
distances from meters to kilometers, high spectral selectiv-
ity, and high-speed operability.  Of particular importance
is the issue of detection of signatures from specific
radioactive materials.  Some other subatomic particles,
such as neutrinos, provide very high penetration but are
difficult to detect by simple means.  Obtaining significant
improvement in the generation, collimation, and high-sen-
sitivity detection of such particles is distinctly challenging
and could represent the desired breakthrough for safe
application of large-object tomography.  In addition,
improved broadband (femtosecond pulse) sources may have
significant utility in longer range aerosol remote sensing.
Technology Need Present Problem
Combined sensors to deter-
mine nature of threat (e.g.,
high explosives and radioac-
tive material or radioactive
material alone).
Improved methods for remote
imaging of radioactive
sources contained within
large objects such as cargo
containers, ships, or trucks.
Stand-off detection of 
shielded nuclear materials.
Such integrated systems do
not exist, and both types of
detection systems currently
have sensitivity limitations.
Current methods for large-
object tomography are 
not suitable for routine 
surveillance.
Current active interrogation
systems are incompatible
with some cargo, and are not
portable.
Technology Need Present Problem
Rapid characterization of
aerosol plumes that might
contain radionuclides.
Remote interrogation of a
suspect plume to obtain ele-
mental composition and par-
ticle size distribution for
most radionuclide species
has not been assessed.
Technology Need Present Problem
Ultratrace to single-atom
detection of a broad range of
elements and isotopes
together with chemical,
physical, and structural char-
acterization of sample mate-
rials for attribution and intel-
ligence-gathering purposes.
Current methods are rela-
tively slow and generally
have sensitivities measured in
many thousands of atoms
and poor spatial resolution.
Typically, extensive sample
pretreatment is required
prior to analysis.
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Samples of plant, animal, or mineral materials or manufac-
tured articles differ as to their trace element and isotope
content, depending on their origin.  Detection of trace
constituents indicative of the production of fissile isotopes
or having unusual relative isotope abundances of hydro-
gen or lithium isotopes, for example, can provide an early
warning indicator of proliferation activities and, if associ-
ated with additional trace indicators, the location of 
those activities.  
Further development of ultratrace analysis techniques is
essential to achieve high sample throughput and spatial
resolution with broad elemental applicability, high iso-
topic discrimination, and minimal sample pretreatment.
High-spatial-resolution chemical, physical, and structural
characterization of samples provides additional bases for
differentiating materials and determining their probable
origins.  Development of existing surface enhanced vibra-
tional spectroscopies (e.g., surface enhanced Raman) com-
bined with high-efficiency, solid-state laser microscopies
may provide both the needed chemical speciation and
imaging capabilities down to the single molecule level.
Further development of electron and ion microscopies 
and analysis techniques based on x-ray beams focused to
nanometer dimension may also provide these required
characterization capabilities.
2.3.2 Preparedness
Containment and prevention of isotope migration will be
of immediate concern following a terrorist release of
radionuclides.  Effort is needed to develop rapidly deploy-
able immobilizing agents that can be applied to contami-
nated soils, buildings, vehicles, etc.  Whereas these could
be comprised of nonreactive materials (i.e., urethane
foams or other rapid forming plastics), such immobilizing
agents would ideally facilitate cleanup and removal of the
radionuclides following the initial response to a terrorist
event.  This may be facilitated by inclusion of sorbents
within a permeable coating.  Finally, one might choose a
foam composition that would induce the reduction of
high-valent actinides to less soluble lower oxidation states
or a foam composition that leads to a significant increase
in soil pH, resulting in the precipitation of radionuclides
as hydroxides or oxides.  To date, none of these selective
immobilizing agents exists.  Fundamental work is needed
in the areas of polymer chemistry and separations chem-
istry to realize the potential of this approach.  Furthermore,
it is imperative that personnel be trained to detect
radioactive materials and to react appropriately in the 
case of nuclear terrorism.
Actinide, especially plutonium, contamination is a signifi-
cant danger because of its high toxicity.  The currently
accepted method for reducing and removing Pu in the
body consists of intravenous or inhalation administration
of the chelating agent DTPA, diethylenetriaminepen-
taacetic acid.  This protocol has significant therapeutic
limitations and is inadequate for treatment of the general
public.  Possible new compounds for actinide removal
have shown great efficacy for actinide ions at physiologi-
cal pH.  They are based on the syntheses and characteri-
zation of a number of actinide-specific ligands, patterned
Technology Need Present Problem
Effective therapies needed
for decontaminating victims
of radioactive contamination,
especially for actinide con-
tamination.
The current treatment
method for actinide removal
is limited in its efficacy.
Technology Need Present Problem
Containment of widespread
radioactive contamination
caused by a terrorist event.
Maintain critical infrastruc-
ture and appropriately
trained personnel.
First responders and others
need training in this area and
supplies for detecting, con-
taining, immobilizing, and
removing contamination.
Decaying infrastructure and
limited education and 
training opportunities.
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after natural iron-sequestering agents called siderophores.
These compounds have been evaluated for their efficacy
in removing actinides from mice (in studies supported by
NIH).  However, many additional studies are necessary
before these new materials can be certified for drug use.
A more effective treatment for the decorporation of actinides
in case of human contamination is clearly a highly desirable
goal for the mitigation of a possible terrorist act.
2.3.3 Prevention
Much research has been devoted to the materials science
of the actinide elements, especially plutonium, over the
last fifty years.  Many types of complexes have been
investigated for use in the nuclear fuel cycle as well as for
use for safe and secure storage of special nuclear materials.
The oxides of uranium and plutonium have received the
most study and are the materials commonly found in
nuclear fuels, including the mixed oxide fuels (MOX).
MOX fuels are being seriously considered for disposal of
excess weapons plutonium in both Russia and the U.S.4
Plutonium is commonly stored as PuO2, since in this form
it is highly insoluble. 
In the future, the synthesis of highly refractory actinide
materials that are stable to moisture, are highly dense, can
be produced at moderate temperatures, and have a number
of desirable physical characteristics for nonproliferation
such as the presence of neutron poisons will increase the
safety and reliability of storage systems.  A major obstacle
to the widespread production of these types of actinide
materials relates to the reaction temperatures, which range
as high as 3000 °C to achieve high purity.  
Research in this area should emphasize the development
and implementation of unique reaction conditions and
novel precursors that enable the preparation of materials
at lower temperatures (500–750 °C) and pressures.  Such
research could also be of value to the development of
advanced nuclear fuels that could be easily reprocessed
but are difficult to convert to weapons-grade materials.
The combination of solid-state, homogenous molecular,
and/or vapor-phase deposition synthetic chemistry with
multidisciplinary analytical and spectroscopic characteri-
zation is needed to produce such new materials.  Their
production could be a major factor in decreasing the like-
lihood of diversion for terrorist activities because of the
difficulty to use such materials for terrorist purposes.  
Awareness of chemical agents that could be used in the
purification of Pu and U for use in terrorist activities
either from nuclear weapons or from irradiated fuel could
be an important signature to prevent their use in terrorist
attacks.  Universally, the standard purification method for
U and Pu has been the Purex process, which uses tributyl
phosphate as a solvent extractant.  Large-scale purchases
of this material would immediately be a source of concern.
However, it is likely that terrorist groups who might
attempt to use these materials would use alternate processes
with different materials.  Knowledge of these alternate
materials and processes would enhance intelligence activities.
Technology Need Present Problem
Stabilization of nuclear
materials against dispersal.
Radioactive material invento-
ries are increasing, and safe
and secure storage of these
isotopes is required.
Technology Need Present Problem
Understanding of alternative
process chemistry, prolifera-
tion-resistant fuel cycles.
Unconventional nuclear
materials processing may 
not be detected by current
methods.
4 “Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX) Exploitation and Destruction in Power Reactors,” Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop, Obninsk,
Russia, October 16–19, 1994, Eds., Erich R. Merz , Carl E. Walter, Gennady M. Pshakin, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1995.
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There is significant activity internationally on alternate
processing systems for irradiated nuclear fuel.  These
include aqueous systems as well as nonaqueous separation
systems, volatility methods, and other advanced concepts.
The technological requirements for further advancements
in this field include synthesis, and testing and characteri-
zation of new separation methods with particular emphasis
on the isolation and purification of the actinide elements.  
An example of the potential basis for new actinide separa-
tions systems is neoteric solvents, such as ionic liquids,
supercritical carbon dioxide, or fluorous phases, that can
be considered new classes of solvents for targeted dissolu-
tion and separation of transuranic elements.  Such new
processing conditions represent several fundamental
unknowns.  Use of these solvents may lead to unique 
signatures that are valuable in identifying and locating
process sources; the solvents may lead to cheaper, better,
cleaner processing and/or separations; or there may be
unique chemistries not possible through traditional 
solvent routes.  
Actinide speciation and coordination in many neoteric
solvents are unknown, but knowledge of speciation and
coordination is essential in optimizing separation schemes.
Solvent characteristics such as thermal stability, radiolytic
stability, and heat capacity are for the most part unknown.
These characteristics need to be determined for fundamental
chemistry and separations purposes.  
Understanding neoteric solvent-based separations may
result in improved methods for separating and purifying
actinide elements. It also will aid in identification of unique
signatures of reprocessing via this method, if such signa-
tures exist.
The knowledge base that results from basic research stud-
ies on separations and heavy element chemistry is an
important component in the identification and tracking of
new methods for reprocessing of nuclear fuel and the early
discovery of such reprocessing should it be attempted
clandestinely for terrorism purposes.  
2.3.4 Protection/Response and Recovery
Environmental sampling and analysis of elements and 
isotopes diagnostic of the isotope enrichment processes
needed for production of nuclear materials are a key
means of detecting nuclear threats.  River water samples,
atmospheric aerosol samples, and other water source 
sampling may all contain elemental and isotopic signatures
diagnostic of nuclear proliferation.  Either the radionuclides
themselves (e.g., U-235, Np-237, Pu-239, etc.) or byprod-
ucts of the enrichment process (e.g., fission products) can
be detected in the environment with ultra-low detection
limits using chemical or geochemical sampling protocols
and analytical instrumentation.  
Sampling protocols have been developed for sediments
and waters to support environmental restoration efforts,
and the general analytical framework to analyze samples 
is understood.5 Limitations exist, however, that are 
principally associated with sensitivity, speed and through-
put, fieldability for on-site response, and integration of
Technology Need Present Problem
Identification of the chemical
and physical form of a 
contaminant.
Insufficient knowledge of
chemical signatures, low 
signal for widely dispersed
material, needed information
for predicting fate and 
transport not available.
5 Groundwater & Soil Cleanup: Improving Management of Persistent Contaminants, National Research Council. Committee on Technologies for
Cleanup of Subsurface Contaminants in the DOE Weapons Complex: Board on Radioactive Waste Management; National Research Council,
Commission on Geosciences, Environment, and Resources, Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999.
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existing archived data with analytical tools to assist cali-
bration and interpretation.  Research objectives associated
with these technology gaps include development of new 
instrumental approaches.  Research into the processes 
that control the fundamental signatures in environmental
substrates, governing the correlation between agents and
sources, would be one of the prerequisites to developing
new methods.  
If nuclear materials are dispersed through a terrorist act,
large areas at or near the site will become contaminated.
Research efforts on fundamental science relevant to the
cleanup of radionuclides have been supported by BES.
Additional research is being conducted in DOE’s EMSP
program.  However, these research efforts have been
focused on development of information for the cleanup 
of historical, or “aged,” contamination problems, which
are not likely relevant to the cleanup of recently 
contaminated sites.   
The recent development of new molecular-level spectro-
scopic methods is providing unprecedented opportunities
to explore interfacial processes, in many cases in real time.
These techniques enable study of the dynamics of highly
specific interactions at surfaces.  They include scanning
probe microscopy (SPM), x-ray absorption spectroscopies
(XAS) with microscale spatial resolution, laser microscopy,
scanning electron microscopy (SEM), high-resolution
transmission electron microscopy (HRTEM), and electron
microprobe (EM) methods.  An ever-increasing body of
evidence from these methods demonstrates that radionuclide
sorption at the mineral-water interface begins with specific
molecular-level interactions.  These are the chemical reac-
tions that scale up to yield the macroscopic interfacial
phenomena observed in the environment and, ideally, can
be predicted with geochemical models.  Confidence in such
predictions can be improved by a mechanistic understanding
of these molecular reactions and their representation as
equilibrium thermodynamic or kinetic expressions in 
such models.  
Aged contamination represents an established steady state
that has developed over time following the initial sorption.
The sorption processes that are relevant following a terrorist
event are more likely kinetically driven.  To address these
science needs, research should focus on defining the initial
kinetic processes and the mechanisms whereby radionu-
clides are sorbed to environmental matrices.  The tools
described above should make this possible.  This information
will be essential in developing clean-up strategies for
deployment after a terrorist event involving nuclear materials.
Beyond identification of the mechanisms of sorption and
transport, research is required on treatment methods
appropriate to immobilize or mobilize contaminants in a
controlled fashion with minimal disruption to the host
matrix.  Understanding of interfacial redox and complexa-
tion chemistry is distinct from traditional solution process
chemistry, but will be key to successful development of
new clean-up protocols.
To the extent that the application of separation science to
counter terrorism involves the isolation, separation, or
preconcentration of radioactive metal ions, the general
research needs identified are the following:
Technology Need Present Problem
Develop clean-up strategies
for deployment after a terror-
ist event involving radioac-
tive materials.
Initial sorption processes
resulting from a terrorist
event are kinetically driven.
Better knowledge of funda-
mental equilibrium chemistry,
radiation chemistry, and
kinetics of chemical reactions
involving radionuclides (for
improved predictions for
during response and cleanup)
are needed.
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▲ Development of highly specific ligands, allowing
separations to be performed in fewer steps, with
smaller equipment, or with lesser volumes of reagents,
and cost-effective methods for their synthesis.
▲ Development and application of improved 
computational methods for ligand design.
▲ Application of parallel synthesis technologies and
combinatorial methods to the preparation and 
evaluation of new ligands.
▲ Improved understanding of the thermodynamics and
kinetics of solute-solvent interactions, permitting
selection of the most appropriate separation medium
(solvent, ion-exchange resin, membrane) and offering
additional opportunities to increase process efficiency.
▲ Greater consideration of complexation and mass
transfer kinetics in the design of extractants and
complexing agents.
▲ Application of modern experimental (e.g., synchrotron
radiation sources) and theoretical (molecular dynamics
calculations) methodology to the development of an
improved understanding of the properties of liquid-
liquid and liquid-solid interfaces, thus providing new
perspectives on the nature of separations-relevant
processes occurring at these interfaces.
▲ Development of environmentally benign separation
processes that produce no secondary wastes and 
consume no chemicals.
To mitigate the chemical consequences of radioactive 
contamination in the environment, predictive models are
required.  Much is known about the fundamental radiation
effects in homogeneous systems of common materials.
However, the chemical effects of ionizing radiation on
complex, heterogeneous environments are largely unknown.
Fundamental information on the time evolution of events
following the absorption of radiation by complex materials
and at interfaces is, therefore, needed.  The absorption of
radiation in complex materials changes the chemical and
physical properties of the material.  This is particularly
important in systems that are common in the natural 
environment.  Oxidation state, surface potential, lattice
parameters, reactive site density, solubility, particle size,
and size distribution of soil particles, humic substances,
minerals, metal ions, etc., will all change as a result of the
radiolytic processes and affect the mobility and migration
of radionuclides in the environment.  In a terrorist attack
involving nuclear incidents, components of sensors (optical
materials, semiconductors, plastics, etc.), which are 
sensitive to radiolytic effects, will suffer significant 
performance deterioration.  These can be modeled, and
remedies may be offered if fundamental information on
the effects of radiation is available.  
Studies should include not only electron and gamma 
irradiation, but also the effects of alpha particles and 
neutrons. Ionizing radiation is one of the available methods
for preventing the spread of lethal bioagents via steriliza-
tion.  Improving the efficiency of the sterilization process
and minimizing adverse side products are significant 
challenges.  Existing machines use electron beams whose
penetration depth is relatively limited.  Scenarios should
be developed to enhance penetration depth, and thereby
the efficiency of the sterilization process.  At the high
doses required for sterilization, the object itself may be
damaged.  This not only destroys the object, but may also
Technology Need Present Problem
Better understanding of 
radiation effects on environ-
mental materials.
Insufficient knowledge of
chemical consequences of
irradiation of environmentally
exposed materials.
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release noxious gases, which may harm the personnel 
handling the materials.   Fundamental studies, experimental
and computational, will identify and quantify the risks
from using ionizing radiation and develop strategies to 
minimize them.
2.4 Research Needs
The preceding sections have identified a number of scientific
issues and research needs than can have significant impact
in addressing critical problems associated with countering
radiological and nuclear threats.  The following are some
of the most critical issues that were identified.
2.4.1 Scientific Issues
Chemical Separations
Chemical separations will play an important role in 
delineating the scope of contamination, mitigating the
damage, and facilitating recovery from a terrorist event.
Continued research is required on critical issues including
the isolation, separation, or preconcentration of radioac-
tive metal ions.  In addition, resources should be directed
toward the development of environmentally benign 
separation processes that produce no secondary wastes
and consume no chemicals.
Ion/Molecular Recognition
Selective ligands for actinides and fission products will
play a key role in technologies associated with detection,
prevention, and response and recovery. Combinatorial
chemistry approaches should be used to aid in the design
of new receptors. In addition, new approaches for model-
ing and characterizing the thermodynamics and kinetics
of radionuclide-ligand interaction will help to accelerate
the development of more effective ligands. 
Interfacial Science
There is a significant need to describe the behavior of
actinides in more complex media, often involving 
nonequilibrium conditions, and chemical speciation/
distribution at interfaces (solid/solution, aqueous
phase/biological membrane, etc.).  Research should seek
to establish the nature of chemical processes, including
those between actinides and fission products and reactive
surfaces.  This will require the development of new probes
to characterize kinetic, thermodynamic, and structural 
elements at surfaces. 
Computing, Modeling, and Simulation
It will be critical to develop improved algorithms and
computing platforms to provide accurate predictions for
nuclear, atomic, molecular, and macromolecular properties
and interactions.  Important areas for such calculations are
as diverse as determining the influence of hyperfine, 
electrostatic, and magnetic interactions on atomic and
ionic spectra of actinide isotopes to improving the design
of novel scintillator materials.  Insight gained from theo-
retical calculations must be integrated into the planning,
execution, and analysis of experiments, particularly those
designed to assess new approaches to countering terrorism. 
Advanced Instrumentation/ Laser and 
Mass Spectroscopy
Many of the advanced instrumentation needs that were
identified, such as large-area tomography, will have to be
addressed by multidisciplinary research teams of scientists
and engineers. The continued development of high-sensi-
tivity spectroscopic tools will underpin research efforts in
chemical speciation of actinide and fission products under
a variety of conditions.  Advances in laser-based tech-
niques are needed for improved stand-off detection, while
improvements in the performance of conventional mass
spectrometry instruments are needed to address the broad
range of isotopes and elements that need to be quantified. 
Novel Materials
Combinatorial chemistry or other rapid synthesis and
assessment techniques along with insight gained from 
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theoretical calculations should be employed to improve
scintillator performance.  The same methods can also be
applied to ligand design for specific ion separations.
Research in actinide materials is required to address 
technology needs in material stabilization.
Alternative Processing Chemistry
Fundamental research in physical and chemical separation
methods, chemistry in alternative media (including non-
aqueous), and methods for isotopic enrichment, is needed
to understand the possibilities for alternative processing of
nuclear materials and their potential for affecting nuclear
proliferation.  This research might also lead to the devel-
opment of new processes that have significant advantages
over our current technologies.
2.4.2 Research Environment and Infrastructure
The DOE is the only source of funding for fundamental
and applied research studies involving radiation effects
and nuclear and radiological materials.  The Office of
Science has the stewardship role for fundamental research
in these areas.  However, the resources allocated to these
areas have, in general, been decreasing over the last three
decades.  This has resulted in a net loss of personnel and
aging infrastructure, including a lack of modern equip-
ment.  These problems are not only acute at the national
laboratories, but are also reflected at universities where
faculty positions and studies in radiochemistry and nuclear
chemistry have been rapidly declining.  
Most of the buildings and facilities at the national labora-
tories used for fundamental research with radioactive
materials were built more than thirty years ago.
Upgrading and modernizing these facilities is necessary to
bring them to modern day standards and also to imple-
ment new research tools to advance fundamental research
in heavy element chemistry and physics and the effects 
of radiation.  This is an essential first step necessary to 
reinvigorate the national laboratories.  Collaborative
efforts or virtual conferencing should be encouraged to
facilitate productive interaction among geographically
diverse team members.
Education and Training
The key need for all areas of Homeland Security is trained
personnel.  For the Radiological / Nuclear Threats area,
this means that personnel trends in both university and
national laboratory programs must be reversed for DOE to
maintain a cadre of qualified scientists and personnel that
can address radiological technical issues and threats now
and into the future.  With the realization that nuclear
power represents, at least at present, the only major source
of energy without the production of carbon dioxide, it is
even more critical to attack the personnel and infrastruc-
ture problems that can greatly handicap future programs.
In addition, the further development of nuclear power,
although it brings the risk of terrorist attacks, reduces the
dependence of the U.S. on foreign sources of oil and 
the risk of the U.S. being held “hostage” by foreign oil-
producing nations.
Although radio and nuclear chemistry was an active
research area at many universities, the facilities to conduct
radiochemical research and education at universities are
either disappearing or have aged beyond a useful stage.
Furthermore, whereas aspects of nuclear science and nuclear
engineering were once considered an important part of
the general science and engineering curricula, others, per-
ceived to be of more general interest, have replaced these
subjects.  Without the infrastructure to educate science
and engineering undergraduates in nuclear science and
engineering, the general population becomes increasingly
ignorant of the risks associated with a radiological or
nuclear attack and will not understand response efforts.  
The supply of trained radiochemists is seriously impeded
by the lack of facilities at universities to conduct research
and teaching in this area.  University radiochemistry 
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programs also provide an additional source of novel ideas
and research agendas to complement those at the national
laboratories. Without an incentive for adequate infrastruc-
ture within the educational system, the universities will
continue to close the few remaining programs in nuclear
science and engineering, and the knowledge base in radio-
chemistry and actinide science, and the ability to respond
to threats will be eroded.  Applications of radiochemistry
and, to some extent, actinide chemistry extend not only to
defense programs, nuclear energy, and counter terrorism,
but also to areas more attractive to the general public such
as environmental cleanup and nuclear medicine (e.g.,
advances in cancer treatment and diagnosis).  
One attractive concept is to augment the national labora-
tory programs and facilities that deal with radiation chem-
istry and heavy element chemistry and physics by creating
regional centers (with national coordination) that can act
as user facilities for university programs.  The model for
this type of center is the user facilities and programs at
DOE’s synchrotron sources.  In this scenario, the national
laboratories will provide materials, training, facilities, and
instrumentation for visiting researchers to be able to come
to the center and perform experiments with materials or
equipment not available at their institutions.  Part of the staff
at the national laboratory will be responsible for training
these visitors and facilitating their experiments.  At the same
time, universities should extend their training and research
in these areas with courses taught by national laboratory
personnel in their specialty science areas to supplement
the traditional university radiochemistry programs.
To help universities initiate and/or continue their programs
in nuclear and radiochemistry, DOE should consider the
award of start-up funds for newly appointed and established
faculty in research areas that are determined to be in the
national interest.  Such grants might be for five years and
renewable based upon peer review.  These faculty and their
students could collaborate with the national laboratory
regional centers to avoid duplication of resources and to
strengthen the ties between academia and the national
laboratories.  Clearly, such programs would benefit DOE
and the U.S. by providing qualified scientists and personnel
to pursue future radiological/nuclear issues.
BES-Supported User Facilities
Over the last several years, both national laboratory and
university researchers have successfully capitalized on the
ability to perform experiments with radioactive materials
at many of the BES-supported user facilities.  This is par-
ticularly true at the synchrotron radiation light sources,
where significant experiments contributing to the under-
standing of both fundamental and applied aspects of 
radiological materials relevant to issues of homeland 
security have been performed.  
Many of the user facilities are situated at national labora-
tories or at DOE centers that have sufficient infrastructure
and experience handling radioactive materials in accor-
dance with DOE standards to permit and support a rea-
sonable number of such activities.  However, to facilitate
more efficient and productive scientific investigations of
radioactive materials, as well as to engage a larger commu-
nity of users, additional operational support for these stud-
ies is necessary, especially since the safety aspects are an
integral and time-consuming component of the experi-
ments.  Furthermore, having the ability to capably handle
materials close to the user facilities is also important, and
the need for support of these “satellite” user facility labora-
tories should be recognized.  An increased level of opera-
tional support for the use of radioactive materials, at least
in the case of synchrotron radiation sources, will also
allow utilization of a larger number of synchrotron radia-
tion techniques.  
2.4.3 Relationships with Other Programs
DOE is the only source of funding for fundamental radio-
logical and radiation chemistry because of its role in
nuclear weapons design, manufacturing, and stewardship,
as well as in managing the environmental legacy of
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weapons production.  Strong scientific ties exist between
core BES programs and the Environmental Management
Science Program (EMSP), particularly in areas relating to
the development of chemistry for waste treatment or diag-
nostics of chemical behavior.  It is important to note that
these specific areas have been cited as research needs in
the context of counter terrorism.  Technologies derived
from BES-funded research are now beginning to find 
interest in appropriate NNSA programs.  Certainly research
investment in analytical tools (e.g., mass spectrometry)
has been and will continue to be a vital contribution to
programs in radiochemical analysis sponsored by DOE –
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and 
a variety of other federal agencies.
Strong interests exists between research in heavy element
and radiation chemistry and Defense Programs activities
within the NNSA.  Historically, BES-sponsored programs
have been integral to the development of process chemistry
for the chemical and isotopic separation of actinides.  More
recently, these programs are playing a significant role in the
development of tools to investigate chemical and structural
properties of materials related to weapons components,
including the effects of aging and radiolysis.  This has led
to the development of new partnerships between NNSA
laboratories and user facilities supported by BES.
New relationships are likely to develop as a function of
increased emphasis on relevant research areas within BES.
For example, as research is expanded to include a greater
role for fission product research, overlap will be strength-
ened with technical interests in BER and DOE-NE (e.g.,
NE-70, the Office of Isotopes for Medicine and Science).
These include mutual interest in the biological chemistry
and coordination chemistry of radionuclides, as well as the
development of novel separations methods for purification
and isolation.  It is significant to note that interactions are
increasing between DOE laboratory programs in heavy
element chemistry and university-based programs in radio-
chemistry.  These collaborations are encouraged in principle
through the Office of Nuclear Energy through programs
such as the Advanced Nuclear Medicine Initiative (ANMI)
and the Innovations in Nuclear Infrastructure and Education
(INIE) initiative.  While these do not specifically fund
work in counter terrorism, they may support the 
infrastructure and training needs (as cited above).
2.4.4 Dual-Use Opportunities
The knowledge to be gained from these and associated
research programs will not only hold value in countering
terrorism, but can make contributions to many other tech-
nology areas.  For example, improvements in radiation–
detection schemes or materials for radiation detection
would be beneficial in a range of applications from medical
diagnostics to astrophysics research.  Improved under-
standing of chemistry in complex matrices has already
been highlighted as a research topic that can bring great
benefit to the DOE complex in meeting its responsibilities
for long-term stewardship at a number of contaminated
facilities and at waste repository sites.  Improved knowl-
edge of process and materials chemistry will be integral to
the implementation of advanced nuclear fuel cycles, and
will equally contribute to solving problems in materials
stabilization or disposition.  Through examination of
interfacial and materials chemistry, this research will also
devise new scientific tools suited to addressing technical
questions in one of the primary missions of the DOE:
stewardship of the nation’s nuclear stockpile (in particular,
examination of the effects of aging on key materials).  
Finally, it has long been recognized that the scientific
infrastructure associated with actinide and fission product
research within the DOE is very similar to that required
for further development of nuclear medicine.  This is 
recognized directly in the DOE-funded summer nuclear
chemistry schools, as well as in the curricula of a number
of university departments emphasizing nuclear and radio-
chemistry.  This overlap will become even more significant
in the event that BES-sponsored research can be expanded
to include more research on fission products.
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3.1 Terror ism Threats and Techno logy  Needs
Potential chemical threats from terrorist attacks include
chemical weapons, toxic industrial chemicals and materials
(referred to in this report as TIMs), and explosives.
Chemical warfare agents, or simply chemical agents (i.e.,
nerve, choke, blister agents, etc.), are well known and
therefore possibly perceived by the general public to be
the greatest threat.  However, TIMs are far more readily
available and constitute a significant threat.  TIMs are
defined as those chemicals with an LCt50 value (lethal
concentration for 50% of the population multiplied by
exposure time) of less than 100,000 mg-min/m3 in any
mammalian species and produced in quantities exceeding
30 tons per year.1 Explosives, on the other hand, are
undoubtedly the chemical threat agent that has 
historically been most highly utilized by terrorists.
This section deals only with the challenges associated
with conventional (e.g., non-nuclear) explosives.  Nuclear
and radiological threats are discussed in Section 2 of this
report.  Each of these specific threats has unique charac-
teristic and associated technology needs to facilitate
detection, preparedness, prevention, protection, and
response and recovery.  This section describes these
threats and associated technology needs in more detail,
gives examples of how current and previous research 
within Basic Energy Sciences (BES) is helping to counter
these threats, and defines future research directions for
improving homeland defense capabilities with respect 
to chemical threats. 
3.1.1 Chemical Warfare Agents
Chemical warfare agents were designed to have devastat-
ing effects on their target and to achieve those effects in a
short period of time.  Chemical weapons are commonly
grouped according to their major physiological activity as
blister, nerve, choking, and blood agents.  The nerve
agent Sarin, for example, was used by the Aum Shinrikio
terrorist organization in an attack on the Tokyo subway in
1995.  The attack exposed 5,000–6,000 people to the
agent, hospitalizing nearly 500 people and killing 11.
Some of those requiring medical attention because of
exposure to the nerve agent were first responders and
medical personnel. 
Detection
Rapid and specific detection of chemical weapons is an
important technological need.  The first responders in
future terrorist incidents within the U.S. will be local law
enforcement, fire, and medical personnel, and the budgets
of many localities will not accommodate expensive detec-
tion equipment.  Thus, cost restrictions are imposed on
future detectors intended for widespread use and field
deployment. 
The Institute of Medicine, National Research Council,
published a survey of detectors for chemical agents in
1999.2 Of the 100 detectors identified, funding for their
development came from the Department of Defense
(DoD) (28%), commercial companies (56%), and the
remainder from other agencies, including the Department
of Energy (DOE), Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), and the Technical Support Working Group
(TSWG).  These figures reflect what was previously 
considered to be a military need, as opposed to a home-
land defense need; however, the figures do not necessarily
reflect the source of basic research funding that led to 
the discovery of fundamental principles on which these
instruments are based.  
All detectors surveyed had sufficient sensitivity to detect
chemical agents at high enough concentrations to present
an immediate health hazard, but only the most expensive
3   Chemical Threats
1 A. A. Fatah, J. A.; Barrett, R. D. Arcilesi, D.J. Ewing, C. H. Lattin, and M. S. Helinski, Guide for the Selection of Chemical Agent and Toxic
Industrial Material Detection Equipment for Emergency First Responders, NIJ Guide 100-00, Volume I, June 2000, NCJ184449.
2 “Chemical and Biological Terrorism: Research and Development to Improve Civilian Medical Response,” Committee on R&D Needs for Improving
Civilian Medical Response to Chemical and Biological Terrorism Incidents, Health Science Policy Program, Institute of Medicine; and Board on
Environmental Studies and Toxicology, Commission on Life Sciences, National Research Council, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.; 1999.
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systems had sensitivities sufficient to ensure the complete
health and safety of victims and responders.2 Further,
false-positive responses were a problem in some chemical
agent detectors, which is a highly undesirable characteris-
tic for detectors used in a civilian environment.  The
future of chemical weapons detectors relies on new funda-
mental developments in the areas of separation and analysis,
materials chemistry, chemical transformations, and atomic
and molecular spectroscopy.
Protection/Response and Recovery
An integral part of incident response and recovery is the
decontamination of chemical agents to remove any resid-
ual source of slowly vaporizing material.  Chemical-agent
simulants have been shown to penetrate porous building
materials, thereby providing a continuously emitting
source and complicating the decontamination process.3
An understanding of the movement of chemical agents
and decontaminating reagents through porous building
materials constitutes a technological need for efficient and
complete decontamination.  This need is emphasized by a
general lack of knowledge regarding health effects from
long-term exposure to low concentrations of chemical
agents.  The potential for low-level exposure also points
to the need for finding biological markers of low-level
exposure to chemical agents, as well as other chemical
threats, to facilitate early detection and treatment for
exposure.  Decontamination of victims and nonporous 
surfaces exposed to many chemical agents can be achieved
with dilute bleach and through adsorption onto dry
decontamination materials.  Supporting fundamental
knowledge from BES-funded studies of chemical reactions
in complex media, materials synthesis and processing, and
catalysis and chemical transformations will guide develop-
ments in this important area.
Personal protection equipment (PPE) for chemical agents
consists of protective clothing and masks for respiratory
protection.  PPE suitable for use against chemical weapons
is commercially available, but the items are bulky and
physically demanding to wear.  Technological needs exist
for lighter weight protective and reactive barrier materials
for PPE.  Future technologies for catalytic decomposition
and adsorptive binding of chemical agents will be founded
on basic research advances in areas such as physical and
chemical properties of materials, surface and interface 
science, catalysis and chemical transformations, and 
materials synthesis and processing.
3.1.2 TIMs
In 1999, the General Accounting Office reported to
Congress (Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans
Affairs and International Relations, Committee on
Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives) its
finding from a survey conducted among law enforcement
and intelligence agencies regarding the threat of chemical
and biological terrorism in the U.S.  The report concluded
that “in most cases terrorists would have to overcome 
significant technical and operational challenges to 
successfully make and release chemical or biological
agents of sufficient quantity to kill or injure large numbers
of people without substantial assistance from a state 
sponsor.” 4 In the GAO report, a “large number of 
people” was defined to be greater than one thousand. 
A likely alternative chemical weapon for terrorists is often
considered to be TIMs.  Unlike chemical weapons, TIMs
are not designed to kill people; however, many TIMs are
highly toxic and are produced in very large quantities by
chemical manufacturers throughout the world.  A list of
approximately 100 TIMs and their respective toxicity 
ratings has been published elsewhere.1 The onset of
symptoms from TIMs exposure may be delayed for up to
several days in some cases.  A powerful example of the
deadly nature of some TIMs is the accidental release of
methylisocyanate in Bhopal, India, on December 2, 1984.
In the Bhopal accident, 40 tons of methylisocyanate were
released over 90 minutes, exposing 200,000 people and
killing 8,000.  This single incident claimed almost three
times as many lives as the September 11, 2001, attacks on
New York and Washington, D.C. 
3 R. A. Jenkins, M. V. Buchanan, R. Merriweather, R., R. H. Ilgner, T. M. Gayle, and A. P. Watson, J. Hazardous Material 1994, 37, 303.
4 GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50.
32
Basic Research Needs for countering terrorism
Detection
Many technological needs for homeland defense from ter-
rorist attacks utilizing TIMs are very similar to those for
chemical weapons.  However, detection devices designed
for use with one class of chemical threat (i.e., chemical
weapons) may not properly identify or respond to the
other (i.e., TIMs).  The Department of Justice recently
published the results of a survey of 148 detectors capable
of detecting chemical weapons and TIMs.1 Of 69 hand-
held-portable instruments surveyed, 12 had chemical
weapons detection capabilities, 52 had TIMs detection
capabilities, and only 5 would respond to both chemical
weapons and TIMs.  None of the vehicle-mounted, fixed-
site detection systems or fixed-site analytical or stand-off
detectors had TIMs detection capability.  Technological
barriers to generalized multi-threat detectors will require
basic research in separations and analysis, atomic and
molecular spectroscopy, and materials synthesis and 
processing.
Protection/Response and Recovery
Many of the decontamination and personal protective
equipment issues associated with chemical agents also
apply to TIMs.  However, in the case of TIMS, material
safety data sheets and first-aid information are readily
available for these industrial products.  In addition, risk
assessment studies have already been performed for most
common industrial materials.  Biological markers and 
long-term health effects of low-level exposure are also
important for TIMs. 
3.1.3 Explosives
As a chemical threat, explosives are dramatically different
from chemical agents and TIMs.  A terrorist action utiliz-
ing a conventional explosive may result in a catastrophic
event that takes many lives, but the event is not likely to
result in post-event decontamination and mitigation prob-
lems associated with the explosives compounds them-
selves.  Like TIMs, explosives are produced in large quan-
tities throughout the world for military and commercial
applications.  Some explosives can be prepared from mate-
rials available at virtually any pharmacy.  The availability
of explosives and the widespread recipes for their use in
publicly available books and on the internet contribute to
the large number of terrorist events involving explosives. 
Explosives have been used in many terrorist attacks within
the U.S. and abroad.  The most notable terrorist attack
within the U.S. that utilized explosives was undoubtedly
the bombing of Oklahoma City’s Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in 1995.  In that event, the detonation of several
tons of ammonium nitrate fertilizer mixed with nitromethane-
based racing fuel took the lives of 168 people, including
19 children.  In 1993, the World Trade Center withstood
an attack by a bomb containing in excess of 1,000 pounds
of nitrourea and hydrogen gas cylinders.  Six people died
and more than 1,000 people were injured in the attack.
More recently, a mixture of pentaerythritiol tetranitrate
(PETN) and triacetone triperoxide (TATP) packed into 
the soles of a terrorist’s shoes failed to detonate aboard an
American Airlines flight in December 2001.
Detection
Commercial detectors for explosives are deployed
throughout the world to safeguard against terrorist
attacks.  Lower limits of detection and higher specificity
are ever-present technological needs in the area of explo-
sives detection.  Chemically specific standoff detection
can be especially important for safe detection of explosives.
The low vapor pressures of most explosives impose tech-
nological challenges in sample collection and transport
that are unique to the detection of this chemical threat. 
Protection/Response and Recovery
In some instances, the severity of a terrorist event involv-
ing an explosive device could be mitigated by containing
the primary blast or through shielding from the blast.
The fundamental technological barriers involved in 
containing a blast are embodied in materials science and
structural engineering.  Fundamental advances in the areas
of separations and analysis, atomic and molecular spec-
troscopy, and surface and interface science will lead to
better detectors, sampling methodologies, and incident
containment technologies in the future.
3.2 BES Research Accompl ishments and
Impl icat ions for  Counter ing Te r ro r i sm
Fundamental research within the DOE’s Office of Basic
Energy Sciences has contributed significantly to existing
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and emerging technologies that can be applied to counter-
ing terrorist chemical threats.  Fundamental research will
continue to have an impact on all areas of homeland
defense, including detection, preparedness, prevention,
protection, and response and recovery.  Examples of some
of this research are outlined below.
3.2.1 Detection 
Optical Spectroscopy
Interfering background components are a ubiquitous barrier
to real-world deployment of sensors and detectors.  BES-
supported research programs in separations and analysis
are assisting in breaking down these barriers and enhancing
the ability to confidently detect trace compounds.  Several
research programs are devoted to the development and
utilization of laser-based ultra-sensitive detection schemes
for monitoring molecular species.  Fluorescence, absorp-
tion, and laser/mass spectrometric techniques are employed
to push the detection limits toward the ultimate goal of
single molecule detection.  Research in advanced laser-based
chemical measurement problems has led to advances in
high-sensitivity and high-resolution measurements in gas
and condensed-phase chemical systems.  This research has
evolved to investigate molecules in micro- and nano-domains
and at interfaces, including molecules adsorbed on individual
particles, contained in microdroplets, and within microflu-
idic “lab-on-a-chip” devices. 
Specialized light sources at BES Scientific User Facilities
provide researchers with the ability to scan the electro-
magnetic spectrum from x-rays up to the infrared.  These
powerful light sources provide a tool for gaining funda-
mental insight into molecular spectroscopy and properties
that may form the basis for future detection techniques.
Resonant laser photoionization of sputtered atoms from
surfaces can measure as few as 10 atoms and can measure
target analytes in concentrations as low as parts per trillion.
Fundamental laser-based studies, coupled with advances in
microfabricated separation and analysis systems such as
lab-on-a-chip devices, hold much promise for future tech-
nologies to counter terrorism.  BES-supported fundamental
studies in energy transfer and optical spectroscopy have
led to the discovery of detectors for nitroaromatic explo-
sives and structurally related compounds at the ppb level. 
Microfluidics for Chip-Based Detection 
Many of the detection and identification approaches for countering terrorism will 
benefit from microfabricated chemical and biochemical measurement devices.  To meet
these needs, lab-on-a-chip technology must be able to identify chemical and biological
materials in liquids with low false signatures.  In these devices, typical analysis volumes
will be in the range of one nanoliter where a concentration of one femtomolar would
represent only one to several molecules for analysis.
Measurement at the single molecule limit discussed above requires fundamental 
under-standing of the transfer of target species through the measurement system.
Investigations supported by BES have advanced our understanding of the requirements
for low-level (single molecule) detection in the liquid phase.  Statistical principles
developed and experimentally confirmed in these studies allow molecular detection
efficiencies to be estimated for a given experimental condition.
[Oak Ridge National Laboratories]
A 5 s integrated
CCD image of
Jurkat cells labled
with Calcein under-
going hydrodynamic
focusing for high
sensitivity detection.
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Magnetic Resonance Imaging and Spectroscopy
The emerging technique of Magnetic Resonance Force
Microscopy (MRFM) is being utilized to study problems
where high-resolution 3D imaging is important.  Scientists
are combining the resolution of atomic force microscopy
and the imaging capabilities of magnetic resonance to
produce a new method of nondestructive and chemical-
specific analysis.  Ex situ magnetic resonance imaging is 
a fundamental breakthrough that may provide a future
detection technology.  Nuclear magnetic resonance,
which places the sample “outside” the magnet, has poten-
tial for detecting bulk quantities of enclosed materials. 
Mass Spectrometry
The specificity required by many analytical problems 
benefits from the high information content of mass 
spectral analysis.  Fundamental research has led to many
advances in our understanding of the chemical processes
comprising the framework of mass spectrometry, ion 
formation, manipulation, and detection and in exploiting
its multidimensional capabilities for chemical analysis and
characterization.  Electron-transfer chemistry, correlation
of gas- and condensed-phase chemistry, ion-molecule and
ion-ion chemistry, surface chemistry, and mechanisms and
energetics of ion processes are among the wide array fun-
damental issues addressed in this research.  Many of the
advances from these studies aid in enhanced analysis capa-
bilities and for the future miniaturization of mass spec-
trometers for field detection devices and have already
demonstrated capabilities for detection of chemical agents
and explosives.  Precise methods have also been devel-
oped for analyzing the distribution of stable light isotopes
(e.g., D/H, 13C/12C, and 18O/16O) to better than 1 part
in 105 for samples with masses less than one nanogram.
Precise isotopic ratio measurement may play a significant
role in future forensic and attribution efforts to counter
terrorism by helping to identify the geographical and
manufacturing origin of terrorist tools. 
Photochemical Nanomaterials for
Explosives Detection
Rapid detection of chemical, biological, or explosives threats has
emerged as a major need in countering terrorism.  In this area, low-
power, portable, and inexpensive devices are key to widespread
deployment.  BES-funded research on the photochemistry of mate-
rials has focused on understanding photosynthesis.  In photosynthe-
sis, a large assembly of molecules in a green plant each collects a
photon of light, and the energy is then funneled into a small spot,
where the chemical conversion of carbon dioxide into fuel can
occur.  The concept of building an antenna to harvest energy over a
large area can also be used to amplify the detection of chemicals.
Studies of luminescent silicon nanoparticles, sponsored by DOE BES, led to the development of quantum dots
and nanowires of silicon that collect light over a large area and then funnel the energy to the vicinity of a mol-
ecule of an explosive, which amplifies the optical signature of the target molecule.  Similar light harvesting/
amplification detection concepts are being developed in other university laboratories and in private industry.
[University of California, San Diego]
A fingerprint from a person who had
recently handled TNT shows
up as a dark spot on a subway ticket
after treatment with the imaging
agent (right ticket).
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Detection and Nanoscale Properties of Materials
The future of detectors for countering chemical threats
from terrorists lies in making the devices smaller and more
robust.  Fundamental studies in materials synthesis and
processing are providing the groundwork for future devel-
opments in this area.  Research into the use of templated
self-assembly to create nanoporous inorganic materials
may find applications in future development of sensor
platforms and separations elements.  The basic principles
governing self-assembly of complex hybrid interfacial and
laminar species are also being addressed in parallel efforts.
Novel ceramic/polymer and metal/polymer nanocompos-
ites, prepared by employing magnetic fields, represent
new classes of tailored materials with a variety of potential
applications in chemical sensing.  The fundamentals of
thin film growth, epitaxy, and structural evolution are also
being studied with a focus on elastic strain resulting from
film microstructure and surface morphology.  Materials
containing d- and f-electrons can exhibit complex and 
collective states resulting from competing interactions.
Research has shown that these complex states are highly
susceptible to small perturbations and may form the basis
for future detectors of weak magnetic fields, small temper-
ature or volume changes, and chemical environment and
incident electromagnetic radiation.  The results of these
studies provide important support for future development
of field sensors for chemical threats. 
The role of nanostructures in controlling the behavior of
materials is being elucidated through fundamental
research.  Theoretical and experimental tools are being
utilized to understand the fundamental mechanisms gov-
erning the electronic and optical properties of nanostruc-
tured materials.  The basic understanding gained from
these studies will lead to the discovery of new material
properties and physics architectures that can be utilized
for improved efficiency and sensitivity in electronic and
optical detector systems.  In related research, advances in
our fundamental understanding of the atomic and nano-
structural processes governing materials properties are
being sought through the study of energetic-particle 
synthesis, modification, and analysis.  The physics and
Mass Spectrometry for Airport Screening
Mass spectrometry has proven to be one of the more effective tools
for the rapid trace detection of threat compounds, such as explosives,
toxic chemicals, and biological materials.  BES-funded research has
led to the development of quadrupole ion trap mass spectroscopy,
many features of which are incorporated in commercial ion trap
instruments that may be found at airport screening stations.  Ion traps
greatly improve our ability to miniaturize high-performance MS.
These basic research developments are also incorporated into the
U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command that is devel-
oping the Block II Chemical Biological Mass Spectrometer (CBMS).
This program is developing, demonstrating, and delivering to the
Army the first integrated instrument capable of real-time detection and identification of both chemical and
biological warfare agents on the battlefield. 
[Oak Ridge National Laboratory
The Chemical Biological Mass
Spectrometer employs novel fundamental
gas phase processes for highly sensitive
and selective detection of threat agents.
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deformations of ultrafine scale composites that exhibit
extremely high specific strength levels and that can be
assembled into nanostructures capable of responding
to their environment are also being investigated. 
The role of surfaces and interfaces in the development of
new materials for detecting chemical threats is being 
elucidated through fundamental studies at several national
laboratories and universities.  The atomic-scale kinetic
processes of diffusion and atom-defect interactions, as well
as collective phenomena such as self-assembly, on solid
surfaces are being studied.  Self-assembly of metals and
semiconductor materials is a promising approach to rapidly
producing nanoscale sensor arrays and quantum dot 
networks that may be employed in future chemical
threat detection devices.  An atomistic understanding 
of the chemical and physical interactions that control
solid/solid and solid/liquid interface formation is impor-
tant for developing predictive models of adhesive bond
strength, interfacial stability, and flow kinetics.
Understanding these phenomena will assist in tailoring
material surfaces for use in sensing applications.  Surface
Nanocomposite Materials for Chemical
Sensing
An important class of chemical sensors is based on metal/polymer com-
posites materials whose ability to conduct electricity changes in a dra-
matic fashion when exposed to target chemicals.  The secret of this
behavior is in controlling the spacing between the electrically conduc-
tive metal particles.  As chemicals are absorbed, the polymer expands,
creating more space between the particles and making it harder for
electrons to pass from one particle to the next.  While extremely sensi-
tive, the practical application of these sensors is limited by previous
ability to build composites with precise and uniform spacing between
the metal particles.
BES supported research has led to a new approach for building extreme-
ly uniform and controlled composite structures. These composites are
members of a new class of Field-Structured Composites.1 They consist
of 1–5 micron sized magnetic metallic particles suspended in an
uncured polymer solution.  The suspension is then exposed to an axial
magnetic field, causing the magnetic particles to form chains with highly
uniform particle spacing.  Upon final curing, these composites demon-
strate high sensitivity and extremely reproducible sensing performance.
[Sandia National Laboratories]
1J. E. Martin, R. C. Hughes, and R. A. Anderson, Science, Dec. 21 news brief.
Field-Structured Composites – 
showing simulated (top) and 
actual (bottom) structures.
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phenomena in thin films are likely to be the basis of
microelectromechanical sensors of the future.  Studies of
surface acoustic waves (Raleigh waves) in thin films can
serve as the basis for future developments in this impor-
tant area.  Modification of Raleigh wave velocity resulting
from surface modification may be used to detect airborne
chemical agents. 
Finally, detectors of chemical threats will continue to get
smaller and less expensive through the advances in the
area of microfabrication.  Research has led to the develop-
ment of high-throughput x-ray microtomography, capable
of providing full reconstructions of micron-size parts, and
high-resolution 3D imaging.  Advances in lithography,
electroforming, and molding (LIGA) research is providing
the fundamental knowledge required to produce many of
the micron-sized parts that will be required in detectors 
of the future. 
Nanomaterials for Integrated Chemical Analysis
Detection of low levels of chemical toxins with high reliability (low false response) is a major challenge to sen-
sor technologies for countering terrorism.  An alternative approach to improved detection sensitivity and
selectivity can be realized by integrating chemical preconcentration, chemical separations, and detection into a
single miniaturized total chemical analysis system.  This approach relies on multiple levels of discrimination to
achieve high sensitivity and low false responses. 
BES-supported research has made critical contributions to the development of hand-held chemical and biologi-
cal detection systems.  In the example, self-assembled mesoporous sol-gel materials provide highly controlled
nano-sized pores for preconcentration of chemical toxins.  BES-supported research on thin film deposition
processes has allowed direct integration these chemically selective films resulting in greater than one-hundred
fold improvement in the miniaturized system analysis sensitivity.  The improved sensitivity is critical to the
overall capability for the integrated system that is now being evaluated for protection of public assets from ter-
rorist attacks on U.S. soil. 
[Sandia National Laboratories]
Micro-scale heater
The micro-scale heater with its integrated nanoporous film is used in the Sandia National Laboratories developed
µChemLab to provide a 100-fold boost to the performance of this hand-held total analysis system.1
1W. A. Groves, E. T. Zellers, G. C. Frye, Analytica Chimica Acta, 37 (1998), 131-143.
Nanoporous film selectively concentrates 
target analytes.
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3.2.2 Preparedness
An important aspect of countering terrorism is maintain-
ing a state of preparedness. Remaining prepared may
require that detection devices be deployed with an
onboard power source.  When an event occurs, devices
need to operate reliably, without a power-source failure.
Maximizing the power and lifetime of batteries is impor-
tant to maintaining a state of preparedness.  Fundamental
research into the synthesis and properties of materials for
thin film rechargeable lithium batteries has examined the
physical vapor deposition and properties of electrochemi-
cally active thin film materials between 50 nm and 5
microns thick.  The resulting batteries are very thin, less
than 15 microns, and exceptionally stable, and they 
provide both a long cycle life and a long shelf life in the
charged state.  Design changes required to achieve the
optimal low cost and environmentally benign rechargeable
lithium batteries are being addressed.  The high costs and
environmental unacceptability of cobalt containing 
electrodes is an important issue addressed in this research.
The formation and control of interfacial films that form
on the electrode surfaces as a result of chemical reactions
between the electrodes and electrolytes are also being
addressed, along with overcharge and overdischarge 
problems, and mass transport at electrodes. 
3.2.3 Prevention
Preventing terrorist attacks is the ultimate goal of many
agencies and the focus of much fundamental and applied
research.  Basic research into amorphous and aperiodic
materials is being conducted with the goal of understand-
ing the effects of initial atomic arrangements on devitrifi-
cation and deformation behavior.  The influence of crystal
chemistry on the structural stability of aperiodic systems
and atomic mobility in these systems plays key roles in
determining the physical properties of the materials.  This
research is laying the groundwork for the development of
improved heat-resistant materials, longer-lived insulators,
and ultra-hard materials.  Such materials would potentially
be harder to breach, harder to damage, and even less sus-
ceptible to fire. 
3.2.4 Protection
If a terrorist event occurs, the first responders are typically
local emergency personnel.  Fundamental research may
result in materials that better protect first responders.
Investigations into the fabrication of carbon nanotube
membranes may lead to new adsorbent barriers.
Membranes consisting of well-defined arrays of small,
aligned graphitic pores are being sought to separate energy-
related molecules such as hydrogen, methane, carbon
monoxide, and carbon dioxide.  Extending the results
from this work to the adsorption of larger molecules used
as chemical threats may contribute significantly to the
personal protective equipment of the future.  In related
research, mesoporous materials containing mesostructures
characterized by a precise periodic arrangement of inor-
ganic and organic constituents on the 1–50 nm scale can
be prepared by evaporation-driven self-assembly.
Scientists have shown that the pore size can be controlled
in thin films prepared by the process.  The synthetic
method holds potential for the preparation of new materi-
als with membrane/filtration applications. 
Adsorption, absorption, filtration, and separation are
processes that can potentially remove selectively targeted
chemical agents from the environment.  A unique high-
pressure adsorption process has been discovered in fully
hydrated zeolites.  Superhydrated nanoporous materials
can retain an excess of water after pressure release, thus
permitting selective adsorption, immobilization, and stor-
age of chemical species.  At high pressures, the pores of
zeolites expand because of the excess of water, allowing
larger cations to enter the nanopores.  After the pressure
release, the pores contract and trap cations.  Superhydrated
zeolites and nanoporous materials can find application in
waste remediation and immobilization (separation) of
chemical and biological material. 
Fundamental catalysis studies are examining the reactivity
of Au/TiO2 catalyst.  A unique activity of this system for
destruction of SO2 has been discovered for catalysts of
Au/TiO2, and related gold/oxide catalysts may find utility
in the destruction of sulfur mustard chemical agents.
Research has shown that chemical species adsorbed 
onto the surface of oxides, such as silica, alumina, and 
zirconia, undergo radiolytic processes more efficiently. 
A combination of sonication and radiolysis enhances the
efficiency of remediation even more.  Sensitized large-gap
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semiconducting nanocrystals (ZnO, porous Si) are being
used to detect the presence of chemical vapors.  Frontier
research supported by BES in surface-supported polymer-
ization and supported-polymer phase formation holds prom-
ise for future advances in lightweight protective clothing.
3.2.5 Response and Recovery
In open environments, even semi-volatile chemical agents
and TIMs will dissipate.  Nonporous surfaces are readily
decontaminated with existing products.  However, when
semi-volatile chemicals diffuse into porous building mate-
rials, they become much more difficult to decontaminate,
and they can form slowly emitting sources of low-level
concentrations of agent.  Research into the fundamental
aspects of advanced oxidation processes may play a signif-
icant role in the development of future decontamination
strategies for porous materials. 
Photo- and ionizing-radiation induced effects at nonocrys-
talline oxide materials are being investigated. Photolytically
and radiolytically formed species in heterogeneous system
may degrade, neutralize, and destroy toxins, chemical
agents, and TIMs.  By chemical modification of the oxide
surface, a selective adsorption and destruction of reactants
may be achieved. 
3.3 Scient i f ic  Issues and Research Opportun i t i es
The scientific issues associated with countering chemical
threats of terrorism are discussed below in terms of the major
emphasis areas of homeland defense.  The fundamental
issues and the research opportunities in the areas of detec-
tion, preparedness, prevention, protection, and response
and recovery fall into the BES funding areas of materials
synthesis and processing, physical and chemical properties
of materials, surfaces interfaces and thin films, microfabri-
cation, catalysis and chemical transformations, separations
and analysis, and atomic and molecular spectroscopy.
3.3.1 Detection
Micro- and nano-fabricated devices that combine separation
and detection elements into an integrated device (lab-on-
a-chip) are an emerging technology that will play a signif-
icant future role in countering terrorism.  There is a need
for sensors that respond selectively to a given analyte, as
well as those that recognize and respond to a broader set
of threat chemicals and/or harsh conditions that pose a
health hazard.  Advances in materials chemistry, such as
the development of selective coatings, are needed before
molecule-specific recognition elements for sensors can be
realized.  High information content analytical methods,
such as mass spectrometry, provide means of minimizing
false positives while being sufficiently sensitive to achieve
zero false negatives.  Fundamental advances are required
to make these methods fieldable and to expand their utility.
Sample collection and transport requirements will neces-
sarily change as detection technology morphs to meet the
challenges of the future.  The technological frontiers asso-
ciated with each of these challenges are discussed here.
Microfluidics
Although some microfabricated lab-on-a-chip technologies
have already moved from the laboratory to the market,
fundamental research topics remain to be addressed.  In
particular, fundamental understanding of electrokinetic
transport is not well developed.  The structure of the 
electrical double layer formed at the solid/liquid interface
has still not been directly probed experimentally even
though its existence was articulated long ago.
Nonintrusive probes must be developed with nanometer
spatial resolution for such studies.  Additional fluid pump-
ing mechanisms must also be developed to allow compact
low-power devices to be realized.
As the lateral dimensions of microfluidic channels shrink,
the surface-to-volume ratio increases, as do the demands
on our ability to pacify surfaces to preclude nonspecific
adsorption of liquid-borne materials.  Surface characteriza-
tion tools and improved micron-scale surface modification
and patterning chemistries are needed to allow viable
manufacture of lab-on-a-chip devices with spatially het-
erogeneous surface chemistry. These chemistries will also
find utility in improving microfabricated gas phase 
separation and analysis devices.
Technology Need Present Problem
Devices to enable chemical
threat detection are required
for both “detect to treat” and
“detect to protect” scenarios.
Sensors and detection systems
must become smaller and less
expensive to be available for
all first responders and for
deployment in surveillance
arrays.
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New quantification tools are also needed for microfluidic
devices.  Typical analysis volumes in lab-on-a-chip devices
are in the one-nanoliter range.  Femtomolar concentra-
tions in such volumes imply low numbers of molecules in
the analysis volume.  Measurement tools with extreme
sensitivity are needed, and ideally, they should also be
miniature in size and compatible with microfabrication
procedures. 
Nanofluidics
The transport of fluids through nanoscopic conduits is an
area of study that has received very little attention,
although it is fundamental to life.  The fabrication of such
conduits and the active transport of fluid through them
are referred to as nanofluidics.  Detailed understanding of
nanofluidic transport will likely lead to revolutionary tech-
nological capabilities (e.g., the ability to sequence single
molecules of DNA at rates many orders of magnitude
faster than currently possible).  Understanding of molecu-
lar transport in nanoscopic domains will require probing
many fundamental questions in the fields of fluid dynam-
ics and statistical physics.  Theories that need to be inves-
tigated under nanoscale confinement include one- and
two-dimensional fluid theories, fundamental assumptions
of fluid dynamics such as "stick" or "slip" boundary condi-
tions, the scaling of polymer structure and dynamics with
chain length, and the validity of continuum theories.
Fabrication tools must be developed to realize nanofluidic
devices.  Although multiple strategies for formation of
nanochannels appear feasible, fundamental questions
regarding intrinsic surface roughness associated with each
fabrication strategy will be important.  Molecular-scale
channels are essentially entirely interfaced with no bulk
fluid; thus, understanding and control of interfacial chem-
istry on the nanometer scale are paramount.  Molecular
dynamics simulation tools will be needed to understand
transport at this scale, and an understanding of the validity
of continuum theories at nanometer scale must be estab-
lished.  Importantly, transport through molecular-scale
conduits implies that quantification tools must be effective
at the single molecule limit.  Optical and electrochemical
techniques must be developed to interrogate single 
molecule transport.
Chemical Sensors
The current trend in portable chemical detection is to
make sensors selective to the extent of giving analyte 
discrimination at the molecular level.  Detection with
molecular specificity is a difficult challenge, and as the
number of compounds posing chemical threats continues
to increase, the problem only becomes increasingly difficult.
Within the context of terrorist chemical threats, it is 
useful to consider a second paradigm—that of detecting
chemical properties or environmental conditions present-
ing an immediate health hazard.  For example, a large
number of materials will hydrolyze to produce highly
acidic environments that generate a health hazard.  It may
not be feasible to detect all these chemicals with molecu-
lar specificity; however, it is feasible to detect acidic envi-
ronments.  Potential targets for generalized detection
schemes include molecules that bind to iron competitively
with oxygen, and molecules that mimic acetylcholine.  It
may be useful to think of detectors for these chemical
threat groups as “effects sensors,” with the emphasis on
the effect, rather than on the specific chemical.
Fundamental research to overcome the challenges of
developing “effects sensors” should be pursued as a worth-
while target, even though the challenge may not be as
great as that of molecule-selective sensor development.
Molecule-selective chemical sensors for standalone appli-
cation, as well as those embedded into integrated systems
discussed above, will play a crucial role in countering
threats of terrorism.  At the core of a threat-specific sensor
is a molecular recognition event coupled to a transducer
to produce a detectable signal.  Many sensors employ a
thin sorbent layer of chemically selective material to col-
lect and concentrate analyte at the interface of the coating
Technology Need Present Problem
Highly selective sensors are
needed to identify target
chemicals in complex 
backgrounds.
Easy-to-use chemical sensing
techniques are not capable of
molecule specific recognition.
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and transducer.  Detection is elicited by some change in
the physiochemical properties of the interface.  There are
a number of transducer platforms for coupling the binding
event to some observable signal.  Designing the coating
for specific analytes so as to maximize the collection of
analyte and to minimize the collection of interferents is
the most significant challenge to produce an effective
chemical sensor.  
Chemical sensors can employ biological entities such as
antibodies, enzymes, receptors, or whole cells as recogni-
tion elements, commonly referred to as biosensors.  With
the advent of recombinant antibodies and phage display
antibody libraries, recognition elements can now be found
even for analytes for which a natural receptor does not
exist.  However, biological receptors have rather limited
chemical and physical stability that can restrict their use
under harsh conditions that include high temperatures,
extremes in pH, or nonaqueous media.  Biomimetic recep-
tors are attractive alternatives for these applications, since
they lend themselves to rational design and chemical syn-
thesis.  In some cases, affinities and specificities that rival
natural receptors have been achieved.  The most success-
ful examples of this type have been for inorganic ions as
analytes.  However, with targets of increasing complexity,
this strategy becomes less tenable because of the synthetic
challenges associated with the receptors. 
New chemically selective materials are needed that can
recognize complex analytes.  A further requirement is that
the synthesis and processing of these materials be readily
incorporated into transducer platforms for use as sensors.
It would also be desirable that the processes to produce
these materials be amenable to existing microfabrication
technologies.  Strategies such as molecular imprinting
offer considerable potential for making important contri-
butions to this area.  Molecularly imprinted polymers
(MIPs) are robust network materials that may be tailored
for specific analytes.  They offer an advantage in that they
can function under harsh conditions.  Not surprisingly,
there has been considerable effort in recent years to
employ MIPs as the recognition element of chemical 
sensors.  Basic research is needed to expand the range of 
targets (ligands) for which this technique can be used.
Important ligands include water soluble biologicals such as
peptides and proteins.  Imprinted polymers are produced
by bulk polymerization and, as such, are not conveniently
coupled to transducer platforms.  Important developments
would include new imprinting formulations and processes
that are amenable to thin film formation.  The ability to
produce selective materials that can be produced in 2D or
3D spatially resolved domains by photolithographic
processes would facilitate their incorporation into devices.
There is also a lack of basic understanding of how recog-
nition sites of MIPs are produced.  An understanding of
this process can lead to improvements in selectivity and in
convergence towards producing more uniform "monoclonal"
recognition sites.
An additional approach to producing recognition elements
for chemical sensors is through organic polymer
nanophases grafted-from sensor platforms by surface 
initiated polymerization (SIP).  SIP is a new and powerful
method for tethering ultrathin (10–100 nm) polymer 
layers onto surfaces.  SIP offers potential advantages over
attaching preformed polymers to the surface because, for
example, it is easier to achieve high grafting densities.
However, most of the efforts devoted to SIP have employed
standard free radical initiators, resulting in polymers with
broad molecular weight distributions and limited control
over polymer architecture.  Only recently have methods
like living radical and living ionic polymerization been
used to gain better control over the SIP process.  Using
these methods, diblock, triblock, and other architectures
could be grown from the surface, and chain end function-
alization could be achieved.  Block copolymer composi-
tion can be used to control nanophase formation in 
tethered polymer brush systems.  While experimental
work in this area is in its infancy, theory and simulation
predict that a rich range of patterned films could be
achieved by controlling block copolymer composition,
architecture, grafting density, and environment.
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Systematic studies to synthesize well-defined block
copolymer brushes by living SIP processes and to 
investigate their properties are needed.
Control over the spatial extent of polymerization is a 
critical issue for incorporating functional polymers into
micro- and nano-fabricated devices by both MIPs and SIP
polymer formation.  The small scales of modern MEMS
devices provide an additional barrier to producing poly-
meric recognition elements.  The chemistries discussed
above must be performed on platforms and within the
confines of micro- and nano-channels with dimensions
less than that of a human hair.  The prospect of producing
chemically distinct domains within these limited real-estate
devices is particularly challenging. Multiple domains 
within a single device are one strategy for expanding 
system functionality.
One of the “holy grails” of trace explosives detection is
the quest for detectors so sensitive that detection of low
vapor pressure explosives becomes realistic.  While some
volatile explosives (e.g., nitroglycerin) typically have
vapor pressures in the parts per million (ppm) range or
higher, explosives such as RDX and PETN have vapor
pressures in the low parts per trillion (ppt) range.  When
these compounds are incorporated into plastic explosives
such as C-4, semtex, and detasheet, the vapor pressures
are reduced further by matrix effects, and of course, any
packaging or concealment of the explosive will further
reduce the amount of vapor available for collection and
analysis.  As a result, actual vapor pressures in the field
may be in the parts per quadrillion range or even lower.
Basic research in interface and surface science, separations
and analysis, and materials synthesis and processing are
needed to produce the breakthrough advances required to
enhance the sensitivity of existing detectors or to develop
a completely new sensor with superior sensitivity.
Incremental improvement in sensitivity will lead to
improved vapor detection of explosives with intermediate
volatilities (e.g., TNT).
Mass Spectrometry
High information content analytical methods, such as
mass spectrometry, can obviate the selectivity problems
that are so troublesome for MEMS-based sensors.  Mass
spectrometry has inherent sensitivity but is hampered by
efficiency in ionization and ion detection.  Tandem mass
spectrometry techniques can detect targeted compounds
with high confidence, but this technique is limited to ana-
lyzing one target molecule at a time.  While a computer
can step through the detection of up to about 50 analytes
sequentially, new techniques to permit the detection of
many targets without reducing the detection duty cycle
will be needed to meet the requirements of TIMs detection.
Bringing the high information content and sensitivity of
mass spectrometers into a size and price range that makes
them widely available to first responders and as continu-
ous monitors of air and water sources will require over-
coming some fundamental barriers.  Reducing the size of
mass analyzers requires studies that investigate the effects
of Coulomb forces on ion manipulation and analysis.
Microfabricated gas phase micro-instrumentation is a 
rapidly emerging area of science.  The development of
truly miniature mass spectrometers that can be hand held
could have a huge impact on our ability to monitor the air
for harmful materials.  Understanding of ion chemistry
and physics in confined spaces must be developed.  Small
lateral dimensions for gas phase devices also implies
increased interaction with container walls.  Small mass
spectrometers may also allow operation at relatively small
mean free path conditions (high pressure), and new 
quantification tools for ions may be needed.  
There is also a need for advances in laboratory-based
approaches to separations and analysis.  The recent
anthrax terrorist attack on the U.S. has shown how 
quickly our analytical laboratory capacity can become
overwhelmed.  New methods of applying high informa-
tion content analytical methodologies will provide faster
sample throughput and improve the accuracy of analysis. 
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One of the principal basic research areas related to chemi-
cal detection is the development of adsorptive materials
for the collection of chemical agents, TIMs, and explo-
sives.  A common sampling application involves adsorp-
tion of gas phase species from air, but adsorption of mole-
cules from other media such as water is also important.
Selective adsorption from air by molecular recognition
processes represents a fundamental research problem with
the potential for enhancing detection levels and reducing
background interference. 
Sample Collection and Transport
Fundamental research in polymer films and molecular
recognition that will lead to advances in selective sensing
elements is directly relevant to selective sampling.  In
addition to SIP and MIP soft materials, several other mate-
rials offer promise in this area, including sol-gels, carbon-
based materials such as carbon foams or carbon-nanotubes,
and composite materials.  Several properties are needed
for a material to be a good adsorbent for chemical agents,
TIMs, or explosives.  The material needs to have a high
adsorption efficiency for the molecules of interest—–as
close to 100% as possible.  For low volatility species such
as some explosives, it may be relatively easy to find such a
material, but the problem becomes more difficult as the
volatility of the species to be trapped increases.  The
adsorptive material should also have a high surface area,
which combined with efficient adsorption would result in
a high adsorptive capacity for the analytes of interest.  For
reactive chemical agents and explosives, it is also necessary
for the adsorptive material to release the analyte collected
to a detector with minimal decomposition.  One common
means of releasing the analyte from the adsorbent is via
surface heating, and with some current adsorbent/analyte
pairs, this can lead to significant sample loss through
decomposition.  For use in real-world settings, the adsorbent
ought to be robust, difficult to poison, and easily regener-
able if degradation over time is a problem.  Future research
in materials synthesis and processing and separations and
analysis will provide enhancements for chemical threat
detection devices of the future.
Sample transport is another key issue associated with sam-
pling of chemical agents and explosives.  This is most likely
to be important with low vapor pressure species, where
detection in air will rely upon either very low amounts of
vapor or airborne particles.  Both experimental and model-
ing studies of particle dispersion and transport in air can
be useful in addressing these issues.  Such studies can, for
example, help to establish how much sample is available
in air under different environmental conditions, when a
low vapor pressure dictates the need to detect particulate
matter.  Several sampling issues are more likely to arise
during the detection of explosives rather than chemical
agents.  These issues are mainly related to the lower vapor
pressures of many explosives, so they may also arise in the
detection of some chemical agents with relatively low
volatilities.  When relying on particles to perform trace
chemical detection, it will often be necessary to dislodge
particles from various surfaces as a first step in sample col-
lection.  Low vapor pressure explosives are so adsorptive that
they will adhere to almost any surface at room temperature.  
Development of a material that shows little adsorption of
these compounds at room temperature could enhance
detection systems by reducing adsorptive losses on duct-
work and other surfaces during transport.  Dislodging
material for sampling can employ either direct physical
contact (swiping) or air flow methods (e.g., air jets).  In
either case, optimization of the sampling procedure can be
critical.  While this area is somewhat applied, there are
fundamental aspects of particle physics, surface and inter-
face science, and fundamental interactions that are at the
heart of particle sampling under realistic conditions.
Technology Need Present Problem
Chemical signatures must be
extracted from gas, liquid,
and solid sources.
Develop versatile collection
approaches that couple well
with miniaturized sensor 
systems.
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In addition to the technological needs in support of new
sensors discussed above, advances in stand-off detection
methods for field use are necessary for countering future
chemical threats.  In stand-off detection, the sample is not
physically transferred to the detection device, as required
for the sensing and analytical methods discussed above.
Instead it is interrogated from some distance based on a
physical or spectral property of the material.  
Atomic and Molecular Spectroscopy
Remote laser induced fluorescence (LIF) sensing has been
widely used for atmospheric monitoring, especially for the
detection of small molecules such as OH, NO2, and SO2.
An interesting modification to the LIF method is to per-
form laser-induced photodissociation on the species of
interest and then measure LIF of a sensitive fragment mol-
ecule.  This photofragmentation LIF approach has been
used to detect 2,4,6-trinitrotoluene (TNT) vapor in air
with a limit of detection of 8 ppb.5 Detection of fluores-
cence from photodissociated NO makes this method
somewhat selective; however, the bulk of the equipment
required and the associated laser hazards currently make
this technique impractical for hand-held field use.  
Laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) is another
laser-based method beginning to be used for the charac-
terization of many solid materials, including single parti-
cles.  LIBS is an atomic emission spectroscopy technique
that uses a laser-induced microplasma, functioning as both
the sample volume and the excitation source.  The laser-
induced breakdown itself can be defined as the generation
of a near totally ionized gas (i.e., plasma) by the end of
the initiating laser pulse.  Advances in laser technology
are required to bring these analytical methods out of the
laboratory.  Vibrational spectroscopy has found practical
use as a stand-off detection method.  Laser induced Raman
(LIR) spectroscopy is a highly informative technique for
molecule detection.  Excellent selectivity has already been
demonstrated for many of the substances of interest to
homeland security.  While it is less sensitive than LIF or
LIBS, it is clearly useful as a remote probe for the detec-
tion of what are essentially pure substances.  It also has
the inherent advantage, shared with LIF, of having the
potential to probe large areas of sample, using powerful
expanded lasers and highly selective imaging detectors,
although this is incompatible with easily transportable
hand-held systems.
No single laser-based spectroscopic technique can be
expected to detect the wide range of chemical compounds
with the necessary sensitivity and selectivity.  However,
each method has important merits, and some combination
of these methods could form the basis for a powerful and
highly useful routine monitoring instrument.  Fundamental
issues that remain to be addressed include a lack of basic
spectroscopic data (LIBS, LIF, and LRS) for some species,
improvement in overall sensitivity for all methods, and
sampling statistics (especially for LIBS).  High-throughput
applications may require new imaging detection systems
with improved sensitivity.
3.3.2 Prevention
Many of the opportunities for preventing future acts of
terrorism with chemical threats involve limiting access to
materials through institutional controls.  However, oppor-
Technology Need Present Problem
Stand-off detection of 
chemical toxins.
Improvements in range,
portability, and sensitivity
are required.
Technology Need Present Problem
Stand-off detection of 
chemical toxins.
Improvements in range,
portability, and sensitivity
are required.
5 T. Arusi-Parpar, D. Heflinger, and R. Lavi, “Photodissociation Followed by Laser-Induced Fluorescence at Atmospheric Pressure and 24 oC: A unique
Scheme for Remote Detection of Explosives,” Appl. Opt., 40, 6677- 6681 (2001).
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tunities exist for fundamental research to assist in counter-
ing terrorism through the development of new chemical
processes that assist in reducing inventories and access to
highly toxic industrial materials.  Industrial processing
centers that use large quantities of TIMs are significant
targets of opportunity for terrorist attacks because of the
potential release of these dangerous materials and their
impact on the public.  Significant opportunities exist to
develop new chemistries that minimize or eliminate the
use of TIMs and to reduce inventories of these materials.
For example, since the accidental release in Bhopal, many
chemical manufacturers have found ways to make pesti-
cides either without using or without storing large
amounts of methyl isocyanide.  Development of alterna-
tive synthetic chemistries, new robust catalysts, and pro-
duction and processing systems that minimize the use of
hazardous materials significantly reduce the threat to the
public from terrorist actions.  An example would be the
development of robust solid acid catalysts to eliminate the
use of liquid HF in petroleum processing.  
3.3.3 Protection, Response, and Recovery
Personal protective equipment to guard against the effects
of chemical agents and TIMs has existed for many years,
yet there are many opportunities for fundamental research
to provide a basis for improved systems.  Technological
barriers impede the development of catalytic materials
that operate under ambient conditions to decompose
chemical agents and TIMs.  Catalysis research sponsored
by BES can address these issues.  Materials synthesis and
processing advances hold promise for developing light-
weight barrier materials for comfortable protective cloth-
ing.  The porous nature of common building materials
coupled with uncertainties about the lifetime of chemical
agents in environmental settings presents technological
challenges to decontamination in a post-event recovery
after a chemical attack.  These issues, along with the need
for stronger barrier materials, present a set of technological
challenges for future protection, response, and recovery
aspects of homeland defense.
Current filtration technologies remove nerve agents by
adsorption, whereas more volatile reagents (e.g., blood,
choke, and blister agents) are removed through a com-
bined process of catalytic decomposition and adsorption.
Advances in filtration technology will leverage a signifi-
cant BES investment in catalysis and chemical transforma-
tions.  Adsorption of reactive chemical agents and TIMs
onto different substrates is insufficiently understood.  Data
for adsorption on metal oxides, surfaces of plastics, fibers,
and lipid bilayers (e.g., cellular membranes) are needed.
Fundamental studies will allow a systematic mapping of
adsorption properties of chemical threat agents and their
analogues.  Little is known about surface chemistry of 
G-agents, and even less is known about the complex reac-
tivity of VX 6,  and their analogues or simulants.  Current
detoxification, decontamination, neutralization, and
destruction schemes do not involve catalysis, and funda-
mental investigations of homogeneous and heterogeneous
catalysis are warranted.  Surface science studies of model
compounds related to chemical threat agents would lead
Technology Need Present Problem
Personal protective equip-
ment and barrier materials
require further development.
Advances in filtration tech-
nologies are needed.
Lighter weight protective
clothing is required.
Current barrier materials are
cumbersome to use.
Knowledge must be devel-
oped to design better, more
efficient, stable, and selective
catalysts for chemical threat
destruction with no toxic
byproducts.
Fundamental research at the
forefront of materials chem-
istry must be developed.
6 Y.-C. Yang, Acc. Chem. Res. 32 (1999) 109.
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to an improved understanding of the fundamental princi-
ples of bond activation on surfaces of oxide, metals, and
supported metal catalysts.  Fundamental studies are
required to develop model catalytic systems that operate
at ambient temperatures and are resistant to poisoning.
The ultimate product from these studies would be the
knowledge required to design better, more efficient, stable,
and selective catalysts for chemical threat destruction with
no toxic byproducts. 
Solvated electron technology (SET) is one of several alter-
natives tested for chemical threat agent destruction.  Little
is known about details of this reaction on molecular scale.
The reactivity of solvated electrons and reactions of mate-
rials called electrides with chemical threat agents or suit-
able analogues is an area that needs further investigation.7
In addition, sodium vapor reduction of CFC may have
potential for chemical threat agent destruction.
Protective clothing to guard against the effects of chemical
agents will be made of lighter weight materials than current
protective suits.  Permeability of materials to chemical
threats is directly related to the underlying chemical 
structure of the material.  Fundamental research at the
forefront of materials chemistry will lead the way to
lighter weight materials.  Both military and civilian 
personnel need clothing that is lightweight, inexpensive,
and comfortable to wear, while providing protection
against chemical agents.  Block copolymers are one 
obvious candidate for such applications because of their
low cost and ease of processing.  
In preliminary experiments, it has been demonstrated that
linear triblock copolymers based on a continuous phase of
butyl rubber with dispersed nanodomains of partially sul-
fonated polystyrene fulfill many of these characteristics.
They allow water vapor to transport through the material
while preventing the passage of common toxic chemical
agents.  However, both the mechanical properties and
permselectivity of these materials require further improve-
ment.  Simultaneously, work has been conducted that
demonstrates the strong impact of changing polymer
architecture (linear diblock triblock versus branched graft
copolymer architectures) on permeability characteristics
and mechanical properties.  Introduction of controlled
branching into block copolymers is thus a tool that can be
used to enhance both mechanical properties and permse-
lectivity.  Both these areas are only beginning to be
explored systematically, and much fundamental research
needs to be conducted in these areas.  Small angle neutron
scattering (SANS) and neutron reflectivity are powerful
tools for studying the structures of such materials.  DOE
facilities for neutron studies of soft materials will be 
highly utilized in these studies.
Volatile and semi-volatile chemical agents will dissipate in
an open environment, but in a confined area, they will
adhere to surfaces and diffuse into pores and open spaces.
Decontaminating exterior surfaces can be achieved in a
number of ways; however, the pores may be inaccessible,
and the remaining material can slowly diffuse from the
pores, causing long-term, low-level human exposure.
Fundamental studies are needed to further determine the
lifetime of chemical agents and TIMs in porous building
materials, soils, and natural environments.  Vapor phase
decontaminants are limited in number and scope, and
Technology Need Present Problem
Volatile and semi-volatile
chemical agents in a con-
fined area will adhere to sur-
faces and diffuse into pores
and open spaces.
Self-cleaning and self-decon-
taminating titanium dioxide
surfaces technology may not
be adequate for the rigors of
counter-terrorism response
and recovery applications.  
Fundamental studies are
needed to further determine
the lifetime of chemical
agents and TIMs in porous
building materials, soils, and
natural environments.  
Fundamental research is
required to increase the pho-
toefficiency of TiO2-con-
taining barriers and improve
their function.  
5 J. L. Dey, Inorg. Chem 36(1997) 3816 and JACS 124 (2002) 1170.
47
Chemical Threats
additional approaches to this problem are required.  One
approach is to apply an overlayer of titanium dioxide
(TiO2) material to catalytically decompose the chemical
agent or TIMs as they diffuse out of the contaminated
media.  Photocatalytic materials can bring about the oxi-
dation of a wide range of organic and some inorganic sub-
stances.  Photocatalytic particles, coatings, and thin films
have been demonstrated to oxidize (or reduce) a very
wide range of organic and inorganic compounds at 
ambient temperatures, pressures, and humidities.
Self-cleaning and self-decontaminating titanium dioxide
surfaces are well demonstrated.  The current technology,
however, may not be adequate for the rigors of counter-
terrorism response and recovery applications.  Fundamental
research is required to increase the photoefficiency of
TiO2-containing barriers and improve their function.  The
nature of active sites involved in chemical processes at the
air/solid interface is not understood, and the mechanism
of photocatalytic oxidation is worthy of further study.
The role of noble metals deposited on TiO2 for specific
reactions is not understood, and catalyst deactivation by
inorganic reaction residues remains a problem.  In addition
to these fundamental technological barriers, durable catalyst
coatings for high-wear situations and new methods to
incorporate photocatalysts into textiles and filter media
are engineering challenges to be overcome in order to
apply photocatalyst to problems of response and recovery
from chemical acts of terrorism.  Other technical chal-
lenges include the development of new, light transmission
materials to distribute light to catalyst sites for uniform
illumination, polymers or functional structure coatings for
photocatalytic surfaces to increase reactivity, and forma-
tion of nano-textured surface structures to effect catalytic
activity, selective adsorption, or light adsorption. 
In the area of explosives protection/mitigation, there is a
need for the development of materials that can be used to
contain or protect against the effects of an explosives 
detonation.  Applications of such a material might include
containers for luggage/cargo being transported in airplanes
or other vehicles, barriers within high-security buildings,
barriers to protect VIPs at high profile events, and stronger
building materials.  The desired properties of such a mate-
rial would include high blast resistance, low frangibility
(i.e., if the material is breached by a blast, it should not
shatter into many airborne pieces, but should allow pres-
sure to escape through cracks or holes), light weight, and
low-to-moderate cost.  The Federal Aviation Administration
has funded some work in this area, but fundamental mate-
rials synthesis and processing research is needed with a focus
on engineering the desired properties into the materials.
An additional important aspect of response and recovery
is the presymptomatic diagnosis of exposure to chemical
threat agents at sub-lethal levels.  This is particularly
important in addressing social issues associated with a 
terrorist chemical attack by providing a means of gauging
exposure and preventing public hysteria.  Medical diagnostic
tools capable of detecting early signs of exposure to a
chemical threat agent would also reduce stress levels in
the medical community under pressure to manage a crisis
situation.  Biological markers of exposure to a chemical
agent will be formed, as the result of cellular processes,
long before the clinical presentation of symptoms of 
exposure.  Identifying the biological markers of exposure
will allow early screening and detection of exposure to
facilitate treatment of only those individuals exposed to 
a chemical agent.  Once these marker compounds are
identified, new analytical techniques for the rapid and
Technology Need Present Problem
Materials are needed that
can contain or protect
against the effects of an
explosives detonation.  
Current materials cannot
combine low weight, impact
resistance, and low cost.
Technology Need Present Problem
Presymptomatic diagnosis of
exposure to chemical threat
agents at sub-lethal levels is
needed.
Medical diagnostic tools to
detect early signs of expo-
sure to a chemical threat
agent require development.
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confident detection of these compounds in physiological
media (blood, saliva, sputum, etc.) will be required.  As 
in the case of detection of chemical agents themselves,
research in separations and analysis, and materials 
chemistry could provide detection systems that could be
used by medical personnel to assess public exposure to 
chemical threats.
3.3.4 Preparedness
Basic research needs for improved batteries and miniatur-
ized fuel cells will contribute to future developments in
the homeland defense area of preparedness.  Fundamental
research is needed to identify mechanisms, flaws, or film
properties that limit the fabrication yield for thin-film 
batteries.  Mechanisms leading to degraded performance
after storage or use of batteries at elevated temperatures
(60–100 °C) need to be identified.  In addition, synthetic
methods need to be adapted to allow fabrication at low
temperatures, very thin, and inexpensive substrates (e.g.,
plastics) and to facilitate direct integration of the battery
with integrated circuits.  Development of improved pack-
aging for the thin-film batteries is also needed.  Long-term
research needs include the development materials and
deposition processes to fabricate bipolar thin-film battery
stacks and development of alternative battery chemistries
for low-voltage batteries.
Miniaturized fuel cells offer alternatives to batteries for
powering more demanding fieldable detection and 
mitigation devices.  Fundamental research is needed in 
the area of membrane technology for ion and small mole-
cule transport and separation.  Chemical reactions and sta-
bility at electrode-electrolyte interfaces is a topic for
future research from both experimental and computational
approaches.  Mechanisms of corrosion also remain a topic
of importance for the future of fuel-cell research.  
3.4 Research Needs
To seize the research opportunities discussed above and
address the scientific issues associated with countering
chemical terrorism, several research needs must be met.
3.4.1 Scientific Issues
Miniaturized Integrated Systems
Miniaturization and integration research themes underlie
future ability to develop inexpensive and reliable devices
for first responders.  Critical research issues include
microfluid and nanofluid transport, surface treatment and
functionalization, combination of top-down and bottom-
up fabrication techniques, and coupling of nanoscale and
continuum models for mass transport.
Chemical Recognition
Research is required to enable highly selective sensors
capable of identifying target chemicals in complex back-
grounds.  Critical research topics include the use of bio-
logical or biomimetic receptor elements, imprinted poly-
mers, nanophase grafted polymers, and miniaturized mass
spectroscopy.
Interfacial Chemistry
Fundamental theoretical and experimental tools and mod-
els to probe molecular interactions with solid and liquid
surfaces will be critical to development of new, selective
chemical sensors, transport and fate models for toxic
chemicals that are released into a wide range of environ-
mental conditions, development of improved separations
chemistry, and the development of new protective barrier
and catalytic materials for protective clothing and toxin
neutralization.
Technology Need Present Problem
Needs include the develop-
ment materials and deposi-
tion processes to fabricate
bipolar thin-film battery
stacks and development of
alternative battery
chemistries for low-voltage
batteries.
Fieldable detection and miti-
gation devices are needed.  
Fundamental research is
needed to identify mecha-
nisms, flaws, or film proper-
ties that limit the fabrication
yield for thin-film batteries.
Fuel cell research is required.  
49
Chemical Threats
Novel Materials
A wide range of novel and nanophase materials will be
critical for the development of new catalysts to break
down chemical toxins, strong and lightweight materials to
contain explosive blasts, as well as nanoporous and mem-
brane materials for advanced battery and fuel cell minia-
turized power supplies.
Computing, Modeling, and Theory
It will be critical to fully understand and predict the equi-
librium and kinetic chemical interactions in flow fields and
at solid interfaces.  Models will be important for predict-
ing the fate of chemical toxins in a wide range of environ-
mental conditions and for predicting the performance
characteristics of sensors and chemical preconcentration
and sampling approaches.  Modeling will also contribute
to a broad range materials development and optimization
tasks associated with detection, protection, and response
to chemical threats.
Nanoscale Science
Many critical scientific issues and challenges associated
with chemical threats are rooted at the nanoscale behavior
of materials and interfaces.  New tools for fabricating
nanoscale structures, probing structure and chemistry at
the nanoscale, and modeling properties and behavior will
be needed. The Nanoscale Science Research Centers cur-
rently being developed by BES can play a critical role in
providing the tools and research environment needed to
address these critical problems. 
3.4.2 Research Environment and Infrastructure
Existing BES scientific user facilities at DOE laboratories
and universities, coupled with those currently under con-
struction, such as the Nanoscale Science Research
Centers, will provide many important capabilities needed
to address critical scientific issues associated with chemi-
cal-based threats of terrorism.  However, it is important to
recognize that because no single institution possesses all
the required assets, it is vitally important that future
research programs be multi-institutional to ensure that all
research needs are met.  It will be essential to initiate 
collaborative projects that promote the formation of
cross-disciplinary and cross-institutional teams to address
these complex and critical challenges.  For example,
although surrogate chemical threats may work fine for
much of the fundamental research discussed above, at
some point it becomes important to test fundamental prin-
ciples using real chemical threats.  The necessary facilities
for handling these materials safely, especially chemical
warfare agents, are not and should not be available at all
DOE sites and universities.  Many tools for characteriza-
tion and analysis of both hard and soft materials will be
available in the nanoscience research centers being devel-
oped at several sites throughout the DOE laboratory sys-
tem and at other existing and developing BES resources.
The Office of Basic Energy Sciences possesses many
unique resources, in the form of scientific user facilities
that can contribute to developing the fundamental knowl-
edge base required to counter future acts of terrorism
involving chemical threats.  The four BES synchrotron
radiation light sources provide access to radiation ranging
from x-rays through the infrared region for spectroscopic
and structural studies.  Four high-flux neutron sources will
provide the neutron scattering and materials irradiation
resources to meet the fundamental research needs.  Four
BES electron beam and microcharacterization centers are
among the world’s best high-resolution electron-optical
microcharacterization and analytical facilities.  These
facilities will be crucial for characterizing fundamental
advances in materials research.  BES-funded specialized
single-purpose centers, including the Combustion Research
Facility at Sandia in California, the Materials Preparation
Center at Ames, the Surface Modification and Characterization
Research Center at Oak Ridge, the James R. Macdonald
Laboratory at Kansas State University, and the Pulse
Radiolysis Facility at Notre Dame, provide 
additional resources.
3.4.3 Dual-Use Opportunities
The very fundamental nature of the advances required for
countering future chemical threats by terrorist organiza-
tions opens the door to many dual-use opportunities.  The
more applied programs within DOE that look to BES for
fundamental scientific advances will directly benefit from
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basic research applied to counter terrorism.  For example,
miniaturization and integration of separations and analyses
systems will find use in field analysis for environmental
monitoring in support of remediation efforts.  Small, inex-
pensive sensors with high chemical selectivity will play a
significant role in environmental monitoring.  Selective
sensors deployed in a monitoring network can potentially
save millions of dollars each year in manual sample collec-
tion and fixed laboratory analysis costs.  New fundamental
knowledge in the areas of materials and interfacial chem-
istry will provide breakthrough advances in many areas,
including increased energy efficiency in lighter weight
vehicles and stronger composites for industrial applica-
tions.  The knowledge base for improved adsorption and
catalytic decomposition of chemical agents and TIMs will
certainly lead to better catalytic materials and processes
for environmental restoration and environmental protec-
tion through reduced emissions.  Advances in nanotech-
nology are going to influence developments in virtually
every area of science and technology, making the dual-use
opportunities endless.
4.1 Terror ism Threats and Techno logy  Needs
The challenges we face from biological threat agents 
are increasing.  While microbes continue to evolve and
biotechnology becomes more powerful, the inherent 
hazards to humans, plants, and animals from infectious
microorganisms are greatly increased by their intentional
use by terrorists.  The recent mailing of anthrax-laced 
letters to our political leaders and members of the press
demonstrated how simply a pathogen can be used to kill,
instill fear, and radically disrupt normal societal activities.
The need for faster and better capabilities for warning,
response, and cleanup was painfully evident as we
responded to this one case of a small-scale deployment 
of a noncontagious, naturally occurring pathogen.  The
specter of terrorist use of other biological agents that
could result in far greater loss of life has risen in our con-
sciousness—agents that might be contagious or perhaps
engineered for increased virulence and resistance to our
medical treatments such as antibiotics and vaccines.  In
this context, we must recognize that as microbes evolve
and compete for survival, we also face naturally emerging
threats that we must be able to quickly identify and 
distinguish from a suspected terrorist act.  
While today’s focus on bioterrorism is being driven primarily
by concerns about attacks on humans, attacks on livestock
and/or crops can be just as devastating.  The recent outbreak
of foot and mouth disease in Great Britain demonstrates
the devastating impact microbes can have on livestock,
and the consequent impact on food supply and economies.
We know, for example from the work of the United
Nations inspectors in Iraq, that rogue nations have actively
explored both animal and plant pathogens as weapons.
This report was written with strong reference to attacks
directly on humans; however, the science and technology
base needed to protect crops and livestock is highly related.
The biological threat is real, and we must tap into new
science and technologies in order to reduce that threat.
Advances in material and chemical sciences not tradition-
ally applied to biothreat reduction technology require-
ments hold great promise for rapid improvements in the
U.S. counter-bioterrorism posture.  Fundamental advances
are needed to fill gaps in our needs and to develop the
next-generation technologies for
▲ Detection and identification 
▲ Medical diagnostics 
▲ Protection 
▲ Decontamination and remediation 
The Department of Energy (DOE) materials and chemical
sciences research and development (R&D) programs in
4   Biological Threats
51
Biological Threats
Basic Energy Science (BES) are poised to make significant
contributions to reducing the biothreat through scientific
advances that have great potential for transition to other
developmental efforts that focus on shorter term 
deployment of technology to address the biological
threat, including the DOE National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) Chemical and Biological National
Security Program (CBNP).  A multidisciplinary approach
that leverages advances in the chemical and physical sci-
ences holds great potential for decreasing our vulnerabili-
ties.  The advances envisioned in this report would pro-
vide quantum leaps in technology that will alter existing
approaches to prevention, response, and mitigation of the
biological threat.  In addition, the technology will enjoy
wide application in resolving related public health chal-
lenges from infectious diseases. 
The Department of Defense has addressed the biological
threat in the context of the battlefield.  However, bio-
threat reduction in the context of the civilian population
is very different.  For example, the average civilian is not
trained or equipped for response, the public health system
is not supported with the kind of central command and
control systems associated with the military, different
requirements exist on sensitivity and different levels of
tolerance for false positives and false negatives, and there
is a need for dealing with a broader set of potential
agents.  Also, much higher sensitivity is required for
Counter Terrorism (CT) detection, raising substantial
technology challenges and the need to assess background
interferences that will be much more significant for low-
level detection/monitoring issues.
Scientific research and technology development to reduce
the threat from bioterrorism must be conducted in an
environment that has strong multidisciplinary capabilities,
that includes biology along with materials and chemical
sciences, that has the infrastructure to support large teams
and projects, and that has the ability to separate and com-
partmentalize work that must be classified or protected
while still being able to attract the best scientists and
technologists.  
The technological challenges that need to be addressed
are significant and diverse.  Some examples that will be
specifically addressed in this report are the following: 
Environmental backgrounds.  In general, backgrounds
are complex with an imponderable diversity of biology.
They are not well characterized, are highly variable (in
time and space), and can contain measurable levels of
the "smoking gun" chemicals from normal industrial
activities.  False positive and false negative detections of
biological agents will be extremely unpredictable with-
out a more thorough understanding of the chemical and
biological environments being sampled.  
Transport and transformation in the environment.
Understanding the fate of signature species in the envi-
ronment is required to minimize large uncertainties.
Few studies have examined the natural distribution and
survival capabilities of pathogens like Bacillus anthracis
in even the most common environments.
Sample collection. Means for collection, concentra-
tion, and separation of low-level agents in highly 
variable, complex environments are required for reliable
detection of many agents.  The development of 
materials and systems that achieve this task with high
efficiency is a significant challenge.
Development and characterization of new materials.
New materials for many applications are needed (e.g.,
remediation and decontamination materials that can be
rapidly deployed to mitigate initial impacts and that are
environmentally friendly, coatings and materials to pro-
tect against hazardous substances, and materials for new
sensors and diagnostics).  
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Coupling sensitivity, selectivity, and reliability.
Many systems with the required sensitivities are prone
to false alarms.
Developing durable and reliable unattended systems.
To achieve broad area surveillance, some detection 
systems may need to be left in place with little over-
sight for years of time and need to be stable, subject 
to reliability checks, etc.
Speed. High-speed, secure, reliable information flow
can be critical to screening of high volumes of materials
(e.g., travel bags, shipping containers) or providing ade-
quate time for a response (e.g., shutting down an air
handling system or taking some neutralizing counter-
measure).
Complexity. The ability of biological agents to mutate
or to be manipulated and the inherent diversity of the
biosphere are challenges in this regard.  Also, large 
volumes of complex data need to be processed and 
analyzed rapidly in order to make sound decisions (e.g.,
through artificial intelligence).
Development of new trigger systems. Rapid response
to bioterrorist threats has been hampered by the focus
on initial detection that relies upon highly specific and
expensive detection systems.  Techniques that detect
simple environmental changes that are easily measured
(e.g., rapid increases in total bacteria numbers or highly
conserved biosignatures unrelated to any other changes
in the environment) could provide much better and
cheaper initial warning systems for first responders.
4.2  BES  Research Accompl ishments  and
Imp l i ca t i ons
DOE’s Basic Energy Sciences program has supported
research and development in many areas that are critical
Nanoparticles for Novel DNA and Protein Sensing
Technology  
BES-sponsored research has led to the development of new methods for
chemically coupling biomolecules to metal oxide nanoparticles, opening up
opportunities for development of new families of electronic sensors of DNA
hybridization (bio-chips), protein binding, and in situ DNA imaging.  Single-
strand DNA-linked nanoparticles retain the ability to hybridize to comple-
mentary DNA and to carry out sequence-specific, light-triggered DNA 
recognition.  Light-generated silver deposition on metal oxide nanoparticles 
is observed only when attached DNA sequences are in a double helix form.
This allows the electronic sensing of the DNA double helix, as well as the
development of new electrochemical probes for DNA-binding.  This system also extends to detection of DNA
binding polymers because of a change in redox properties of DNA after binding to proteins as well as detection
of protein-protein interactions.
[Argonne National Laboratories]
Electron micrograph of titanium
oxide nanoparticles with
attached DNA  
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to advancing our capabilities for addressing the emerging
biological threat, including the threat posed by potential
terrorism.  These areas include basic research and technol-
ogy development relating to molecular recognition, inte-
grated molecular systems, interfacial science, novel materi-
als development, nanoscience and technology, spec-
troscopy, computing, modeling and simulation, and inte-
grated devices, as well as advanced instrumentation and
the development of large-scale facilities for materials and
molecular characterization.  A few examples are given
here of BES research accomplishments that highlight fun-
damental advances in these areas.
4.2.1 Nanophase Materials
BES is one of the larger sponsors of research that addresses
fundamental issues controlling the synthesis, characteriza-
tion, and properties of nanophase materials.  Materials
that are structured on the same scale as the molecular
machinery of life offer extraordinary approaches to
address complex biological problems.  Current research is
being pursued in areas including the development of new
semiconductors for spectroscopic analysis of bio-agents,
membranes and nanoporous materials for detection and
protective applications, and nanocrystals that can be used
to provide new approaches for molecular recognition for
detection, medical diagnostics, and response and recovery.
4.2.2 Interfaces
The structure and properties of interfaces between living
systems and man-made materials play an extremely impor-
tant role in technologies related to the detection, medical
diagnostics, protection, and response to biological threats.
BES research has led to the development and application
of experimental and theoretical tools that are providing
new insights into the structure and dynamics of these
interfaces.  Developments include local and scanning
probe techniques for measuring structure and molecular
interactions, time resolved spectroscopic tools to examine
interfacial energy transfer, X-ray and neutron tools to
determine detailed molecular structure, and a wide range
of computational tools.
SQUID-Based
Pathogen Detection  
BES sponsored researchers are
developing a sensitive, fast, and
versatile new technique for detect-
ing pathogenic organisms or mole-
cules using a “microscope” based on
a Superconducting Quantum
Interference Device (SQUID).
[Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory]
Magnetic particles labeled with molecular recognition elements bind target
if present. After 1-second pulse of magnetic field, only bound particles
send relaxation signal for detection in the next second.  No more than
2000 magnetic particles are required, which, for detection of bacteria or
viruses, could translate into fewer than 10 targets.   
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4.2.3  Integrated Systems
Integrated systems for chip-based detection and diagnostics
are already being developed to counter biological terrorism
threats.  BES research has played a pioneering role in the
development of these technologies by providing under-
pinning science addressing microfabrication, integration
of new materials and synthesis approaches, fluid and 
energy transport at small dimensions, and the control of
interfacial properties and interactions.
4.2.4 Atomic and Molecular Spectroscopy
Advanced spectroscopic tools being developed in BES
research programs have significant impact on technologies
for detection and source attribution of biological agents.
Developments included high-resolution mass spectroscopy
for identifying bacteria or other biological agents, laser-
based spectroscopy for both microanalysis and stand-off
detection and identification of bioagents, and nuclear 
isotope detection that can help in identifying the source
of specific bioagents.
In addition to the individual research projects highlighted
above, BES is developing a major new initiative to establish
five Nanoscale Science Research Centers: Center for
Integrated Nanotechnology (Sandia/LANL), Molecular
Foundry (LBNL), Center for Nanophase Materials
Sciences (ORNL), Center for Functional Nanomaterials
(Brookhaven National Laboratory), and Center for
Nanoscale Materials (Argonne National Laboratory).  The
research centers will provide facilities and support collab-
orative research that will bring together the best researchers
in the national laboratories, academia, and industry with
the latest technologies to carry out breakthrough research
and development in nanoscience and technology.  These
intellectual and resource centers will be major assets in
advancing the research and development needed for bio-
threat reduction applications described in this report.   
Finally, BES is steward of a number of the nation’s major
facilities for materials and molecular characterization;
specifically synchrotron (Advanced Photon Source,
Host-Pathogen Interactions Probed
Using Neutron and X-Ray Scattering    
Neutron and x-ray diffraction and reflectometry experi-
ments being performed at the BES-supported Los Alamos
Neutron Science Center have been used to probe the
molecular recognition interaction of cholera toxin with its
natural receptor, GM1, on a cell membrane surface.
Binding of the cholera B5 subunit to a phospholipid
monolayer containing GM1 in a Langmuir Blodgett
trough results in an ordered array of cholera with electron
density distribution shown in the Figure.  Binding of the
full cholera protein, AB5, results in disruption of the order in the aliphatic portion of the phospholipid mono-
layer, possibly indicating incorporation of the A subunit into the membrane.  Improved models for toxin
molecular recognition can contribute to the development of new biomimetic sensor technology as well as the
development of improved human vaccines.
[Los Alamos National Laboratory]
Electron density of cholera B5 binding to GM1 in
a phospholipid monolayer.
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National Synchrotron Light Source, Stanford Synchrotron
Radiation Laboratory, Advanced Light Source) and 
neutron scattering (Spallation Neutron Source, High Flux
Reactor [HIFR], Intense Pulsed Neutron Source, and Los
Alamos Neutron Science Center) facilities that each year
serve hundreds of users.  These facilities will play a key
role in advancing the materials and chemical sciences
underpinning advances in biothreat technologies. 
4.3 Scient i f ic Issues and Opportun i t i es
To keep the focus clearly on the goals of biothreat reduc-
tion, this part of the report is organized around the four
critical application areas broadly recognized as key to our
ultimate defense against biological threats: (1) Detection
and Identification, (2) Medical Diagnostics, (3) Protection,
and (4) Decontamination and Remediation.  Each of 
these areas will be discussed in terms of the specific 
scientific issues and opportunities.  The common themes
emerging from these discussions are summarized at the
end under Research Needs, which will also consider 
infrastructure, research environment, and relationship to
other programs.  
4.3.1 Detection and Identification
Nanostructured, Interfacial Materials for
Biosensors     
BES-supported research is exploring the use of templated self-assembly
approaches to create nanoporous inorganic materials and hybrid
organic/inorganic materials that could serve as novel platforms for 
bio or chem sensors and as separation elements in purification and 
filtration devices.  While molecular self-assembly is routinely used to
precisely control nanoscale porous materials, new research focuses on
the co-assembly of soft organic structures within more robust inorganic
scaffolds.  Specific examples include the co-assembly of lipid bilayers
within sol-gel silica meso-porous materials.  Results show that the 
co-assembled lipid membranes retain their biomimetic sensing capabil-
ities while the hybrid composite material provides greater stability and
ease of processing.  The emphasis of this research is on the development
of material preparation strategies, on characterization of the resulting materials, and on understanding the
interaction of these materials with other nanostructured components such as biological membranes or elec-
tronically active macromolecular systems.
[Los Alamos National Laboratory]
Nanostructure supported ion 
channel system.
Technology Need Present Problem
Identify biohazards in wide
variety of ambient settings.
Need improved techniques
to rapidly and selectively
sample biohazards from
complex biomaterial back-
grounds.
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Here we consider detection and identification technolo-
gies needed across the full spectrum of intervention sce-
narios:  indications and warning, environmental surveil-
lance, diagnostics, residual hazard surveys, and attribution
and forensics.  The key attributes required for effective
detection and identification technologies across this entire
spectrum include high sensitivity, specificity, speed, no
false positives or false negatives, reliable discernment of
targets against complex backgrounds, simple operation,
inexpensive to deploy for broad coverage devices, systems
integration, and size (potential for miniaturization,
microfluidics, portability).  We will consider these attrib-
utes as we address the issues and needs for different 
phases of detection: sampling and collection, triggers,
early warning and point sensors, and characterization 
and forensics.
Sampling and Collection
Biohazards will be presented in the context of an already
complex environment that is rich with materials that both
dilute and interfere with the intended detection signal.
Sampling technologies are required to improve the sensi-
tivity and specificity of detection and analysis methods for
assessment of contamination of the environment as well as
the related personnel and surfaces.  Of particular impor-
tance is the characterization of aerosol hazards using sys-
tems that can be automated and allow operational simplic-
ity.  System attributes should include means for selective
concentration of the species of concern to avoid compli-
cations from the widely varying and complex background.
Extraction, Purification, and Concentrating Technologies.
There is a clear need for novel technologies for the
extraction, purification, and concentration of bio-agents.
Key to this technology will be molecules that exhibit very
high affinity and specificity for the agent of interest.
These molecules may be synthetic, such as abiotic recep-
tors, polymers imprinted to achieve high specificity, or
biological molecules selected from large, diverse libraries
for their high affinity and specificity to the agent of inter-
est, such as single-chain antibody variable domains.
Methods to engineer high stability into these specific lig-
ands represent an important challenge for this problem, as
well as the development of detectors and point sensors
discussed below.  
Affinity purification will require molecules designed for
specific recognition and binding followed by reversible
release of the targets so that they can be recovered.
Scaling down to the use of microfluidic devices, including
flow cytometry to select specifically labeled cells or size
selected cells and the ability to lyse cells for further analy-
sis, are all capabilities that need to be developed signifi-
cantly to make possible extraction of agents from small,
dirty samples in the field.  New materials for separations,
such as novel polymer resins for column chromatography
will need to be developed that are robust, reusable, and
inert to environmental contaminants.  
Sampling and Collection Materials. Selective adsor-
bents for pathogens that are compatible with biomaterials
are needed to collect environmental samples from both
the aqueous and gas phase.  These materials must be
designed both to specifically entrap the pathogens, via
molecular or shape recognition, and to maintain the bio-
material’s structure and function.  Molecular or shape
recognition can be pursued using biologically or syntheti-
cally derived receptors that can be engineered onto vari-
ous surfaces/materials.  The supporting surface or material
must not only support functionalization for specific bind-
ing of the biomaterial, but must also be engineered to
resist nonspecific adhesion of the biomaterial.  Besides the
main issue of nonselective capture of the biomaterials
from the environment, nonspecific adsorption of biomate-
rials can lead to numerous additional problems.  For pro-
teins, nonspecific adsorption often will lead to denatura-
tion, thereby changing the function of the protein as well
as its affinity characteristics to sensor systems down-
stream.  Denaturation also can mean tenacious binding of
the protein to the surface and thus ineffective desorption
of the protein for subsequent identification.  Cellular
adhesion to surfaces can also run into similar problems
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Biocavity Laser for Real-Time
Detection of Pathogens    
BES-funded research on nanostructured compound
semiconductor light emitters has supported the
development of a highly sensitive micro laser
device, the Biocavity Laser.  Consisting of a
microfluid channel introduced into the optical
cavity of a quantum-well semiconductor laser, the
Biocavity Laser has been successfully demonstrated
for rapidly screening human cells for abnormalities
(e.g., brain tumors and sickle cell anemia).  The
power of this approach relies on the intimate
coupling of solid-state nanostructured materials with living biological systems.  Operationally, the bio agent,
suspended in a fluid, enters the optical cavity of the laser via the microfluid channel and becomes a part of the
cavity, impressing bio agent information on the spectral output of the laser.  Spectral analysis using a laptop
computer leads to the identification of the agent.  While this work has focused on human disease detection, it
is directly applicable to the rapid identification of potential biowarfare agents in the form of tiny pathogens
like bacteria, spores, or viral particles.  
[Sandia National Laboratories]
1P. L. Gourley and D. Y. Sasaki, “Biocavity Lasers,” American Scientist, v. 89(#2) pp. 152-159 Mar-Apr 2001.
Mass Spectrometry Based Bio-Agent Detection
Fourier Transform Ion Trap (FTICR) mass spectrometry has already been
demonstrated.  Preliminary work has already demonstrated the useful-
ness of this approach, providing advanced designs that have many of
the features needed for reliable field instrumentation with the required
performance.  It has the required mass range, sensitivity, and resolution.
However, significant advances are needed to turn this instrument into a
sufficiently small, rugged, reliable, and easily used instrument for routine
work outside a research laboratory.  To this end, numerous issues associ-
ated with the fundamental physics of these instruments are being inves-
tigated in BES research projects.  Perhaps, the most important problems
are those associated with electric and magnetic field quality.
[Pacific Northwest National Laboratory]
PNNL’s advanced ion trap is used to
perform full 3-D modeling and 
simulation calculations
Fig.1. Electron
micrograph of
biocvity laser and a
bacillus endospore
approximately 1
micron in diameter.
Fig.2. Compact microfluidic
system for reading nanolaser
chip output spectra and
images for high throughput
analysis of endospores.
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and even lead to cell lysis, again rendering downstream
detection schemes useless.  Surfaces coated with polymers
(e.g., surface grafted polymers, block copolymers, or 
dendrimers) or self-assembled materials (e.g., SAMs, lipid
bilayers, or liquid crystals) with unique functionality (e.g.,
PEG, PNIPAM, or polysaccharides) have proven effective
as biomaterial-passive coatings, but further advances in
the materials with regard to molecular-level structure,
nano- and micro-scale patterning, functional group orien-
tation and placement, and post-functionalization capability
would greatly improve upon existing systems.  
The sampling and collection materials must not only 
possess the ability to capture the bioagent but must also
reversibly desorb the captured agent.  In that sense, the
receptor sites, and the material, must have either reason-
ably low on/off rates, such that relatively small changes in
temperature can effect biomaterial desorption, or the ability
to reversibly alter its structure to reduce ligand affinity on
command.  Reversible structure schemes could be triggered
by temperature, light, or chemical treatment.  For any
scheme to succeed, the material must be robust to the
physical or chemically changes used to impose desorption.
Triggers
It can be very expensive and challenging to deploy 
sensing systems that detect biological agents with reliabil-
ity adequate for taking actions that may have major 
economic impact or cause significant societal disruption.
An alternative is to deploy less definitive and less expen-
sive devices for providing information that would “trigger”
further analysis and sample collection for definitive 
decision making.  Trigger sensors fall into two general
types, point sensors and stand-off sensors.  Point sensors
are described in their own section as they can play roles as
either trigger of definitive sensors depending on their
characteristics.  We consider here the needs for develop-
ment of improved stand-off sensors.
Laser-Based Remote Detection Methods. Laser based
detection systems are inherently capable of remote real-time
characterization.  Their value as triggers for biothreat
agents will be determined only by research leading to the
development of advanced tools to enable exhaustive char-
acterization of ambient microflora versus biothreat clouds,
demonstration of detection above background, and identi-
fication of organisms in different states.  Next generation
instruments will be more portable, more sensitive, lower in
cost, and more reliable.  X-ray fluorescence and synchro-
tron FTIR may prove to be valuable tools for obtaining
materials properties leading to remote trigger detection
methods.  Creation of mathematical tools (e.g., artificial
intelligence) for the extraction of reliable information
from large volumes of complex data will be a valuable
adjunct to any trigger system.  
Fundamental issues that must be addressed include a lack
of basic spectroscopic data for bio-particles such as 
bacteria, improvement in overall sensitivity for all of these
methods, sampling statistics, and the ever-present issue 
of eye safety that must be adequately addressed if such
instruments are ever to find widespread use in commercial
and industrial environments.  High-throughput applications
may require new imaging detection systems with improved
sensitivity.  Examples of three applications of lasers to
remote sensing are given below.
Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS).
Characterization of many solid materials, including
single particles, can be accomplished using LIBS, an
atomic emission spectroscopy technique that uses a
laser-induced microplasma for the highly efficient 
dissociation of the components of fine particulates
Technology Need Present Problem
Simple, inexpensive triggers
that alert the need for
detailed biohazard analysis.
Stand-off detection of 
biohazards.
Current biomolecular analy-
sis approaches not suited to
widespread and continuous
applications.
Laser-based techniques must
become more portable with
greater range and sensitivity.
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(~10 microns diameter) producing light emission
characteristic of the atomic constituents.  Detection 
of the emission can be used for chemical analysis at 
a distance of up to 24 m and for about 75% of the
known elements.  Research is needed to evaluate and
extend the sensitivity (current detection limits are of
the order of tens of ppm for most elements) and selec-
tivity of this technique for characterization of aerosol
dispersed biological agents, as well as chemical agents
and explosives. 
Laser Induced Fluorescence (LIF). For substances
that luminesce, which include most bioaerosols and
many organic aerosols, LIF is a sensitive remote char-
acterization method.1,2 Detection of small molecules
can be highly sensitive with limits of detection in the
tens of parts per trillion levels.3,4 The simple presence
of particle luminescence can be used to distinguish
between biological and nonbiological particles, and
the spectra of individual particles can often be used
for more detailed identification.  Successful applica-
tions have included detecting allergens and spores.
However, spectral similarities have made it difficult 
to identify specific bacteria.  Research is needed to
better understand the photophysical processes
leading to fluorescence from dispersed biological
agents to extend the diagnostic potential of LIF for
stand-off detection in complex atmospheric environ-
ments.  A modification to the LIF method as applied
to volatile explosives at the ppb levels is to perform
laser-induced photodissociation on the species of
interest and then measure LIF of a fluorescent 
fragment molecule.  
Laser Raman Spectroscopy (LRS). An inherently
remote method, LRS can provide functional group
specific spectral information over a distance of tens of
meters.   Recent advances in laser Raman spectroscopy
are from the development of spectroscopic systems
using UV excitation for resonance enhancement, near-
IR excitation for freedom from fluorescence back-
ground, sensitive array detectors, and Fourier transform
techniques.  Research is needed to continue the recent
advances in spectral selectivity (i.e., using acousto-optic
tunable filters) and sensitive optical detection schemes.
Raman characterization of individual particles currently
requires that the particle under study be held station-
ary using relatively simple electromagnetic or electro-
static particle traps in order to have sufficient time to
acquire adequate signal-to-noise ratios.  Spectra of
particles of less than 1 mm diameter have been
obtained in this manner.  While these techniques have
so far only been used in the laboratory, they could be
promising approaches for field detection of a wide
variety of toxic particles in air.  Researchers have
found that bacteria can be readily distinguished by
their Raman spectra, as can explosives.  Raman spec-
troscopy is the least sensitive of the laser techniques
but can be the most specific.  
Early Warning and Point Sensors  
Advanced point sensors for environmental detection of
biological pathogens are critical for early warning and for
assessing possible contamination.  Sensor systems capable
of rapid, sensitive, and specific detection of biothreat
agents are needed to deal with not only the terrorist
threat, but also naturally emerging biological threats.
1 S. C. Hill, R. G. Pinnick, S. Niles, N. F. Fell, Y. L. Pan, J. Bottiger, B. V. Bronk, S. Holler, and R. K.Chang, “Fluorescence from Airborne
Microparticles: Dependence on Size, Concentration of Fluorophores, and, Illumination Intensity,” Applied Optics 40, 3005-3013 (2001).
2 Y. L. Pan, S. Holler, R. K. Chang, S. C. Hill, R. G. Pinnick, S. Niles, and J. R. Bottiger, “Single-Shot Fluorescence Spectra of Individual 
Micrometer-sized Bioaerosols Illuminated by a 351- or a 266-nm Ultraviolet Laser,” Optics Letters 24, 116-118 (1999).
3 C-Y. Kung, M. D. Barnes, N. Lermer, W. B. Whitten, and J. M. Ramsey, “Confinement and Manipulation of Individual Molecules in Attoliter 
Volumes,” Analytical Chemistry 70, 658 - 661 (1998).
4 N. Lermer, M. D. Barnes, C-Y. Kung, W. B. Whitten, and J. M. Ramsey, “High-Efficiency Molecular Counting in Solution: Single-Molecule
Detection Using Electrodynamically-Focused Microdroplet Streams,” Analytical Chemistry 69, 2115-2121 (1997).
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Environmental point sensors could be used by first respon-
ders (firemen, police, hazmat personnel, etc.) as portal
monitors or in sensor networks.  The sensors must be 
simple, robust, reliable, compact, and, in many instances,
battery operated.  They must also be able to differentiate
between pathogens in the context of the inherently complex
environment.  These attributes are difficult to achieve for
environmental sensing.  Moreover, there is a pressing need
for real-time and continuous monitoring, and for the sensor
system to operate directly in air with no prior aerosol 
collection.  What is addressed here is the basic science
that underpins the development of advanced sensor 
systems and entirely new detection methods.  
Molecular Recognition. Molecular recognition (the
process by which two molecules come together, recognize
one another, and initiate the process by which they finally
bind in a specific, high-affinity interaction) is one of the
most important processes in any technology to detect bio-
logical (or chemical) agents.  However, the chemistry and
physics of the recognition process, which involves initially
weak interactions, are poorly understood.  Questions that
arise when considering molecular recognition in the 
biological arena are:  How does the binding site of proteins
convert from a typically disordered state to one that
achieves strong ligand recognition?  How does a disordered
loop of peptide on the surface of a protein recognize a
small molecule?  How can the interaction of the small
molecule lead to the formation of a stable, protein–small-
molecule complex?  How are the specificity and affinity 
of the interaction coded into the structure of the binding
partners prior to their interaction?  We need to find
answers to these fundamental questions to make progress
in engineering host-guest complexes that will be impor-
tant for design of sensors, whether they use biological or
inorganic molecules as components.
Engineering of Robust Ligands.  There is a huge
need for highly specific ligands that are robust for use
in field detectors, as well as in collection devices.
One option for these ligands is to use polymers 
treated by molecular imprinting to provide specificity.
Another approach is to utilize carbohydrates and
small peptides (7–20 mers) that are inherently stable.5
Both of these approaches satisfy the need for stability
but suffer from low affinities and relatively poor speci-
ficity owing to cross reactivity to multiple biomole-
cules.  A third method is the engineering of proteins
or DNA/RNA aptamers obtained from large, diverse
molecular libraries.6,7 For instance, antibodies have
many properties that are highly favorable for use in
sensors (or collectors), but often lack the stability
required for use in the field or for long-term storage.
Structure-based engineering of antibody domains can
be used to create hyper-stable, single-chain variable
domains.  Alternative approaches involve the use of
other scaffolds that have greater intrinsic stability.    
Technology Need Present Problem
Point sensors for early 
warning detection.
Real-time continuous 
biohazard monitoring.
Present sensors cannot 
combine rapid, sensitive and 
specific detection.
Sensors will have to become
more robust, reliable and
able to operate at low 
power in air.
5 M. Mourez, R. S. Kane, J. Mogridge, S. Metallo, P. Deschatelets, B. R. Sellman, G. M. Whitesides, and R. J. Collier, "Designing a Polyvalent Inhibitor
of Anthrax Toxin," Nat Biotechnol 19:958-961 (2001).
6 J. L. Lou, R. Marzari, V. Verzillo, F. Ferrero, D. Pak, M. Sheng, C. L. Yang, D. Sblattero, and A. Bradbury, "Antibodies in Haystacks: How Selection
Strategy Influences the Outcome of Selection from Molecular Diversity Libraries,"  Journal of Immunological Methods 253(#1-2) pp. 233-242 (July 1, 2001).
7 A. D. Ellington and  J. W. Szostak, "Invitro Selection of RNA Molecules that Bind Specific Ligands," Nature, 346 (#6287) pp. 818-822 (1990).
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Structural Biology of Surface Epitopes and
Macromolecular Complexes. Protein-based detec-
tion of bioagents will depend on interaction of a
detector molecule(s) (such as a single-chain antibody
variable domain) and a surface epitope of the agent.
Characterization of the surface epitopes can be carried
out either through the crystallographic analysis of
structural proteins that make up the surface of the
agent,8 or through epitope analysis using libraries of
antibodies displayed on the surface of phage particles.
Screening of antibody libraries will lead to the identi-
fication of those with affinity for surface epitopes of
the agent.  The epitope can then be identified by
screening peptide sequences, which may or may not
be derived from the gene of interest, displayed on the
surface of phage particles.  Characterization of the
specificity of the antibody will provide the identifica-
tion of the epitope.  Identification of these epitopes is
a significant step towards an understanding of the
parameters needed for vaccine design, design of drugs
targeting the adhesion molecules of the agents, or the
design of drugs involved in agent neutralization.  
Signaling and Amplification. Cell signaling in nature is
an exquisitely sensitive molecular cascade that converts a
highly specific molecular recognition event to a macro-
scopic change.  Nature does this by directly coupling a
molecular recognition event to a signal, often a structural
change that is then amplified through the enzymatic 
production of secondary messenger molecules that open,
for example, ion channels.  There is continued need to
develop new molecular transduction approaches that
mimic cell signaling in increasingly innovative ways.
Examples of recent advances in signal transduction and
amplification include the coupling of novel electronic and
photonic materials to recognition.  Conducting polymers
have been used to provide amplification through the fluo-
rescence quenching of the entire polymer by a single 
molecule.9 Similar approaches have been taken with 
carbon nanotubes and related “molecular” wires to provide
exquisitely sensitive response to a molecular-level event.
Molecular recognition has also been used to open and
close ion channels to provide signal amplification that
mimics nature.10 
In addition to new transduction approaches that build on
novel new materials, entirely new approaches are needed
to provide the level of specificity and sensitivity inherent
in high-affinity recognition ligands yet with lower affinity
permitting continuous monitoring.  Current approaches
based on immuno-assays are, in effect, irreversible.
Mammalian olfaction is an example of how nature utilizes
low affinity but highly specific recognition to achieve
rapid reversibility of an event and avoid saturation.  The
development of new sensing approaches that build on 
biomimicry and biomimetic materials could well provide
the underlying scientific foundation for near real-time
continuous monitors for environmental sensing of 
threat agents.
Interfacial Phenomena. Sensors that are based on 
mimicking biological recognition and response must be
able to interface the biomimetic system with a sensor 
platform that can interpret the signals.  Biochemically
based identification devices correspondingly require 
quantification tools that approach single molecule 
8 J. Bella, M. G. Rossmann, “Review: Rhinovirus and Their ICAM Receptors,” Journal of Structural Biology 128, 69-74 (1999).
9 L. H. Chen, D. W. McBranch, H. L. Wang, R. Helgeson, F. Wudl, and D. G. Whitten,  "Highly Sensitive Biological and Chemical Sensors Based on
Reversible Fluorescence Quenching in a Conjugated Polymer," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 96,
12287-12292 (1999).
10 B. A. Cornell, V. Braach-Maksvytis, L. G. Kim, P. D. J. Osman, B. Rague, L. Wieczorek,  R. J. Pace," A Biosensor That Uses Ion-Channel Switches,”
Nature 337, 580-583 (1997).
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sensitivities.  Moreover, technologies that have features
with small (<10 µm) length scales necessarily have high
surface-to-volume ratios increasing the importance of
understanding interfacial chemistry.  Understanding how
ultrasensitive spectroscopy and interfacial phenomena
interrelate is fundamental to developing more sophisticated,
robust sensors.  Spectroscopic probes can be applied to
condensed-phase systems and have applications in both
biological and materials sciences.11,12 These ultrasensitive
laser-based probes have been used to interrogate physical
and chemical interactions in micro- and nano-domains and
at interfaces.  These probes can now be used to study 
systems where biological or biomimetic molecules interact
with hard and soft materials.  
Dry Sensors. Environmental sensing of biological markers
generally requires an aerosol collection followed by sample
injection.  It would be highly desirable to develop sensors
that could directly respond to biological markers dissolved
in aerosols without first concentrating the aerosol.  Such
“dry” sensors may need a permeable barrier material that
separates the air to be monitored from the active element
of the sensor system.  Mesoporous materials (sol-gel,
hydrogel, aerogel, block-copolymers, etc.) with controlled
pore size and character (hydrophilicity and functionality)
could be used to separate the air to be sampled from the
active sensor elements.  Ideally, these would be hybrid
materials where proteins or genes could be, for example,
electrophoretically (or physically) driven across the mem-
brane barrier into the active sensor region.  Other trans-
duction approaches that use biomimetic materials that
incorporate recognition and reporter molecules in a stable
fluid media (e.g., membrane mimetic architectures) also
have promise as dry sensors.
Single Particle Methods.  Instrumentation is becoming
available for the rapid, real-time analysis of individual
aerosol particles.  Such instrumentation can be highly
diagnostic, as it does not average information about a 
specific agent with that from background constituents—
finding the needles in the haystack by rapidly looking at a
large number of individual “straws.”  Many field-portable
instruments have been developed that follow an initial
sorting of the aerosols by their aerodynamic size with a
volatilization, fragmentation, and ionization step (some-
times through the use of lasers) and mass spectral charac-
terization of the ionic fragments.13,14 Instruments using
ion traps for mass analysis are especially powerful because
of their MS/MS capability, permitting the generation 
of sequence tags for protein identification, for exam-
ple.15,16,17,18 Research into laser material interactions is
needed to improve the quantitative aspects of such 
11 A. P. Bartko, R. M. Dickson, “Imaging Three-Dimensional Single Molecule Orientations,” Journal of Physical Chemistry B 103 (51): 11237-11241 (1999).
12 M. D. Barnes, K. C. Ng,  K. P. McNamara, C-Y. Kung, J. M. Ramsey, and S. C. Hill, “Fluorescence Imaging of Single Molecules in Polymer 
Microspheres,” Cytometry 36, 169-175 (1999).
13 P. J. McKeown, M. V. Johnston, and D. M. Murphy, “Online Single Particle Analysis by Laser Desorption Mass Spectrometry,” Anal. Chem. 63,
2069-2073 (1991).
14 C. A. Noble and K. A. Prather, “Aerosol Time-of-Flight Mass Spectrometry,” in Analytical Chemistry of Aerosols, K. R. Spurny, ed., Lewis Publishers,
Boca Raton, (1999).
15 M. Yang, P. T. A. Reilly, K. B. Boraas, W. B. Whitten, and J. M. Ramsey, “Real-time Chemical Analysis of Aerosol Particles Using an Ion Trap Mass
Spectrometer,” Rapid Comm. in Mass Spectrometry Special Issue, Vol. 10, 347 (1996).
16 P. T. A. Reilly, R. A. Gieray, M. Yang, W. B. Whitten, and J. M. Ramsey, "Tandem Mass Spectrometry of Individual Airborne Microparticles,” Anal.
Chem. 69, 36 (1997).
17 R. A. Gieray, P. T. A. Reilly, M. Yang, W. B. Whitten, and J. M. Ramsey, “Real-Time Detection of Individual Airborne Bacteria,” J. Microbio. 
Methods 29, 191 (1997).
18 R. A. Gieray, P. T. A. Reilly, M. Yang, W. B. Whitten, and J. M. Ramsey, “Tandem Mass Spectrometry of Uranium and Uranium Oxides in Airborne
Particulates,” Anal. Chem. 70, 117 (1998).
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instruments, with particular attention to characterization
of biological agents and explosive materials.  Aerodynamic
sorting can also be followed by deposition of the aerosols
on a substrate for later laboratory analyses.  Recent advances
allow elemental analyses on tens of thousands of individual
particles (as small as 0.1 mm) to be performed via automated
electron induced x-ray emission detection.  Advances in
high-resolution mass spectrometry indicate the potential
for direct biological species identification through detec-
tion of highly specific signature molecules, following laser
ablation of molecules from the surface of an individual
spore, for example.  These recent examples show that
there is much to be gained in the speed and certainty of
detection of biological agents through additional research
into methods of single particle analysis.
Miniaturization. Among the technologies needed for
addressing the identification of biological threat agents
will be microfabricated devices.  Different aspects of R&D
needed to achieve miniaturization will be described here.
Microfluidics. Microfluidics enables samples and
reagents to be easily manipulated, analyzed, and
detected “on-chip.” This suggests the eventual ability
to perform virtually any type of “wet-chemical” bench
procedure on a microfabricated device.19,20,21 This
moving of the chemical or biological laboratory to a
microchip includes the advantages of reducing reagent
volumes, automating material manipulation without
human intervention, reducing capital costs, parallel
processing, faster analysis, and remote operation
away from large laboratories.  The volume of fluids
manipulated or dispensed in the microfluidic struc-
tures depends on the channel dimensions but is typi-
cally on the order of picoliters to nanoliters.  By
implementing multiple processes in a single device
(serial integration), these small fluid quantities can be
manipulated from process to process efficiently and
automatically under computer control.  An operator
would only have to load the sample to be analyzed.
This serial integration of multiple analysis steps can
be combined with parallel processing by replicating
microfabricated structures on the same device.  
Although significant progress has been made,
microfluidic devices need to reach the next level of
sophistication to contribute significantly to deterring
terrorism.  Fundamental research issues include mate-
rials development, novel fabrication techniques, fluid
transport phenomena, and system integration.
Developments with microfabricated fluidic devices
would need to parallel advances in biochemical assays
for future integration.
Nanofluidics. Understanding the chemistry and
physics of molecular transport through fabricated
channels with molecular-scale lateral dimension is fun-
damental to developing the next generation of biolog-
ical sensors.  Although such transport is fundamental
to life, there is little molecular scale understanding of
the requirements for such processes.  Studying such
phenomena using well-characterized nanometer scale
channels fabricated in substrates such as silicon,
quartz, or other materials is one approach.22,23
19 S. A. Casalnuovo; G. C. Frye-Mason, R. J. Kottenstette, E. J. Heiler, C. M. Matzke, P. R. Lewis, R. P. Manginell, S. L. Hietala, W. K. Schubert, V. M.
Hietala, D. Y. Sasaki, and J. L. Reno, "Gas Phase Chemical Detection with an Integrated Chemical Analysis System," Proceedings of the Joint Meeting of
the European Frequency and Time Forum and the IEEE International Frequency Control Symposium, Besancon, France, Apr. 13-16, 1999,  Publisher:
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,  New York, N. Y;  2  991-996 (1999).
20 D. J. Harrison, K. Fluri, K. Seiler, Z. Fan, C. S. Effenhauser, and A. Manz, “Micromachining a Miniaturized Capillary Electrophoresis-Based Chemical
Analysis System on a Chip,” Science 261, 895 (1993).
21 J. M. Ramsey, “The Burgeoning Power of the Shrinking Laboratory,” Nature Biotech. 17, 1061 (1999).
22 J. Han, S. W. Turner, and H. G. Craighead, “Entropic Trapping and Escape of Long DNA Molecules at Submicron Size Constriction,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 83,
1688 (1999).
23 J. Han and H. G. Craighead, “Separation of Long DNA Molecules in a Microfabricated Entropic Trap Array,” Science 288, 1026 (2000).
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Fundamental transport issues for fluids and solutes
need to be studied within these nanoscale conduits.24,25
These studies should include chemistry and physics
issues related to hard materials (the materials that
form the fluid enclosures), soft materials (fluids,
molecular coatings, and biological molecules), and 
the interface between the two types of materials.
Fundamental questions that need to be addressed
include phase transitions and scaling of polymer trans-
port through nanoconduits, the validity of continuum
fluid mechanics at the nanoscale, and fundamental
limits of forming nanoscale conduits.
Miniature Gas Phase Analysis; Mass Spectrometry.
The inherent selectivity and speed of mass spectrome-
try has the potential to provide significant capability
for rapid identification of biological agents.  The idea
of advanced, selective miniature mass spectrometer-
based sensor systems is intriguing.26,27 Experimental
and computational approaches to study the fundamen-
tal chemical and physical processes that permit the
reduction of size, cost, and analysis speed for mass
spectrometer systems would be needed.  Evidence
suggests that the fundamental processes underpinning
laboratory scale mass spectrometry will not scale with
size when moving from the centimeter to the microm-
eter domain (and beyond).  Thus, transitioning mass
spectrometry from laboratory to small-scale (hand-
held) sensor devices will require the study and under-
standing of fundamental phenomena in the new size
regime both to determine the limits of scale as well as
to identify and exploit new opportunities.  These phe-
nomena include ion transport, ion energetics, and 
gas phase ion and ion-ion chemistry at micrometer 
dimensions.28,29
Characterization, Attribution, and Forensics 
For bioagent characterizations, a variety of technologies
ranging from compact fieldable sensors to elegant laboratory-
based bioanalytical methods are needed.  The discussion
above for sample collection and environmental point sensors
applies equally to forensics and attribution.  Forensics and
attribution can also be achieved by isotopic and elemental
analysis of nonbiological constituents of a sample, as well
as by DNA analyses for the species and strain identification.
Analysis of DNA variations using Amplified Fragment
Length Polymorphism (AFLP), Multiple Locus Variable
number tandem repeat Analysis (MLVA), and single
nucleotide polymorphism (SNPs) have proven invaluable
in characterizing agents.  These DNA-based techniques
will remain important, but we also need novel methods
that will provide for faster analysis for species and, if 
possible, strain-specific detection and characterization.  In
this section, we will concentrate on technologies needed
for attribution and forensics applications of isotopic 
analysis and high-throughput bioassays.
Isotopic Signatures for Attribution. Sensitive techniques for
stable isotope separation provide a means of determining
24 S. Granick, “Motions and Relaxations of Confined Fluids,” Science 253, 1374 (1991). 
25 A. L. Demirel and S. Granick, “Glass-Like Transition of a Confined Simple Fluid,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 77, 2261 (1996).
26 E. R. Badman, R. C. Johnson, W. R. Plass, and R. G. Cooks, “A Miniature Cylindrical Quadrupole Ion Trap: Simulation and Experiment,”  
Anal. Chem. 70, 4896-4901 (1998).
27 O. Kornienko, P. T. A. Reilly, W. B. Whitten, and J. M. Ramsey, “Micro Ion Trap Mass Spectrometry,” Rapid Communications in Mass 
Spectrometry 13, 50-53 (1999).
28 O. Kornienko, P. T. A. Reilly, W. B. Whitten, and J. M. Ramsey, “Electron Impact Ionization in a Micro Ion Trap Mass Spectrometer,” 
Rev. Sci. Instrum. 70, 3907-3909 (1999).
29 O. Kornienko, P. T. A. Reilly, W. B. Whitten, and J. M. Ramsey, “Field-Emission Cold-Cathode EI Source for a Microscale Ion Trap Mass
Spectrometer,” Anal. Chem. 72, 559-562 (2000).
Technology Need Present Problem
Rapidly characterize and
attribute the origin of 
biohazard material.
New methods must provide
rapid species analysis and
stain-specific detection.
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the origin of biological agents in forensic reconstructions.
A specific example of this kind of application is the poten-
tial use of Sr and Pb isotopic compositions in tracing the
source of the anthrax causing B. anthracis recently sent
through the mail system, either through the composition
of the spores themselves or of their carrier medium.  In
the natural environment, different sources of Sr and Pb
can have different isotopic compositions because of decay
of 87Rb to 87Sr, 235U, 238U, and 232Th to isotopes of
Pb, coupled with variable time integrated Rb/Sr, U/Pb,
and Th/Pb ratios in different natural materials.  This varia-
tion, related to underlying regional geology, imparts to
different fresh-water sources contrasting Sr and Pb iso-
topic composition that can be used to constrain geograph-
ically the source of fresh water.  For example, water from
the Connecticut River has a distinct range in Sr and Pb
isotopic composition from water from the Sacramento
River (in contrast, while the Pb isotopic composition of
seawater is variable, the world’s oceans are essentially
homogeneous in Sr isotopic composition).  Likewise, the
trace amounts of Sr and Pb in chemical reagents are likely
to have distinct isotopic compositions.  When Bacillus
anthracis sporulates, it incorporates small amounts of Sr
and Pb, faithfully recording the Sr and Pb isotopic com-
position of the growth medium.  This provides then an
isotopic fingerprint of the source of the spores.  This can
be used to not only compare different aliquots of the
spores, but could also potentially provide clues to the 
geographic origin of spore production or to sources of 
utilized reagents. 
High-Throughput Assays for Agent Characterization.
There are many instances (e.g., distinguishing a pathogenic
agent from a vaccine strain) where it is critical to be able
to rapidly characterize biothreat agents in the field.     
Gene Probe and Protein Chip-Based Assays.
Immunological (protein based) and DNA or RNA
(gene based) detection currently provides sufficient
accuracy for identification and characterization.
Microarrays provide an efficient way of performing
large numbers of nucleic acid hybridizations or protein-
protein interactions simultaneously, but there are 
challenges concerning costs and quality control.  They
rely at the moment on the arraying of nucleic acids or
proteins on glass slides or membranes.   Protein arrays
still rely on sandwich assay formats that require both
capture and reporter antibodies.  For this reason, pro-
tein arrays suffer from problems of relatively low affini-
ties (the weaker of the antigen’s affinities to the capture
or reporter antibodies) and higher levels of cross 
reactivity relative to gene arrays.30 New reagent-free
assay formats that build-in higher binding affinities
and simple chemistries to pattern recognition ligands
onto chips are needed.   In addition, advances in reac-
tive chemistries to improve binding of these ligands to
the array matrix, as well as the development of modi-
fied or synthetic ligands to improve the stability of
ligands (to permit reuse of arrays, for example) would
make these techniques more robust.  In addition, 
construction of hybrid organic sol-gel materials or
modified semiconductor materials (e.g., Nanogen’s
chip technology) may provide rapid, more repro-
ducible fabrication methods.  There are also issues
concerning cost and quality control to be addressed
before this technology can be broadly applied to the
biothreat problem.    
Next-generation microarray technology likely will
involve the elimination of confocal optical techniques
for readout and will, rather, integrate the molecular
interactions with signal transduction at the silicon 
surface, or in thin film composites.  Current directions
in BES Nanoscience and Technology are already 
producing prototype devices demonstrating what
might be possible.
30 G. S. Waldo, protein arrays.
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Single Molecule DNA Sequencing. The possibility
of sequencing single molecules of DNA at kilohertz
rates using nanotechnologies would be essential for
real-time, high-sensitivity identification of pathogens
or real-time DNA fingerprinting of individuals at por-
tals.  One approach to the sequencing of single
polynucleotide molecules is to use conductance
probes within a molecular-scale aperture.  There have
recently been intriguing suggestions about how one
might rapidly determine the sequence of a single
DNA molecule contained in a buffer solution by
transporting it through a voltage-biased nanoscale
aperture while monitoring the ionic current through
that aperture.31,32 
Fundamental research issues are to develop fabrication
strategies for forming nanometer-scale structures,
understand limits to dimensional stability and surface
roughness, evaluate transport for solvated ions and
polyelectrolytes in confined fluids, investigate poly-
mer dynamics in confined spaces, and interface nano-
structured material to the “real-world.”  These investi-
gations should be pursued both experimentally and
theoretically. 
4.4 Medical  Diagnost ics 
In the event of a bioterrorist attack, it will be essential to
have technologies that can be used to rapidly detect 
infection from, or exposure to, biothreat agents within
potentially large human populations.  Early diagnosis of
infection or detection of exposure can make all the differ-
ence in successfully treating victims and in minimizing the
impact to the local medical community.  For example, if
intoxication by botulinum neurotoxin (BoNT) can be
detected prior to clinical diagnosis, this disease can be
effectively treated with therapeutic antibodies; if not, the
only recourse is respiratory aid for 6–8 weeks in an inten-
sive care unit.33 Even a limited terrorist attack with BoNT
could paralyze the medical community.  Medical diagnosis
will, most likely, take place in a doctor's office or point-
of-care facility.  Given the expected low incidence of
events, diagnostic instrumentation or sensors will be 
used sparingly, if at all, to address biothreat attacks.
Accordingly, it is critical that they have dual use capabili-
ties and be used regularly to address common infectious
disease, or they are likely to be ineffective in the event of
a real biothreat attack.34 Other attributes, such as cost,
speed, and simplicity of use are also important.  The most
important contributions of BES are likely to come from
the preparation and characterization of novel materials for
new diagnostic or therapeutic devices, from the develop-
ment of new tools for diagnosis, and from the develop-
ment and application of new materials and tools to study
host-pathogen interactions at a fundamental level.
Bio-Compatible Materials for Therapeutic and
Diagnostic Applications
New bio-compatible materials are need for a variety of
biomedical applications encompassing diagnosis and 
treatment.  These include optoelectronic materials that
Technology Need Present Problem
Rapid diagnosis of infection
or detection of human 
exposure.
Diagnostic tools for use in
point-of-care facilities.
Clinical diagnosis is too slow
for effective early treatment
approaches.
Instruments need to become
simpler, less expensive, and
able to operate after pro-
longed storage times.
31 J. J. Kasianowicz, E. Brandin, D. Branton, D. W. Deamer, “Characterization of Individual Polynucleotide Molecules Using a Membrane Channel,”
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 93, 13770 (1996).
32 D. W. Deamer, and M. Akeson, “Nanopores and Nucleic Acids: Prospects for Ultrarapid Sequencing,” Trends in Biotechnology 18, 147-151 (2000).
33 D. R. Franz, L. M. Pitt, M. A. Clayton, M. A. Hanes, K. J. Rose, "Efficacy of Prophylactic and Therapeutic Administration of Antitoxin for Inhalation
Botulism," Botulinum and Tetanus Neurotoxins, edited by B. R. Dasgupta, Plenum, NY (1993).
34 J. Rosen, C. Lucey, "Emerging Technologies: Recommendations for Counterterrorism," Institute for Security Technology Studies, Dartmouth College (2001).
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have ideal light-emitting characteristics for probing bio-
logical systems.  The ability to implant macro- and nano-
structured materials for detecting disease, monitoring
exposure, and therapy after exposure is also an area to
explore.      
New Materials for Diagnostic Devices
This area of research seeks to apply materials (self-assem-
bled, semiconductor, glass, and polymer) science and
technology toward early detection of infection by bio-
medical analysis of blood, body fluids, and tissues in real
time at a point-of-care setting.  Such detection includes
measuring the response of the human immune system to
invading viral and bacterial pathogens as well as detecting
markers of the pathogens themselves.  Important candi-
date technologies include novel microfabricated and
nanofabricated structures and devices that are integrated
with cells, microorganisms, or biomolecules for analysis,
separation, or processing.  They exploit the interplay of
the microfabricated structure/device materials and archi-
tectures with the biosystem by interrogating the biophysi-
cal or biochemical properties of bioparticles.  Such materi-
als may be used for in vitro detection, in noninvasive
monitoring as in ex vivo detectors and dermal contact 
sensors, or in vivo for detection, imaging, and therapy.35
Microfabricated and nanofabricated materials for optical-
electrical-mechanical systems enable characterization
techniques that offer higher speed, sensitivity, and efficiency
over conventional methods.  Such structures or devices
could include microfabricated flow structures; micro-
cytometers for cell analysis, identification, and sorting;
DNA, RNA, and protein sequencing; insulin or glucose
detectors; antibody and virus detectors.36
This area will need modeling and simulation to better
understand and predict the material or biosystem interac-
tions at micro- or nano-meter scales.  Examples include
the studies of the surface modification of semiconductors
and biocompatible materials (semiconductors, glasses, and
polymers) integrated at the wafer level (lab on a chip),
optical microcavities or porous fabricated materials con-
taining biological fluids under analysis or modification by
enhanced physical or chemical effects, and micromanipu-
lation of molecules/cells/particulates by microfabricated
devices.  Also included are nanostructured surfaces that
exploit enhanced surface effects to study, modify, or
manipulate cells, molecules, or particulates; surface-
enhanced phenomena arising from direct contact of
biosystems with materials; biomimetic materials such as
membrane mimetic architectures; and hybrid organic-
inorganic materials.
It is evident that the research opportunities include a
broad range of materials science such as self-assembled
and hybrid materials, semiconductors (silicon, III-Vs, and
other compounds) insulators (glasses, dielectrics, fibers),
and organics (polymers).  The essential focus is on under-
standing and making very small structures and devices
from these materials and applying them to the flow, 
capture, detection, or processing of biological species.
Novel theories of substrate-organism interactions, experi-
mental techniques, fundamental materials science, and
materials processing are all included.
Spectromicroscopic Imaging at Molecular and 
Cellular Levels
Imaging technologies have experienced great advances in
recent years, and their use in biology has been increasingly
exploited for both research and medical diagnostics.  The
traditional imaging techniques such as MRI and CT, for
example, can generate highly detailed spatial images, but
the observed contrast does not directly contain useful 
biochemical information.  If one could obtain a biomolec-
35 J. R. Lindner, S. Kaul, “Delivery of Drugs with Ultrasound,” Echocardiography 18, 329-337 (2001).
36 W. C. Dunn, S. C. Jacobson, L. C. Waters, N. Kroutchinina, J. Khandurina, R. S. Foote,  M. J. Justice, L. J. Stubbs, J. M. Ramsey, “PCR Amplification
and Analysis of Simple Sequence Length Polymorphisms in Mouse DNA Using a Single Microchip Device,” Analytical Biochemistry 277, 157-160 (2000).
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ular image of tissues or cells, it would be possible to discern
the structurally specific chemical basis of dynamic biologi-
cal processes or take advantage of the combination of
shape and unique chemical composition of individual cells
to obtain fingerprint signatures, including diseased cells
and pathogenic bacteria, without the addition of dyes or
labels.  Vibrational imaging technologies that correlate
molecular spectral (intensity as a function of energy) data
with spatial variables can provide such a molecular map.
The primary challenges to the development of this approach
include needed improvements in the sensitive detection of
vibrational images and development of image understand-
ing tools to extract relevant information.  These problems
may be addressed using infrared and coherent anti-stokes
Raman (CARS) methods as outlined below.37
FTIR Detection of Pathogens in Cells
Fourier transform infrared (FTIR) spectromicroscopy is a
technology that may be enabling for new detection tech-
niques for pathogens in infected cells, as well as in the
environment.38 FTIR has the advantage of a wide spec-
trum, very bright beam that can interrogate surfaces with
living intact cells.  It has been recently demonstrated that
high-brightness synchrotron radiation-FTIR (SR-FTIR)
spectromicroscopy with a spatial resolution of less than 10
µm has the ability to detect many biochemical changes,
such as different phases of the cell cycle and exposure to
very dilute chemical agents (e.g., 10-11 M of dioxin).39 It
also allows one to use the beam to study localized cellular
processes.  This research also indicates that synchrotron
infrared photons do not induce detectable intracellular
chemistry changes or physiological effects (long term or
short term) on cells that are exposed to the synchrotron
infrared beam.  The reflected spectra can show unique
responses in particular wavelengths that indicate compounds
or suites of compounds that are unique to that organism
or indicate metabolic/biochemical changes that have
occurred in a host cell in response to infection or toxicity.
FTIR spectromicroscopy is sensitive enough to detect
reproducibly distinct (spectral) changes in a single hydrated
and living fibroblast (lung) cell as the cell undergoes different
stages of its cell cycle.  Thus, sputum samples from
exposed individuals could be examined to determine if
they have been infected, prior to showing any symptoms.
In addition, the spectra from environmental samples have
been used to identify bacteria on environmental surfaces
and demonstrate their juxtaposition to substrates.  Once
the spectra that are critical have been identified, then a
small tuned laser system that might even be handheld
would enable rapid field detection both by first responders
and clinicians.
IR Focal Plane Arrays for Hyperspectral Imaging
SR-FTIR shows great promise as a research tool to further
unravel what can be learned about disease using spectro-
micoscopy techniques.  It is not, however, practical to rely
on limited high-brightness sources for rapid diagnosis that
will be needed in the event of a terrorist attack.  For this
reason, it is important to continue to develop more flexible
approaches based on advanced detector systems and more
conventional sources that could be deployed in a doctor's
office.  The recent deployment of multichannel 2-D focal
plane array (FPA) detectors including InSb, HgCdTe
(MCT), and quantum-well infrared photoconductors
(QWIP) on the infrared microscope has facilitated the
application of hyperspectral imaging to vibrational
microspectroscopy.  These array-based technologies are being
actively developed, with sensitivity and spatial resolution
issues still to be fully characterized and optimized.  
37 J. X. Cheng, A. Volkmer, L. D. Book, and X. S. Xie, “An Epi-Detected Coherent Anti-Stokes Raman Scattering (E-CARS) Microscope with High
Spectral Resolution and High Sensitivity,” Journal of Physical Chemistry B 105 (7): 1277-1280 (2001).
38 M. Jackson, M. G. Sowa, and H. H. Mantsch, “Infrared Spectroscopy: A New Frontier in Medicine,” Biophysical Chemistry 68(1-3): p. 109-125 (1997).
39 N. Jamin, P. Dumas, J. Moncuit, W. H. Fridman, J. L. Teillaud, G. L. Carr, and G. P. Williams, “Highly Resolved Chemical Imaging of Living Cells by
Using Synchrotron Infrared Microspectrometr,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 95(9): p. 4837-4840 (1998).
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Coherent Anti-Stokes Raman Scattering (CARS)
Recently, nonlinear multiphoton techniques have been
applied to fluorescence imaging.  In these experiments,
femtosecond pulses of near-infrared light are tightly focused
on the sample.  Two-photon absorption will occur only
from within the focal volume where the light intensity is
high; hence, fluorescence originates only from the focal
volume.  Similarly, nonlinear optical techniques for vibra-
tional spectroscopy have many benefits for chemical
imaging.  CARS is a nonlinear Raman technique that 
produces coherent emission of Raman radiation.37 The
primary value of CARS includes its superior resolution
capability (sub-diffraction) and, as a stimulated process, its
high signal levels.  Even more important is the fact that it
does not require dye-labeling as do may fluorescent probe
methods.  Molecule specific imaging is possible in unmod-
ified cells or tissues, greatly simplifying sample preparation
and other issues related to medical applications of laser
based imaging methods.
Image Understanding
While vibrational spectroscopy can provide chemical
information for all species present, the sheer volume of
information generated can make data analysis problematic.
As each chemical species gives rise to many vibrational
modes, the measured spectrum will be comprised of con-
tributions from all of these. A similar problem has already
been successfully addressed using an alternate technique
based on “evolutionary algorithms.” The macroscopic
applications of astronomy and satellite-based surveillance
systems have made use of hyperspectral imaging, and the
data analysis routines used in these disciplines have attained
fairly high levels of sophistication.  Two approaches, both
separately and in combination, will improve the utility of
vibrational images: (1) genetic learning algorithms that
use a library of signatures and user-selected screening
algorithms to categorize individual and combined elements
within an image and (2) the application of a multiscale,
multiresolution algorithms to both compress and optimally
select the discriminating characteristics of vibrational images.
The realistic potential for correlating molecular images of
cells to disease states offers enormous technical benefits,
which would accrue from better understanding the rele-
vant biochemical foundations of cellular responses.  In
both the biological and the materials science arenas, the
instrumentation and analysis techniques proposed here
will yield information with an unprecedented level of spa-
tial and chemical detail, and ultimately allow the examina-
tion of how heterogeneous molecular-level structure influ-
ences and controls macroscopic function.
New Materials and Tools to Study Host 
Pathogen Interactions
An understanding of how pathogens invade the host can
help guide the development of both diagnostic and thera-
peutic tools.  One example is the mechanisms of cellular
invasion of viruses and bacterial protein toxins.  In both
cases, the cellular invasion mechanism always involves
pathogen recognition of multiple receptors on the surface
of targeted cells.  A clear understanding of the ligand-
receptor interactions can be used to design man-made
receptors that bind the active receptor site of the pathogen
more tightly than the natural receptors.  These man-made
receptors can then be used for inhibition to block the
pathogen's invasion of cells or as recognition molecules
for sensitive detection of the pathogen.  Structural biology
(neutron and x-ray diffraction as well as electron microscopy)
can be used to clarify the receptor binding sites to guide the
synthesis of man-made receptors with high binding affinities.40
The mechanisms of translocation of a bacterial toxin or
viral particle (or its genetic information and core proteins)
across the cell membrane is understood for only a limited
number of pathogens.  Often, the pathogen-receptor 
complex further aggregates on the surface of the cell
40 M. G. Rossmann, J. Bella, P. R. Kolatkar, Y. N. He, E. Wimer, R. J. Kuhn, and T. S. Baker, “Cell Recognition and Entry by Rhino- and Enteroviruses,”
Virology 269, 239-247 (2000).
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membrane, resulting in structural changes that open a
channel for translocation of, for example, the enzymatic
subunit of a protein toxin.  Understanding the detailed
invasion mechanism could provide the insight to develop
entirely new ways to detect and treat.  In this case, new
membrane mimetic architectures and research tools that
can be used to directly study the invasion mechanisms
would help to develop that understanding.  For example,
the use of neutron or x-ray reflectometry and low angle
diffraction to study protein toxins interacting with natural
receptors at the surface of a fluid phospholipid bilayers
could help in developing a more detailed understanding of
host-pathogen interactions.41 There are a number if other
imaging (e.g., scanning probe microscopy42 and various
electron microscopies) and spectroscopic techniques
(above) that could also shed light on host-pathogen 
interactions.  Single molecule spectroscopic and imaging
methods have recently been developed that allow real-time
imaging of the entire process of viral attack, invasion, and
control, providing valuable kinetic data as a complement
to these structural studies of the mechanism.
Synthesis and Study of Molecular Prophylactics 
and Therapeutics
Materials with molecular recognition moieties that are
attached to carrier vehicles could provide excellent drug
delivery systems for pathogens either in vivo as a thera-
peutic or in solution as a decontaminant.43 These same
materials could also be used to detect and image disease
by incorporating imaging molecules or materials (e.g.,
radionuclides and magnetic or fluorescent molecules).
Functionalized polymers and self-assembled structures
(e.g., liposomes, liposome-coated particles, micelles, den-
drimers, and cage structures) have the properties to physi-
cally and/or chemically carry therapeutic agents to the
pathogen.  Cell or tissue-targeting molecules attached to
these or other materials could offer the targeting as well as
release mechanism for drug delivery.  It has recently been
possible to select peptides and single chain antibodies that
both target specific cell/tissue types and also effect the
translocation of phage particles across the cell membrane.
These molecules are obtained using phage display methods
where the selection pressure requires both recognition and
endocytosis and are remarkable in their specificity in 
targeting specific cell or tissue types and in being able to
distinguish between healthy and sick cells.  Schemes to
link these cell/tissue targeting molecules with the drug
delivery particles must also be further developed.
Moreover, these hybrid materials that couple cell/tissue
targeting molecules with drug-, gene-, or imaging- containing
particles must be made to be stealthy in the vascular system.
In the future, it may also be possible to design and fabricate
nano-structured hybrid materials where highly specific
recognition events between the cell/tissue targeting mole-
cules and the targeted cells/tissues triggers the generation
of a measurable signal or the activation and release of
therapeutic agents.
Synthetic agents that can neutralize the pathogen by
mimicking the target receptor or docking area at the cell
surface could significantly reduce the risk of infection.  To
address this area, an in-depth understanding of the modus
operandi of the pathogen must be addressed.  Structural
analyses of biotoxins, viral particles, and organisms on
lipid membranes should be probed at the nanoscale and in
real time.  Techniques of relevant use include scanning
probes, neutron and light scattering, and modeling simula-
tions.  By thoroughly characterizing the path of pathogen
attack, weaknesses in its cell invasive mechanism will
become clear.  Through this effort, small molecule reagents
could be developed to attack the pathogen during its cellular
invasion, as well as decoys prepared with cell surface mimics.
41 K. J. Kjaer, C. A. Als-Nielsen, L. A. Helm, Laxhuber, and H. Möhwald. “Ordering in Lipid Monolayers Studied by Synchrotron X-ay Diffraction and
Fluorescence Microscopy,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 58:2224-2227 (1987). 
42 J. Mou, J. Yang, Z. J. Shao, “Atomic Force Microscopy of Cholera Toxin B-oligomers Bound to Bilayers of Biologically Relevant Lipids,” Mol. Biol.
248, 507-512 (1995).
43 M. A. Barry, W. J. Dover, and S. A. Johnston, “Towards Cell-Targeting Gene-Therapy Vectors: Selection of Cell-Binding Peptides from Random
Peptide Presenting Phage Libraries,” Nature Medicine, 2, 299-305 (1996).
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4.4.1 Protection
Devices and systems are required to protect at-risk people,
animals, crops, and material from the adverse impacts
associated with biological threat agents.  The need to 
protect-to-warn to facilitate protection of people is dis-
cussed in previous sections.  The risk of infectious disease
also extends to animals (e.g., impact on security dogs
employed to protect facilities) and materials (e.g.,
microorganisms released into fuel storage systems can
cause significant adverse impacts).   
Functional devices are available to remove biological
threat agents from air and water, and the agents can be
killed in foods.  However, the current protective equipment
suffers from significant practical limitations, in particular
for protection of large populations and indoor spaces.
Limitations are associated with excessive unit costs (e.g.,
high efficiency particulate filters), operational costs (e.g.,
fitting and certification of respirators), and impairment of
function (e.g., respiratory burden of negative pressure 
protective masks).  Aspects of the critical infrastructure
are at risk from microorganisms that can degrade or 
interfere with industrial and other large-scale processes
(e.g., fuel storage).  
Research has been conducted to incrementally improve
protective equipment along traditional lines of inquiry.
However, advances in BES areas of research suggest great
advances in protective equipment can be realized as
described below.  
Individual Protection
There is a clear need for advanced materials from which
to construct next-generation personnel protection equip-
ment (PPE).  For example, considerable waste could be
eliminated by designing HEPA filter canisters that contain
a color indicator to indicate when the filter has reached a
conservative limit of capacity upon exposure to biological
(and chemical) agents.  Such an indicator could also provide
the user with an additional degree of confidence that the
filter was performing its function.  The indicator would
preferably be a colorimetric scheme (e.g., blue to red) that
allows a distinct and rapid assessment of the material’s
state.  The color-change mechanism should be linked to a
specific chemical recognition scheme that is activated at a
threshold value.  More than one color-changing material
specific to different agents could be incorporated into the
filters to provide additional information to the user about
the environment he was exposed to.
New materials for protective outer garments are especially
needed.  Even the more durable military garments must be
discarded after exposure to agents, as there is no means of
assessing the remaining protective capacity of the suits
(short of sensory detection of the suit no longer function-
ing!).  SBCCOM is already investigating membrane tech-
nologies for the next-generation JSLIST suit, and DOE’s
materials research programs could accelerate this develop-
ment through the development of specialized polymers, as
well as coating fabrics or other textiles with reactive sur-
faces of either chemical or enzymatic nature that could
detoxify CB agents on contact (e.g., Tiller et al. at MIT
recently reported that certain polymers, such as HexylPVP,
can kill 95% of bacteria on contact).  Materials that can
enzymatically cleave amide bonds could neutralize the
majority of biotoxins by degrading them to small inactive
pieces.  Studies of the surface structure of whole organisms
or viral particles, on the other hand, could provide insights
into means of inactivating pathogens using unique
chemistries or materials to inactivate them via cross 
linking or synthetic enzymatic processes that change the
organism/particle coat characteristics.
Collective Protection
The terrorist dispersal of B. anthracis spores through the
U.S. mail system, contaminating USPS facilities, the Hart
Technology Need Present Problem
Protect people, animals,
crops, and living spaces.
Current approaches not able
to meet practical needs of
large populations and indoor
spaces.
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Senate Office Building, and other buildings through
which the mail passed and was opened, revealed a new
mode for deployment of biological agents.  HVAC systems
as currently designed also make it difficult to prevent 
re-aerosolization of settled agent, and hinder decontami-
nation efforts.  Immediate measures have been taken to
decontaminate mail, and mail handlers have been advised
to scrutinize mail for indications that might suggest suspi-
cious contents.  These measures are clearly reactionary,
and active measures to detect and prevent the spread of
biological contamination are necessary.  Such protective
measures would also be applicable to transportable shelters
and mobile platforms.
Respiratory protection, as described above, is largely
accomplished through the use of HEPA filtration given
current technology.  In the case of buildings, new
approaches to air filtration, from the design of more effec-
tive air handling and prefilters, to advanced materials to
increase the duty cycle and durability of the filter matrix
are necessary.   Selective filtration materials may be desir-
able to control influent air, along with recirculation within
a building or work area.  Such materials could also find
use in the physical handling of mail and packages to pro-
vide worker protection.  The use of novel reactive or
absorptive materials that would inactivate any biological
agent on contact would represent a quantum leap over
current technology.  These materials would also have the
collateral benefit of providing solutions to so-called “sick
building syndrome,” which is caused by a variety of fungi,
especially Stachybotris spp.   This problem is so endemic
and difficult to combat in the U.S. that many homeown-
ers’ insurance policies specifically exclude coverage for
this problem.  This also represents a significant compo-
nent of the problem in the workplace.
4.4.2 Decontamination and Remediation
In the event of a release of biothreat agents, decontamina-
tion of people, surfaces, and spaces will be required to
facilitate crisis response and consequence management.
Decontamination will limit spread of the biohazard and
facilitate prompt medical treatment to save lives.  Following
resolution of the incident, remediation of residual hazards
will be required to return property, equipment, and personal
belongings, at an acceptable level of risk, to owners.  
Operational requirements for decontamination and reme-
diation are associated with identification and quantification
of hazard levels, and removal and/or killing of microor-
ganisms.  Biological threat agents (e.g., spores and some
viruses) can be extremely stable in the environment, and
contamination may be widespread and of low concentra-
tion.  In addition, microorganisms may be stabilized
against environmental stresses to enhance their effectiveness.
Development of reactive chemicals and materials that kill
microorganisms and have acceptable levels of environ-
mental, health, and material risk has not been achieved. 
Spaces to be decontaminated/sterilized range from large
outdoor and indoor areas to complicated building ventila-
tion systems.  Materials requiring treatment range from
construction materials to high-value art work (e.g., Senate
Hart Building).  Contaminated and infected people pose
additional challenges.  Current decontamination and ster-
ilization agents and application equipment do not provide
effective, efficient, and environmentally benign decontam-
ination and remediation capabilities to address biothreats.  
Fundamental scientific issues must be pursued to develop
required capabilities described above.  Research needs
reside within many of the focus areas of the BES program.
Of principal interest are scientific advances that will allow
large-scale inexpensive production of effective materials that
are highly specific in their destruction of microorganisms.
Potential methods for the decontamination of sensitive
Technology Need Present Problem
Biological decontamination
of people, surfaces, and
buildings.
Need to develop decontami-
nation approaches that are
effective, efficient, environ-
mentally benign, and not
harmful to humans or 
materials.
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equipment and valuable art include supercritical CO2,
environmentally friendly solvent wash systems, thermal
approaches, and plasma approaches.  For ductwork and
other “hard to reach” places, methods to vaporize or
encapsulate existing or newly developed noncorrosive
chemistries or the development or identification of non-
corrosive gases is needed.  These chemistries may be
agent-specific, since the primary use would be for facility
restoration.  Methods could be developed for deactivation
and destruction of agents rapidly by solid matrices for
remediation of bulk agents.  This could include methods
such as reactive nanoparticles, reactive microparticles,
adsorption, and highly reactive surface chemistries.  
Encapsulating Materials
Many objects that may be contaminated, such as desktops,
chairs, large machines (e.g., letter sorters, etc.), and fixed
equipment, are too large to be quickly and efficiently
decontaminated.  In addition, many biocides may also be
toxic or have damaging effects on objects being treated
(e.g., oxidation, depolymerization, etc.).  Thus, a simple
inert material that can quickly and fully encapsulate an
object to contain a diverse array of biological threats is
highly desirable.  The problem with many current materials
like polyurethane foam is that they are too porous to be
effective in containing spores.  The ideal encapsulating
material would be inert, transparent, thin, resilient to 
normal handling, applied as an aerosol, and easily applied
by a first responder.  Plastics and polymers research will
find application in this area.
Irradiation
Microwave irradiation would become a viable technique
for destroying Bacillus anthracis or other bacterial spores
if the spores were found to have absorption lines in the
few GHz region.  Such specific absorption lines would
then couple power into the spore, in analogy with the
2.45 GHz line of water exploited in microwave cooking.
Research is required to determine if bacterial spores do
have such absorption bands.  If this were the case, then
radio frequency (RF) power sources with relatively low
powers of about 10 kW could potentially provide an effec-
tive method for selectively destroying bacterial spores.
In the case of a federal need for sterilization of a significant
mail stream using electron irradiation, BES research expertise
in the design of specialized linear accelerators could be
brought to bear on this problem.  There are a number of
approaches, requiring R&D, that could provide sources
superior to those presently available including, for example,
(1) an integrated sheet-beam-klystron and linac that would
provide a very compact device using sheet electron beam
technology to spread the energy dissipation over larger areas
than a conventional round beam, thus allowing higher
average powers to be reached before destruction of the
irradiated mail and (2) magnetron driven systems that
would result in low-cost, very robust linear accelerators
suitable for widespread deployment.
Nanoparticle Fluorescence
High affinity ligands, with an attached reporter, in a nano-
material structure may be used for identification of surface
contamination to guide decontamination treatment.
Success of this effort will require directed synthesis of
highly specific binding agents, which are attached to
nano-structures.  The process must be amenable to large-
quantity, low-cost manufacturing.  
Laser-Induced Fluorescence from Semiconductor
Nanoparticles
This area of research encompasses surface functionalized
semiconductor quantum dot particles equipped with speci-
fied bulk optical properties for interacting with external
electromagnetic fields generated by lasers.  The surfaces
are functionalized for selective binding to cell membranes
or pathogens.44 One use of these luminescent semicon-
44 M. Y. Han, X. H. Gao, J. Z. Su, and S. Nie, “Quantum-Dot-Tagged Microbeads for Multiplexed Optical Coding of Biomolecules,” Nature
Biotechnology 19, 631-635 (2001).
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ductor nanoparticles is to label cell membranes, organelles,
or cytoplasmic molecules for the purpose of imaging the
cell structure.  They have advantages over conventional
fluorescent molecular probes, including ease of synthesis,
broadband absorption, narrowband emission, and wave-
length selection by quantum size effects.45,46 An array of
such nanoparticles tailored to emit at selected discrete
wavelengths can be used to identify pathogens, for exam-
ple, in microfluidic systems in real time in a field setting
for evaluating residual agent levels and hence risk.
Reactive Chemistry
Develop noncorrosive, materials compatible, nontoxic,
and environmentally friendly oxidative or enzymatic
chemical and biological decontaminants (both aqueous
and nonaqueous) to replace current toxic and corrosive
formulations for use in first response and facility restora-
tion.  These formulations should be capable of neutraliz-
ing CBW agents at material-friendly pH of 7.5–9.5 by
either oxidation or displacement reactions yielding
acceptable reaction products.  The decontaminants should
be effective against standard CBW agents, TICs, and
TIMs, and other biological pathogens.  Formulations
should be inexpensive and easily deployable in the field. 
Agent Targeted Remediation
Advances in ligand design and synthesis, when combined
with reactive chemistries and novel materials hold the
potential for development of decontamination systems
that are selectively targeted at biological threat agents and
that can self-activate upon recognition of the target sub-
strate.  Development of this capability would require
interdisciplinary basic research and cross-functional 
coordination between researchers engaged in ligand and
decontaminant development.  Bacterial chemotaxis is an
example of a simple chemoreceptor system that directly
activates a response.  A molecular system that contains a
specific receptor that then activates the release of a 
biocide is an exciting possibility and within the realm 
of the Nanoscience and Nanotechnology programs.
4.5 Research Needs
A number of themes that emerged from the discussion of
scientific issues and opportunities build on the areas of
strength in the BES research program. 
4.5.1 Scientific Issues
Molecular Recognition
Molecular recognition is an underlying research theme for
almost every aspect of biothreat reduction discussed.
There are research needs for ligand design in terms of
specificity, desired affinities and kinetics of binding,
robustness, and manufacturability.  Biological and abiotic
ligands are relevant.  The structural biology of receptors
and complexes with receptors will be important in detec-
tion and in therapies designed to block infection by mim-
icking key receptors required for pathogen invasion and
proliferation. 
Integrated Molecular Systems
Sensing biological agents and medical diagnostics depend
upon being able to integrate recognition with signaling
and amplification.  Technologies for detecting small toxins
such as aflatoxin and small peptides are needed. 
45 M. Bruchez, M. Moronne, P. Gin, S. Weiss, and A. P. Alivisatos, “ Semiconductor Nanocrystals as Fluorescent Biological Labels,” Science 281, 2013-2016 (1998). 
46 M. D. Barnes, A. Mehta, T. G. Thundat, R. N. Bhargava, V. Chhabra, and B. Kulkarni “On-Off Blinking and Multiple Bright States of Single Europium
Ions in Eu3+:Y2O3 Nanocrystals,” Journal of Physical Chemistry B 104, 6099-6102 (2000).
R. M. Dickson, D. J. Norris, Y. L. Tzeng, and W. E. Moerner, “Three-Dimensional Imaging of Single Molecules Solvated in Pores of Poly(acrylamide) Gels,”
Science 274, 966-969 (1996). 
S. C. Hill, R. G. Pinnick, S. Niles, Y. L. Pan, S. Holler, R. K. Chang, J. Bottiger, B. T. Chen, C.S. Orr, and G. Feather, “Real-Time Measurement of 
Fluorescence Spectra from Single Airborne Biological Particles,” Field Analytical Chemistry and Technology 3, 221-239 (1999).
P. Karnchanaphanurach, H. Yang, T. M. Louie, L. Y. Xun,  and S. Xie, “Single-Molecule Conformational Dynamics of Proteins,” Biophysical Journal 80, 655 (2001).
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Interfacial Science
Like molecular recognition, interfacial science is an under-
lying theme of every aspect of biothreat reduction.  Nano-
bio interfaces, transport at interfaces, functional interfaces
through the attachment of recognition molecules, stability
of layered materials (phase control, adhesion), and trans-
port and fate of pathogens in the environment all depend
on understanding and advances in interfacial science.
Novel Materials
New materials with novel properties are needed for detec-
tion, diagnostics, protection, decontamination, and reme-
diation.  Nano-bio materials, hybrid materials and sys-
tems, self-organized materials, patterned surfaces, reactive
materials, molecular electronics will all be important.
Nanoscience and Technology
Detection, diagnostic, decontamination, and remediation
technologies that build upon the principles of molecular
recognition, signaling, and amplification require tools for
studying nanostructures and nanostructured materials,
Spectroscopy
Spectroscopic tools will be needed as sensitive, specific
probes of molecular and nano-scale structures, for probing
interfacial phenomena, as stand-off detection systems, for
sensing, for single particle analysis, etc.
Computing, Modeling, and Simulation
Molecular dynamics simulations will be important for
understanding recognition, collective phenomena, materi-
als properties, and interfacial interactions.  High-speed
data analysis is important for analyzing array data, data
from distributed sensors or trigger systems.  Intelligent
control systems to coordinate multiple components of
integrated sensor systems, or networks of sensors will be
important to efficient operation of complex systems 
triggered by sentinel detectors, and to interpretation of
responses from multiple sensors.
Advanced Instrumentation
New advanced instrumentation is needed for materials and
interfacial characterizations, high-resolution bio-imaging,
mass spectrometry (precision, portable, high-mass 
analysis), and stand-off detection using laser systems,
spectroscopy, or hyperspectral imaging.
Integrated Devices
Integrated devices require research and development in
microfluidics and nanofluidics, optoelectronics, microelec-
tronics, MEMS, and a wide range of functional materials.
Achieving these integration goals will require new experi-
mental tools and modeling approaches that are able to
address materials interfaces, energy and information 
transfer, device manufacturing, and materials assembly.  
4.5.2 Research Environment and Infrastructure
Requirements 
Addressing the R&D needs of such a complex problem as
biothreat reduction requires an unusual hybrid environment
that includes elements from both academic, industry, and
defense-related research environments.  For example, the
best scientists and technologists must be attracted; there
must be mechanisms to support large, cross-disciplinary
teams from across the community; and major facilities for
molecular and materials characterization are needed in a
research environment that is juxtaposed with secure envi-
ronments.  Specific to countering the biological terrorist
threat is the need for a biology expertise that can interact
with physical and chemical sciences as well as engineering
and computational science.  
Special Facilities and Large-Scale User Facilities
Synchrotron and neutron scattering facilities will be needed
for materials characterization and structural biology.
State-of-the-art macromolecular crystallography that can
be carried out possibly in a secure location or with Biosafety
Level 3 (BSL-3) capabilities might be an asset to consider
at one of the synchrotron facilities.  A “biosurety” program
and specialized facilities for handling pathogens, such as
Biological Safety level-2 and -3 laboratories are critical.
All of these elements are contained within the DOE 
complex of national laboratories.  Mechanisms should be
put in place to make the appropriate facilities available to
these teams of research scientists and engineers.
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Nanoscale Science Research Centers
Facilities for nanoscience and technology, including fabri-
cation, will be key for many aspects of biothreat reduc-
tion.  The Nanoscale Science Research Centers will also
be centers of excellence for interfacial science, synthesis
of nanomaterials, self-assembly, novel materials, biomimetics,
and more.  
4.5.3 Relationships with Other Programs
The DOE Basic Energy Science program is partnered with
other major programs that bring critical expertise to the
problem of reducing the threat from bioterrorism.  For
example, there are programs in Environmental
Management (EM), Super Computing (ASCR), and
Biological and Environmental Research (BER).  In 
particular, a partnership with the BER and its genomic 
science capabilities will be a critical.  Through the Joint
Genome Institute, the department has highly competitive
genomic sequencing capabilities in terms of both cost and
throughput.  These sequencing capabilities can provide a
wealth of information on human, plant, and animal pathogens
and the host systems they attack.  The BER/ASCR initia-
tive, Genomes to Life, explicitly targets genome scale
analyses that will yield systems-level information on the
composition and function of the biochemical components,
networks, and pathways that carry out the fundamental
processes governing life.  The initiative will also develop
the computational tools and infrastructure for integrating
and understanding the vast amount of data that will be
generated and then used to gain predictive understanding
of the fundamental processes in biology.  This initiative
promises to be a rich source of information on protein
complexes, regulatory networks, and microbial communi-
ties that will significantly enhance the potential for success
in the material and chemical science programs within BES
efforts that will focus on specific bio-molecular assemblies
and interfacial systems for biothreat reduction technolo-
gies.  The BER program in climate modeling and atmos-
pherics is also an important potential partner in the race
to develop the best defense technologies against biothreats.   
The NNSA, within DOE, can be a powerful ally with BES
in the fight against bio-terrorism.  The mission of the
NNSA’s Chemical and Biological National Security Program
(CBNP) is to develop, demonstrate, and deliver technolo-
gies and systems that will help the nation prepare for, 
recognize, and respond to chemical or biological attacks
on the civilian population.  The focus of this program is
on developing new technologies that can be deployed on
a 3–5 year time scale.  In addition, the NNSA’s nonprolif-
eration mission has been expanded explicitly to include
chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.  The
longer term R&D focus of BES, and BER, will be important
fuel for CBNP’s future generations of technology development.  
It will be key for DOE to develop strategic alliances with
other offices or agencies with expertise and research and
development capabilities for different aspects of anti-
bioterrorism.  Perhaps most importantly among these will
be the Health and Human Services’ National Institutes of
Health (NIH) and Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), the Department of Defense, and the
Department of Agriculture.  Some interactions have
already formed and only need to be strengthened and
solidified.  It will also be key to interface with the ultimate
users of the technologies being developed in order to
understand the operational needs, such as first responders,
public health, Department of Transportation, Immigration
and Naturalization, military, and law enforcement. 
4.5.4 Dual-Use Opportunities
The detection, identification, medical diagnostics, and
clean up capabilities needed to protect our citizens against
the bio-terrorist threat will also serve to strengthen our
public health infrastructure in general and provide increased
protection against naturally emerging infectious diseases.
Also, the application of these technologies to agricultural
threats will aid in protecting our food supplies and ensure
its safety.
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The goal of this workshop was to identify the critical 
scientific issues and opportunities where basic research
supported by the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of
Basic Energy Sciences can have an impact on our nation’s
ability to counter terrorism. The two days of workshop
presentations and discussions clearly showed how many 
of the research directions currently supported by BES are
either having an impact or may potentially have a direct
impact on important technology needs for countering 
terrorism.  In addition, the facilities and scientific capabili-
ties that BES supports at the DOE national laboratories
and universities were identified as having extremely high
value to our nation’s war on terrorism.  It was concluded
that the DOE national laboratories and the BES special
and user facilities can be expected to play a continuing 
and increasing role in our nation’s efforts to counter 
terrorism.
In this final section of the report, we turned to the advice
provided by our plenary speakers to develop a set of rec-
ommendations that will help BES and other basic research
organizations further increase the impact of their research
capabilities on problems associated with countering terrorism.
▲ Invest Strategically – Here, we focus on Cross-Cutting
Research that has the potential to have an impact on
a broad set of technology needs, thereby providing
the greatest return on the research investment.
▲ Build Team Efforts – We addressed team efforts in
two contexts:  (1) Research Environments and
Infrastructures that encourage and enable cross-
disciplinary science and technology teams to explore
and integrate new scientific discoveries and (2)
Exploring Relationships with Other Programs that
will build connections between scientific advances
and those groups responsible for technology 
development and implementation.
▲ Consider Dual Use – We have identified areas of
research that present significant Dual-Use
Opportunities for application to countering terrorism
and other complementary technology needs.
5.1  Cross-Cutt ing Research
Sections 2–4 of this report provide detailed descriptions
of critical scientific issues and their relevance to technology
needs associated with Radiological and Nuclear, Chemical,
and Biological threats.  From these underlying scientific
issues, a number of cross-cutting research themes emerged.
Recommendation: We recommend continued or increased
funding for the following research directions since they
underpin many technologies that have high probability
to impact our nation’s ability to counter terrorism.
Novel Materials – A wide range of new and nanophase
materials will be needed as catalysts, sensors, semicon-
ductor detectors and solid-state lasers, membranes,
lightweight structures, and molecular electronic and
optical materials.  Capabilities are needed in synthesis
and characterization of self- and directed assembly,
nano-bio hybrids, complex functional materials, and
patterned and templated surfaces.  Characterization
will require a suite of tools ranging from large user-
based x-ray and neutron scattering facilities to novel
local probes.  The materials development will require
underpinnings in predictive modeling and theory.
Interfacial Chemistry – Fundamental theoretical and
experimental tools and models to probe molecular
interactions with solid/vapor and solid/liquid interfaces
will be critical to development of new selective sensors,
transport and fate models, development of improved
separations chemistry, and development of new protec-
tive barrier and catalytic materials for protective cloth-
ing and toxin neutralization.  Research challenges
5 Workshop Conclusions and
Recommendations
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include development of accurate thermodynamic and
kinetic models for interfacial behavior and ultra-fast
local probes to study interfacial molecular interactions.
Chemical and Molecular Recognition – Molecule/ion
selective receptors could have an impact on a wide
range of detection, protection, and response technology
needs.  Progress will require the development and
application of new theoretical and experimental tools as
well as new combinations of tools and expertise spanning
physics, chemistry, and biology.  It will be important to
develop integrated receptors that provide pathways 
for transducing recognition events to surrounding 
structures and devices.
Laser and Mass Spectroscopy – Laser spectroscopy is
expected to play a key role in stand-off detection and
integrated systems.  Research needs include new, com-
pact, solid-state laser sources, semiconductor/biological
interfaces, luminescent nanoparticles, and improved
data analysis and data mining algorithms.  Mass spec-
troscopy offers the ultimate in specific recognition, but
investment is needed to develop more compact and
portable approaches.
Nanoscale Science – Many critical scientific issues and
challenges associated with each threat area are rooted
at the nanoscale behavior of materials and interfaces.
New tools for fabricating nanoscale structures, probing
structure and properties at the nanoscale, modeling
properties and behavior, and integrating across multiple-
length scales will be needed.  The Nanoscale Science
Research Centers being developed by BES can play a
critical role in providing the tools and research envi-
ronment needed to address these critical problems.
Miniaturized Integrated Systems – Miniaturization and
integration research themes underlie future ability to
develop inexpensive and reliable devices for first
responders.  Critical research issues include microfluid
and nanofluid transport, surface treatment and func-
tionalization, combination of top-down and bottom-up
fabrication techniques, and coupling of nanoscale and
continuum models for mass and energy transport.
Computing, Modeling, and Theory – Reliable predic-
tive models will be required for all research directions
identified in this report.  The capabilities must span
from large-scale continuum models for fate and trans-
port to quantum chemical models that can predict
molecular recognition events.  The challenge is to not
to just span these multiple length scales, but to provide
continuity between the multiple techniques needed to
cover these multiple length and time domains.
5.2 Research Environments and Infrastructures
The presentations and discussions at this meeting have
made it abundantly clear that progress toward countering
terrorism will require the formation of science and tech-
nology teams that combine multiple scientific disciplines
and span from basic research to systems engineering and
manufacturing.  Given this need for broad research and
technology teams, it is important to explore new opportu-
nities to improve the coupling between academic, national
laboratory, and industrial research and development com-
munities.  The workshop participants agreed that the
DOE national laboratories, in general, and the highly col-
laborative research facilities such as the Combustion
Research Facility, the Environmental Molecular Sciences
Laboratory, or the newly initiated Nanoscale Science
Research Centers, in particular, could provide a fertile
environment for nucleating these new research teams and
associated collaborative science and technology projects.
Recommendation: We recommend the development of new
collaborative programs that can help to stimulate the 
formation of, and provide needed resources for, cross-disci-
plinary and multi-institutional collaborations focused on
critical needs for countering terrorism.
The workshop discussions also pointed out the impor-
tance of DOE specialized and user facilities.  Existing BES
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scientific user facilities at DOE laboratories and universities,
coupled with those currently under development, such as
the Nanoscale Science Research Centers, will provide
many important capabilities needed to address critical 
scientific issues associated with threats of terrorism.
However, we recognize that no single institution possesses
all the required assets to address these complex problems.
It will be important that research and technology teams
are able to take full advantage of the spectrum of 
capabilities available at the DOE national laboratories 
and university-based programs. 
Recommendation: We recommend continued investment in
DOE specialized and user facilities and explore new 
mechanisms that enable research teams to “mix and match”
capabilities needed for larger collaborative projects.
The topic of radiological and nuclear threats presents a
unique situation in which the Office of Science has the
stewardship role for fundamental research in these areas.
Resources allocated to these areas have, in general, been
decreasing over the last three decades, resulting in a net
loss of personnel and aging infrastructure, including a lack
of modern equipment.  These problems are not only acute
at the national laboratories, but are also reflected at uni-
versities where faculty positions and studies in radiochem-
istry and nuclear chemistry have been rapidly declining.
Recommendation: We recommend exploring approaches
to stabilize or increase the basic research funding in
radiation effects and nuclear and radiological materials
programs particularly as they apply to terrorist threat
reduction and defense programs.
5.3 Relat ionships with Other  Programs
The task of countering terrorism provides challenges that
are extremely complex and broad.  Advice from our plena-
ry speakers and the results of our own technical and scien-
tific discussions served to reinforce the point that no one
organization or federal agency will be able to provide all
of the tools and capabilities that are needed to meet this
challenge.  This report cites examples that show how
pooling the strengths of various organizations within the
DOE itself could provide greater opportunity to address
the complex problems associated with countering terrorism.
In addition, it will be important for DOE to develop strategic
alliances with other federal agencies whose missions and
capabilities strongly complement those of the DOE.
The examples cited in this report range from agreements
that would provide the research community with appropriate
access to specialized facilities for handling chemical and
biological toxins to alliances that would facilitate the
communication of new scientific developments and accel-
erate their application to important counter terrorism
applications.
Recommendation: We recommend evaluation of comple-
mentary relationships with other organizations and 
agencies and, where appropriate, work to develop agreements
that facilitate the formation of multi-organizational teams
and the sharing of capabilities that will improve our
nation’s ability to counter the threat of terrorism.
5.4 Dual-Use Opportun i t i es
Many examples cited in this report show how critical 
science and technology challenges associated with coun-
tering terrorism could also impact important needs in
energy, national defense, environment, and human health
care.  However, the key requirements for the success of
any of these dual-use opportunities are as follows: (1) a
clear understanding of the technology needs and (2) an
effective pathway to move from laboratory / bench-top
demonstrations and prototypes to low-cost, manufacturable
technologies that can be widely implemented.  In fact, the
key requirements serve to further reinforce the value of
strong technical teams and complementary relationships
with other organizations, especially including industry.
The simple fact is that no new scientific discovery or
technological solution will benefit our nation’s counter-
terrorism effort or any other important national need if 
we are unable to translate that new science into useful 
and cost-effective technology.
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